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

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THE WRITINGS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

VOL. VII.

THE

WRITINGS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON;

BEING HIS

CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE,

SELECTED AND PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS;

WITH

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

NOTES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

By JARED SPARKS.

VOLUME VII.

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COMPRISING

CORRESPONDENCE

AND

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS

RELATING TO

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

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CORRESPONDENCE

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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 31 March, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose the report of the proceedings of the commissioners appointed to meet at Amboy, the 9th instant, for the purpose of settling a general cartel, by which Congress will perceive, that the present attempt has been as unsuccessful as all the former, and from the same cause. In January I was honored with a letter from the minister of France, informing me of his having received advice from Europe, that the court of London, on account of the difficulty they found in procuring men, had instructed their commander-in-chief here to treat with us on a national footing, rather than fail to obtain a reinforcement to their army by the release of their prisoners in our hands. He added, that he had communicated this intelligence to Congress, and that Congress had requested him to transmit it to me, as a matter which ought materially to influence the measures we were about to take on the subject of an exchange.

Though I was strongly persuaded beforehand, that there was a mistake in his Excellency's information, and that the advantages to be reaped by the enemy from the proposed exchange would not be a sufficient inducement to a step of the nature it imported, which I took the liberty to signify to him, yet I thought it my duty to make the experiment, as well from motives of respect to the communication, as from the possibility of its being well founded. I therefore directed our commissioners to take every method to ascertain the enemy's views on this head, and, if the British commissioners did not come with national powers, to decline doing any thing with them in an official capacity; but, after satisfying themselves that nothing was to be effected on a larger scale, they were instructed to enter into private conversation on the terms of particular exchange. Their letter will show what was done in consequence. Congress will perceive, that their proposal was not accepted by the gentlemen on the other side, who insisted on the exchange being at all events extended to one half of the second division of the convention troops. This was a departure from the plan concerted between General Phillips and Colonels Magaw and Mathews. If Congress think that humanity requires or policy permits us to accede to the enemy's ultimatum, I shall be happy to execute their orders; but it is a point of so much delicacy and importance, that I cannot forbear earnestly requesting that I may be excused from deciding in it. On the one hand, the acquisition of so many men will be of great moment to the enemy, if they meet with success at the southward; on the other, I see not how we shall be able to maintain our officers in captivity, and the expense is no trifling consideration. I think it necessary to observe, that if the enemy's proposal should be accepted, it may be

June before the prisoners can be delivered up; but perhaps it will be judged advisable to delay a determination till the probable issue of southern affairs is a little unfolded. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 31 March, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

I was about to fulfil the promise made to you in my last, of writing fully on the subject of your letter and other matters, when your obliging favor of the 22d came to hand. The hint contained in it was too seasonable and striking for me not to derive a lesson from

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* It turned out, that the enemy had not the remotest idea of treating on national grounds. Perhaps it was not to be expected; and yet, as there could be no fair exchange except on terms of equality, it would seem that the difficulty lay more in the form of words, than in the substance of the thing. The national faith was as much plighted on one side as the other, and the King was as much bound in honor to confirm the contracts of his generals, as Congress was to sanction those of General Washington. The difference was, that Congress pledged themselves beforehand to abide by his acts, whereas the British commanders took care so to express all the instructions to their commissioners as to make it appear, that these instructions emanated from no higher authority than themselves. If a consent to treat on national grounds, as it was called, would seem to imply the political independence of the Americans, it should have been likewise considered, that the course pursued was a standing reproach upon them as rebels; and if the former was unpalatable to one party, the latter must have been equally so to the other. It was a case, therefore, which required mutual concessions, especially as both parties, in regard to the matter in hand, stood on equal grounds, had the same interests at stake, and would be equally benefited or injured by the result. It was not a subject in which political considerations ought to have interfered. Justice and humanity had superior claims. There might and should have been an explicit understanding, that agreements for the exchange of prisoners should have no bearing on the other relations between the parties, and that the great points at issue should rest on precisely the same foun-

it. I shall, therefore, as there is danger attending written communications of private sentiments, and my letters to the body of which you are a member will convey every occurrence and information of a public nature within my sphere of action, content myself with acknowledging and thanking you for the letters you may do me the favor to write.

I am much indebted to you for your communications from the southward. I feel many anxious moments on account of the Carolinas, which are increased by the daily diminution of our force in this quarter, the little

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dation, as if no occurrences of this sort had taken place. Upon this basis there could never have been any substantial political obstacles in the way of an equitable exchange of prisoners. But there were reasons, perhaps, why neither party was inclined to propose such a basis, or even to adopt it if proposed.

Respecting the negotiation for a cartel at Amboy, mentioned above, General Phillips wrote as follows to Lord George Germain.

"This attempt for a general cartel and exchange has proved ineffectual, as every former one had done, founded on an objection to the powers given by Sir Henry Clinton; and your Lordship will directly observe the great object of the American Congress is to mark some public act, in which General Washington may be concerned with Sir Henry Clinton in character of equality with Great Britain, on principles of nation against nation at war; and the positive declaration of the American commissioners on this matter fully evinces the fact, and that a general cartel can never possibly take place on any other ground, which it may be imagined will never be suffered by Great Britain. In a number of attempts to release the troops of convention, the matter has broken off under several descriptions. At one time the American Congress would not exchange the troops in corps; at another they were willing to exchange private soldiers to a certain number, but it was never understood what number or in what manner. Interested as I have been, it has led me to hold conversations with a number of American officers, proving to them that the troops of convention stood under a particular description, and that exchanging the officers without the men against American officers prisoners of war could not be considered as equal, the American officers going to an immediate activity of service, and the convention officers not doing so, as the regiments to which they belonged would still be in captivity; and, however eligible and convenient for the officers themselves, it would be of no advantage to the King's service." — *New York, March 25th.*

prospect of getting it augmented in time to answer any valuable purpose, and other obvious embarrassments. We are now beginning to experience the fatal consequences of the policy, which delayed calling upon the States for their quotas of men to a period when they ought to have been joined, that there might have been time for arranging and preparing them for the duties of the field. What to do for the southern States, without involving consequences equally alarming in this quarter, I know not. The enemy are certainly preparing for another embarkation (from present appearances about two thousand five hundred men); but, as I expect a more particular account of this matter by to-morrow, I shall defer writing to Congress till then. With the most sincere regard and affection, I am, &c.*

* In replying to this letter, General Schuyler related the following incident as having occurred in Congress.

"General Greene addressed Congress in a letter of the 3d instant, wishing for their sense of his general conduct in the quartermaster's department. A resolution was proposed, that Congress had full confidence in his integrity and ability, and requesting his future exertions. This brought on much debate. Amendments were moved, and the house got into heats, and an adjournment was deemed necessary to give the members time to cool. A member, more zealous for the general's reputation than prudent, observed that he was an officer in whom the Commander-in-chief had the highest confidence, that he was the first of all the subordinate generals in point of military knowledge and ability, that in case of an accident happening to General Washington he would be the properest person to command the army, and *that General Washington thought so too.* Another observed, that he had a very high opinion of General Greene's military abilities, that he believed the Commander-in-chief had too, but that he believed no person on earth was authorized to say as much as those words implied. I mention this, that your Excellency may guard against any misapprehension, which this may occasion with your officers. General Greene will inform you who delivered the imprudent speech." — *April 5th.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 2 April, 1780.

Sir,

I have received intelligence, which seems to place it beyond doubt, that the enemy are about to make a further embarkation of troops from New York, and the common opinion is, that they are going to reinforce Sir Henry Clinton. Lord Rawdon's brigade, said to consist of his own regiment and of Brown's, Fanning's, and another corps, two Hessian regiments, the forty-second and another British, estimated in the whole at about two thousand five hundred rank and file, are the troops that will, according to report, make the embarkation. This intelligence, the probability there seems to be that the enemy will endeavour to push their operations with vigor at the southward, the weak state of our force there, and unhappily in this quarter also, have laid me under great embarrassments with respect to the conduct that ought to be pursued. In considering the point, a choice of difficulties occurs to our view. The southern States, it is to be apprehended, may require much support; and, while we attempt to afford it from hence, we run a serious risk in this quarter, from the facility with which the enemy, by the help of their fleet, can unite their force at any point where they find us weak. Congress will the better conceive in how delicate a situation we stand, when I inform them, that our whole operating force present on this and on the other side of the North River amounts to only ten thousand four hundred rank and file, of which about two thousand eight hundred will have completed their term of service by the last of May (two thirds by the end of this month), while the enemy's regular force at New York and its dependencies must amount, upon

a moderate calculation, to about eleven thousand rank and file. I enclose to Congress a list of the corps at New York, after the detachment which sailed with Sir Henry Clinton, taken from *Gaine's Register.* Our situation too is the more critical, from the impossibility of concentring our force, as well for want of the means of taking the field, as on account of the early period of the season.

The want also of a magazine of flour and salt provisions at West Point renders it the more necessary, that our covering force should be respectable; as, from this unlucky circumstance, which could not be prevented, the post in case of investiture might be exposed to great risk, at least if its relief depended much on a force to be collected. But, notwithstanding these objections, perhaps something should be hazarded here, relying on the internal strength of the country, for the purpose of giving further succour to the southern States, where there is not the same dependence. I shall therefore put the Maryland line, and the Delaware regiment, which acts with it, under marching orders immediately, and have directed provision to be made for transporting them as far as Philadelphia; and I propose that their march, if practicable, should commence on the sailing of the detachment from New York. But before the measure is carried into execution, I shall be happy to know the sense of Congress on its expediency. The consequences may be very important either way, and I wish to have their instructions for my government.

In case the detachment is to march, its ulterior proceedings and route from Philadelphia will depend on the orders, which Congress, or the Board of War by their directions, shall give; for it is impossible for me, under our circumstances, to give directions upon this

occasion. The quartermaster and commissary general are both in Philadelphia, and will exert themselves, I am persuaded, to carry into execution any plan for the transportation and accommodation of the troops, that may be judged most eligible, as far as it may be in their power. Baron de Kalb, who is now at the head of the Maryland division, will command the detachment in case it proceeds, and will set out to-morrow or the next day for Philadelphia, to assist and expedite the arrangements for its future movements. If the troops could embark without delay at the Head of Elk, and arrive safe in James River, it would not only be a great ease to them, but it would expedite their arrival at the southward, and prevent many desertions, which will probably happen if they march through their State. But how far this mode of proceeding may be eligible, I will not pretend to determine; as the enemy, in case they should be advised of it, which every precaution of secrecy would be necessary to prevent, might by sending armed vessels into the bay attempt to intercept them in their passage.

Major Lee's corps is under marching orders for the southward, of which I have advised the Board of War; and the commanding officer is directed to proceed with it, as soon as he adjusts with them the proper arrangements. I enclose to your Excellency an extract from Robertson's New York *American Gazette.* The intelligence, if true, is very important and interesting. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO BARON STEUBEN.

Morristown, 2 April, 1780.

MY DEAR BARON,

The propositions made by you to Congress for the arrangement of the army this campaign appear to me, upon the whole, best adapted to our circumstances, and especially since so much of the season has elapsed without entering upon it. I am glad the proposed incorporation has been suspended. I doubt, however, the practicability at this time of augmenting the cavalry or recruiting the additional men, from the circumstance you mentioned, the extreme distress of the treasury, which seems to be totally exhausted, and without sufficient resources for the current demands of the service. The present crisis is indeed perplexing beyond description, and it is infinitely difficult to prescribe a remedy.

When I approve your plan for the additional regiments, it is with one condition; that Congress can find means to provide for the officers, so as to put them upon an equal footing with the other parts of the army. If this cannot be done, they cannot continue in the service. I have incessant applications to this effect, and have just written again to Congress on the subject. If the situation of the officers cannot be made more tolerable, it will be preferable to dissolve those corps, incorporate the men with the State lines, and let the officers retire to be entitled to pay, subsistence, and the emoluments decreed at the end of the war. This will be a very bad expedient, if it cannot be avoided; but it is better than to leave the officers in such a state, that they must be miserable while they stay in the army; obliged in a little time, the greatest part of them, to

quit, while the corps for want of care will rapidly decline, and a number of good men be lost to the service.

Your anxiety on the score of southern affairs cannot exceed mine. The measure of collecting the whole force for the defence of Charleston ought no doubt to have been well considered before it was determined. It is putting much to hazard; but at this distance we can form a very imperfect judgment of its propriety or necessity. I have the greatest reliance on General Lincoln's prudence; but I cannot forbear dreading the event. Ill as we can afford a diminution of our force here, and notwithstanding the danger we run from the facility with which the enemy can concentrate their force at our weak points, besides other inconveniences, I have recommended to Congress to detach the Maryland division to reinforce the southern States. Though this detachment cannot in all probability arrive in season to be of any service to Charleston, it may assist to arrest the progress of the enemy and save the Carolinas.

My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond too much with yours. The prospect, my dear Baron, is gloomy, and the storm threatens. Not to have the anxieties you express, at the present juncture, would be not to feel that zeal and interest in our cause, by which all your conduct shows you to be actuated. But I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring every thing to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to difficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon them with more tranquillity than formerly. Those, which now present themselves, no doubt require vigorous exertions to overcome them, and I am far from despairing of doing it. Though I shall be happy to have the honor of seeing the French minister in camp, as soon as it may

be convenient to him, your reasons for persuading him to defer his journey awhile were good. I wish it were in my power to save him the trouble of the journey by paying him my respects in Philadelphia; but our present military situation, joined to other reasons, will not permit me to have that honor. I am very sensible, my dear Baron, to the obliging assurances of your regard, and I entreat you to believe there is a perfect reciprocity of sentiments, and that I am, with great consideration and the truest esteem, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 3 April, 1780.

SIR,

I have frequently had the honor to address Congress on the subject of those corps, which are unconnected with the lines of particular States. Satisfied of the numerous perplexities under which they labor, it is with pain and reluctance I trouble them with repeated representations of the same nature; but in the present case it is so indispensable that something should be done, that I cannot forbear the repetition, however disagreeable. The situation of the officers of these corps is absolutely insupportable. Unless something effectual can be done to make it more comfortable, it is impossible they can remain in the service. The resolutions of Congress for making them part of the State quotas has partial operation, and the benefit resulting to a few has only served to establish a contrast that embitters the sufferings of the rest. Nothing can be conceived more chagrining, than for an officer to see himself destitute of every necessary, while another, not only in the service of the same government, engaged in defending the

same cause, but even in the same regiment, and sometimes standing by his side in the same company, is decently if not amply provided. Enthusiasm alone can support him in a moment's perseverance; but even this principle must give way to a necessity so continued and hopeless. Daily applications are made to me to know whether there is a prospect of relief, always accompanied with a declaration, that it is impossible any longer to endure the extremities to which they are driven.

I entreat the attention of Congress to this matter. If there is no way to make provision for the officers, it would be better to dissolve the corps, incorporate the men with the regiments belonging to the State lines, and let the officers retire with pay and subsistence, and such other emoluments as may be enjoyed by others after the war. In their present state, they are actually suffering every inconvenience, in fruitless expectations of a remedy that will perhaps never come; those who have less resource, less zeal, or less fortitude, are resigning from day to day. A relaxation from care in the interior of the regiments must be a necessary consequence; and many valuable men will be gradually lost to the service, who might be saved. It is much better, therefore, that the expedient suggested should be adopted, than that things should remain as now circumstanced. But if it were possible to obviate this necessity, it were much to be wished, as it would preserve many of our best officers to the army, who would with infinite reluctance quit the field, while the defence of their country called for their services.

Before I conclude, I think it my duty to touch upon the general situation of the army at this juncture. It is absolutely necessary that Congress should be apprized of it, for it is difficult to foresee what may be the

result; and, as very serious consequences are to be apprehended, I should not be justified in preserving silence. There never has been a stage of the war, in which the dissatisfaction has been so general or alarming. It has lately, in particular instances, worn features of a very dangerous complexion. A variety of causes has contributed to this; the diversity in the terms of enlistments, the inequality of the rewards given for entering into the service, but still more the disparity in the provisions made by the several States for their respective troops. The system of State supplies, however dictated in the commencement by necessity, has proved in its operation pernicious beyond description. An army must be raised, paid, subsisted, and regulated upon an equal and uniform principle, or the confusion and discontents are endless. Little less than the dissolution of the army would have been long since the consequence of a different plan, had it not been for a spirit of patriotic virtue, both in officers and men, of which there are few examples, seconded by the unremitting pains that have been taken to compose and reconcile them to their situation. But these will not be able to hold out much longer against the influence of causes constantly operating, and every day with some new aggravation.

Some States, from their internal abilities and local advantages, furnish their troops pretty amply, not only with clothing, but with many little comforts and conveniences; others supply them with some necessaries, but on a more contracted scale; while others have it in their power to do little or nothing at all. The officers and men in the routine of duty mix daily and compare circumstances. Those, who fare worse than others, of course are dissatisfied, and have their resentment excited, not only against their own State, but against the

Confederacy. They become disgusted with a service that makes such injurious distinctions. The officers resign, and we have now scarcely a sufficient number left to take care even of the fragments of corps which remain. The men have not this resource. They murmur, brood over their discontent, and have lately shown a disposition to enter into seditious combinations.

A new scene is now opening, which I fear will be productive of more troublesome effects, than any thing that has hitherto taken place. Some of the States have adopted the measure of making good the depreciation of the money to their troops, as well for the past as for the future. If this does not become general, it is so striking a point, that the consequences must be unspeakably mischievous. I enter not into the propriety of this measure in the view of finance, but confine myself to its operation on the army. Neither do I mean to insinuate, that the liberality of particular States has been carried to a blamable length. The evil I mean to point out is the inequality of the different provisions, and this is inherent in the present system. It were devoutly to be wished, that a plan could be devised by which every thing relating to the army could be conducted on a general principle, under the direction of Congress. This alone can give harmony and consistence to our military establishment, and I am persuaded it will be infinitely conducive to public economy. I hope I shall not be thought to have exceeded my duty in the unreserved manner in which I have exhibited our situation.* Congress, I flatter myself, will have the

* In consequence of this letter, a committee of three persons was appointed by Congress, invested with very extensive powers, and instructed to proceed to head-quarters, and, in conjunction with the Commander-in-chief, to effect such reforms and changes in all the departments of the army, as its present condition required. They were authorized, with the

goodness to believe, that I have no other motives than a zeal for the public service, a desire to give them every necessary information, and an apprehension for the consequences of the evils now experienced.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE BARON DE KALB.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 4 April, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have, in consequence of the opinion of the last Council of War, left it with Congress finally to determine upon the march of the Maryland division to the

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advice of General Washington, "to reduce, incorporate, or unite to State lines, the several additional corps;" to inquire into and regulate the clothier's, quartermaster's, commissary's, and medical departments; to visit the different posts and see that such regulations as they should adopt were carried into execution; "to abolish unnecessary posts, to erect others, to discharge useless officers, to stop rations improperly issued, and to exercise every power requisite to effect a reformation of abuses, and the general arrangement of those departments, which were in any wise committed to their charge;" and to inform Congress from time to time of the measures they had taken. The committee was chosen by ballot, and consisted of Schuyler, Mathews, and Peabody.—*Journals, April 6th, 12th, 13th.*

M. de la Luzerne communicated to Count Vergennes the following particulars respecting the proceedings of Congress on this subject.

"A committee of three was proposed. Warm debates ensued. It was said, that this would be putting too much power in a few hands, and especially in those of the Commander-in-chief; that his influence was already too great; that even his virtues afforded motives for alarm; that the enthusiasm of the army, joined to the kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the United States at his mercy; that it was not expedient to expose a man of the highest virtues to such temptations. It was then proposed, that the committee should consist of one member from each State. This proposition failed, on the ground that the operations of so large a number would be subject to all the delays, which had been complained of in Congress. After a long and animated debate, the motion for a committee of three prevailed."—*MS. Letter, April 16th.*

southward. That no time may be lost in the transportation of the troops, should Congress agree in sentiment with the Council, I am to desire you to proceed immediately to Philadelphia, and, if you find upon your arrival there, that the troops are to move, concert with the Board of War and the commissary and quartermaster general the necessary arrangements for their provision and accommodation. But should it be determined, that the march of the body of men alluded to is at this time either inexpedient or unnecessary, you will be pleased, after completing your private business, to return to your command in the army. If you proceed to the southward, I wish you a safe and expeditious march, and every success that you can possibly desire; as I am, with very great respect and esteem, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 13 April, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have not yet obtained any certain account that the fleet, which fell down to the Hook, has put to sea. I think however it may be depended on, from a concurrence of circumstances, that they are bound to the southward; but, until we know that they are actually gone out, we cannot be too much guarded against what may be only a feint. I am glad you have thought of bringing the fascines and gabions within the works upon the Point. They would be of the utmost importance to the enemy, should they move up seriously against our posts. There was a number cut about Fort Montgomery, and at other places near the water.

General Heath, who is appointed by the State of

Massachusetts to superintend the recruiting service, writes me that he shall endeavour to detain three commissioned and one non-commissioned officer of each regiment, who are already in the State on furlough, to go out recruiting, and to march the recruits, deserters who may be apprehended, and furloughed men, from the places of rendezvous to West Point. But as he is not certain of finding the number desired, he wishes you to send the deficiency, should there be any, from the line. This you will be pleased to do, if the state of the regiments will admit of it. Those officers, who have not been indulged with furloughs should be preferred, as they will have an opportunity of visiting their families and friends, and looking into their private affairs at the same time. Captain Webb, the bearer of this, who is under the necessity of resigning, if he cannot obtain leave of absence, would be content with going home upon these terms. He represents the situation of his family in such a manner, that I wish him to be indulged, if possible, at any rate.

That there may be no misapprehension, you will be pleased to acquaint the officers before they go out upon the recruiting service, that I know of no continental bounty or allowance to reimburse their expenses, or to compensate their trouble. The State, I have been informed, has made some provision, but I do not know exactly what it is. I have been full upon this point, lest the officers should hereafter complain, that they had gone out in obedience to orders, and that the State allowance was not adequate to their necessary expenditures. They must also be informed, that the recruits, who may be obtained, will be for the benefit of the line at large, and not for any particular corps. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, 15 April, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

As far as it is possible for me, at this distance and with a very inconsiderable knowledge of the country, to judge, your reasonings on the best plan for an expedition against St. Augustine appear to me well founded. But unfortunately for us, from every present aspect, we shall find ample employment in defending ourselves, without meditating conquests. Your last letter announces the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, and his progress to Stono. It is of the greatest importance, that he met with the disasters which attended his voyage, though they were much smaller than was expected. This no doubt is the cause of his delay, and, I sincerely hope, will give you time to receive the necessary succours, and put yourself in an effectual posture of defence.

In my letter by General Duportail I informed you, that my advices from New York indicated a further embarkation, supposed to be destined for the southward. This has actually taken place, and has been for some time on the point of sailing, though it is not yet ascertained that the ships have sailed. I have had several accounts of the corps composing the detachment; but, as they materially differ from each other, I cannot rely sufficiently upon either of them to transmit it. From every information the total number will be from two thousand to two thousand five hundred men, commanded by Lord Rawdon as brigadier. I do not learn that there are any cavalry or draft-horses, more than about fifteen dragoons attached to Simcoe's corps. If this embarkation should be designed as a reinforcement to General Clinton, and he should suspend his operations

till its arrival, as is probable, so much time will be exhausted that he will be thrown into the hot season; a circumstance not a little unfavorable to his success. You will easily conceive the degree of our solicitude here for the fate of Charleston and its garrison. My apprehensions, after all, are principally for the harbour. If this is secured, the operations against you must become critical and arduous. But, whatever may be the event, of this we are assured, that no exertion, prudence, or perseverance on your part will be wanting to defeat the attempts of the enemy. May the issue be equally conducive to your personal glory, and to the advantage of these States.

In consequence of the detachment the enemy are now making, it has been determined to march the Maryland division of about two thousand men to your assistance; but our situation here will not permit it to move before it is certain the enemy's detachment has sailed. Baron de Kalb will command this division. This reinforcement in all probability will be too late to have any influence upon the fate of Charleston; but, if that should fall, it may serve to check the progress of the British troops, and prevent their getting entire possession of the State. If they succeed against Charleston, there is much reason to believe the southern States will become the principal theatre of the war.

I enclose to you sundry resolutions of Congress for raising specific supplies of provisions and forage in the different States, in which you will find the quantities apportioned to North and South Carolina. Congress have left it with me to determine the places of deposit; but my remoteness from those two States, and the imperfect knowledge I have of their position and circumstances, disqualify me from extending my arrangements to them. These will be much better made by you, and

I must request that you will as speedily as possible carry into execution that part of the resolutions, which depends on me. I have written to the governors of the two States, referring them to you for information on this head, which you will no doubt give without loss of time. I have written to the governor of Virginia, pressing the supplying of the troops of that State with clothing, agreeably to your request. I am very truly and affectionately, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 17 April, 1780.

SIR,

The Maryland division marched this morning, with the first regiment of artillery and eight field-pieces, besides those attached to the brigades, which will be useful at any rate, and essential, if an accident should happen to Charleston. The want of wagons has unavoidably retarded the march of the troops till this time.

I have attentively considered the application from the State of Massachusetts, on the subject of an expedition against the enemy at Penobscot. It appears to be of great importance in several points of view, that they should be dislodged; but, circumstanced as we are, I do not see how the attempt can be made with any prospect of success. A naval coöperation seems to be absolutely necessary, and for this we do not possess the means.

We have no fleet, and the enemy have a respectable one on the coast, which they can at any time employ to frustrate our measures. From all accounts, the posts at Penobscot are strongly situated, and susceptible of being made more formidable by additional fortifications, which it is to be presumed have not been neglected.

To attempt a *coup de main* with a tolerable certainty of success would require a considerable force, and of other troops than militia, which can by no means be spared. To operate by a siege, with cannon and the necessary apparatus, would be an affair of time. The operating force, I am informed, must depend on supplies of every kind by water. This communication would be liable to be interrupted at the pleasure of the enemy, and the situation of the troops would be alarmingly precarious. A reinforcement might at any time be sent from Halifax and New York to raise the siege; our troops would perhaps themselves escape with difficulty, no doubt with disgrace and with the loss of their cannon and stores. But, were there no other obstacles in the way, the total deficiency of money and magazines seems alone to be insurmountable. With respect to both of these we seem to be arrived at so desperate an extremity, that every arrangement and operation is at a stand, and, without speedy relief, inevitable ruin must ensue.

These objections to the expedition obviously present themselves in the present posture of our affairs, though I confess I have not a sufficient knowledge of the country in question to form a very accurate judgment. Could we obtain an effectual naval coöperation, this and many other things might be undertaken, which without it are impracticable. Indeed, considering the position of these States, a fleet is essential to our system of defence; and that we have not hitherto suffered more than we have for want of it, is to be ascribed to the feeble and injudicious manner in which the enemy have applied the means in their hands during this war. The plan they are now preparing, of attacking points remote from each other, will make us feel the disadvantage in a striking manner, and may be fatal, if our allies are not

able to afford us naval succour. In all respects it is more necessary now than it ever was.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COLONEL JOHN LAURENS, AT CHARLESTON.

Morristown, 26 April, 1780.

MY DEAR LAURENS,

I sincerely lament that your prospects are not better than they are. The impracticability of defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town and garrison. At this distance it is difficult to judge for you, and I have the greatest confidence in General Lincoln's prudence; but it really appears to me, that the propriety of attempting to defend the town depended on the probability of defending the bar, and that, when this ceased, the attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however, I suspend a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider what I say as confidential. Since your last to me, I have received a letter from General Lincoln, in which he informs me, that the enemy had got a sixty-four-gun ship with a number of other vessels over the bar, and that it had been determined to abandon the project of disputing the passage by Sullivan's Island, and to draw up the frigates to the town and take out their cannon. This brings your affairs nearer to a dangerous crisis, and increases my apprehensions.

You will have learned from General Lincoln, that a second detachment sailed from New York on the 7th instant, supposed to be destined to reinforce Sir Henry Clinton. I have not yet ascertained all the particular corps, but know that the forty-second, the Irish volunteers, Queen's rangers, and some foreign troops are of

the number, and have every reason to believe the total number is from two thousand to two thousand five hundred. They appeared a few days since off the Chesapeake Bay, but immediately continued their voyage. I have just received an account of the arrival of forty-one transports at New York from South Carolina, and that there were strong symptoms of another embarkation. This circumstance is to me not of easy explanation. I should imagine that Sir Henry Clinton's present force was equal to his object, and that he would not require more. The garrison of New York and its dependencies at this time cannot much exceed eight thousand men, a number barely sufficient for its defence, and not with propriety admitting a diminution. Perhaps, however, counting upon our weakness the enemy may determine to hazard something here, the more effectually to secure conquest to the southward; or perhaps they may only intend to detach a force for a temporary diversion in Virginia or North Carolina, to return afterwards to New York. I expect more certain advice today, and should it confirm the first, any demonstrations it may be in our power to make, to retard or prevent the embarkation, shall be put in practice; but unfortunately we have very little in our power.

In both your letters you express a wish, that I should come to the southward. Though I cannot flatter myself with the advantages you look for from such a step, yet, if it were proposed by Congress, I confess to you that I should not dislike the journey, did our affairs in this quarter permit it; but unluckily the great departments of the army are now in total confusion, and Congress have just appointed a committee, in conjunction with me, to new model and rectify them. Till this is done, I could not leave this army. And, were not this obstacle in the way, you will easily conceive that I must

have many scruples, which forbid me to let the measure in question originate with me. But all this for your private ear. Be assured, my dear Laurens, that I am extremely sensible to the expressions of your attachment, and that I feel all for you in your present situation, which the warmest friendship can dictate. I am confident you will do your duty, and in doing it you must run great hazards. May success attend you, and restore you with fresh laurels to your friends, to your country, and to me. I am, &c.

TO JAMES BOWDOIN, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Morristown, 26 April, 1780.

SIR,

I am much obliged to you for your favor, transmitting to me a copy of the plan proposed for the constitution of your State. I have not yet had leisure to give it an attentive consideration; but, from a cursory view, it appears to me to be a very judicious one, and to possess all the requisites towards securing the liberty and happiness of individuals, and at the same time giving energy to the administration. This latter indeed is essential to the former, though unfortunately in some of our constitutions it has not been sufficiently consulted. It is of great importance, that a State, which is of so much weight in the union as that of Massachusetts, should have a well combined and vigorous government. Nothing will give me greater pleasure, than to learn that the people have adopted one, which answers this description. Accept my thanks for your communication of the advice from Mr. Adams. It corresponds with

my expectations, though very little with our circumstances.* It is devoutly to be wished, that this campaign may be the last. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Morristown, 28 April, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

It is lamentable that we should be obliged to suffer such distresses as we do everywhere. Those we feel here are not inferior to yours; we are constantly on the point of starving for want of provision and forage. A deficiency of money is the cause, and a cause for which the present situation of affairs renders it infinitely difficult to provide a remedy. We are at a most delicate crisis. I dread with you the consequences.

We are informed that there is an arrival of forty-seven transports from South Carolina at New York, and that there are appearances of a further embarkation. It may be of use to make demonstrations of a movement on our part. I should be glad, so far as it can be done without interfering with the necessary operations, and without incurring expense, that you would set on foot a collection of boats on the river, and have them inspected and some little repairs made. Some time since you were directed at your own instance to have all the fascines and gabions, which had been provided in expectation of Count d'Estaing last fall, deposited within the works. If this has not been effected, you will be

* Mr. Adams was now in Europe as minister from the United States for negotiating a peace, whenever the time should arrive for that event. Mr. Bowdoin mentioned a letter from him, dated in January, in which he gave it as his opinion, that peace could not be expected during the present year.

pleased to have it done. They may possibly be of future utility, and the act of removing them will contribute to our present purpose. A number was provided below Stony Point where the Virginia troops lie. You will not forget to remove these also to a place of security.

General Duportail being gone to the southward, it is necessary that Colonel Gouvion should repair to this army. If there are any previous arrangements, which you wish him to make, you will be pleased to direct him to make them, and to set out for head-quarters as speedily as he can. It has been represented to me, that cattle coming on for this army have been stopped by some of your commissaries for the use of the garrison. As the purchasing commissary makes a distribution in the first instance, and always takes care to send a proportion to the posts under your command, any interference of this kind is irregular and improper. You will be pleased to give orders to prevent it in future. Our wants here are so extreme, that the supplies intended for this part of the army cannot be diverted to any other without risking the most serious consequences.

The state of our arsenals makes the greatest care and economy indispensable. I wish you to pay a pointed attention, that the men whose times of service expire do not, on leaving the army, carry away the public arms with them. Those, who may have brought arms of their own with them, for which they have not been paid, and which have been exchanged for better, must as far as may be practicable return those they now have and receive their own. You will make the commandants of battalions particularly responsible for carrying this into execution. The Maryland division being gone to the southward, all the men belonging to it in

the hospitals at Albany are directed to be sent to Fishkill. When arrived there, you will take measures to have them and those already at Fishkill forwarded to this place. Should they want any little necessaries you will have them supplied. I am, with great regard, &c.

TO DON DIEGO JOSEPH NAVARRO, GOVERNOR OF CUBA.

Morristown, 30 April, 1780.

SIR,

I am extremely sorry to communicate to your Excellency, the painful intelligence of the death of Don Juan de Miralles. This unfortunate event happened at my quarters the day before yesterday, and his remains were yesterday interred with all the respect due to his character and merit. He did me the honor of a visit, in company with the minister of France, and was seized on the day of his arrival with a violent bilious complaint, which, after nine days' continuance, put a period to his life, notwithstanding all the efforts of the most skilful physicians we were able to procure. Your Excellency will have the goodness to believe, that I took pleasure in performing every friendly office to him during his illness, and that no care or attention in our power was omitted towards his comfort or restoration. I the more sincerely sympathize with you in the loss of so estimable a friend, as, ever since his residence with us, I have been happy in ranking him among the number of mine. It must, however, be some consolation to his connexions to know, that in this country he has been universally esteemed, and will be universally regretted.

May I request the favor of your Excellency to present my respects to the lady and family of our deceased friend, and to assure them how much I participate in

their affliction on this melancholy occasion? I have the honor to be, with the highest respect and consideration, your Excellency's, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Morristown, 5 May, 1780.

SIR,

The polite terms in which you mention the attention, which my respectful attachment for you dictated during your stay in camp, add to the obligation I feel for the honor of your visit. I was happy in that opportunity of giving you new proofs of my sentiments, and I entreat you to afford me others as frequently as possible. As the minister of a prince, to whom America owes so much, you have every title to my respect; and, permit me to add, your personal qualities give you a claim, which my heart cheerfully acknowledges, to all my esteem and all my regard.

I beg you to accept my thanks for your intention to represent the army in so favorable a light, as will recommend it to the approbation of his Most Christian Majesty; an honor as flattering as it will be precious. It would be a want of gratitude not to be convinced of the intimate concern he takes in our affairs, after the repeated and decided proofs he has given. I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, &c.*

P. S. Mrs. Washington, sensible of your polite at-

* In giving an account to M. de Vergennes of his visit to camp, M. de la Luzerne said, — "The time which I passed with General Washington has convinced me more than ever of the very great advantage, which the republic derives from his services. His virtues have gained for him the affection of the army which he commands, and the confidence and respect of the generals and other officers." — *MS. Letter, May 13th.*

tention to her, prays your acceptance of her compliments and best respects.

Nine o'clock, A. M. — I have this instant received a letter from my much esteemed and amiable friend, the Marquis de Lafayette, dated in Boston harbour, the 27th of last month. In the course of a day or two I shall expect to see him.

TO MONSIEUR MARBOIS, SECRETARY TO THE EMBASSY FROM HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY.

Morristown, 5 May, 1780.

SIR,

Any marks of consideration, that you may have received during your stay in camp, were only a just tribute to your merit, which my esteem for you made me take pleasure in paying. The manner in which you speak of them in your letter, and the obliging assurances you give me, have a new title to my regard. The opportunity, which your visit to camp afforded me, of knowing you more particularly, has confirmed the sentiments with which the commencement of our acquaintance impressed me; and I entreat you to be assured, that there is nothing I desire more than frequent occasions of giving you proofs of the high estimation in which I hold you, and the perfect regard with which I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Morristown, 8 May, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

Your welcome favor of the 27th of April came to my hands yesterday. I received it with all the joy that

the sincerest friendship could dictate, and with that impatience which an ardent desire to see you could not fail to inspire. I am sorry I do not know your route through the State of New York, that I might with certainty send a small party of horse (all I have at this place) to meet and escort you safely through the Tory settlements between this place and the North River. At all events, Major Gibbs will go as far as Pompton, where the roads unite, to meet you, and will proceed from thence as circumstances may direct, either towards King's Ferry or New Windsor. I most sincerely congratulate you on your safe arrival in America, and shall embrace you with all the warmth of an affectionate friend, when you come to head-quarters, where a bed is prepared for you. Adieu, till we meet. Yours.*

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Morristown, 11 May, 1780.

SIR,

The attentions and honors paid to Monsieur Miralles after his death were a tribute due to his character and merit, and dictated by the sincere esteem which I al-

* The impressions of the British ministry, respecting the condition of things in America, may be learned from the following extract. — "All the private letters from the rebel countries are filled with representations of the general distress and sufferings of the people, the discontents of the troops, and the universal wish for peace. The middle provinces are said to be so disinclined to support the Congress, that no recruits are to be had, and the militia will not submit to be drafted. Their only resort for continuing the war seemed to be a foreign aid, which, however, has not yet been sent to them; and therefore I flatter myself you will have met but little interruption in your progress northward after the reduction of Charleston, and that you will have sufficient time to execute your plan in the Chesapeake, or at least to establish yourself there beyond the power of any force, which can be brought to dislodge you." — *MS. Letter from Lord George Germain to General Clinton, May 3d.*

ways felt for him. I am much obliged to your Excellency for your intention of sending me a detail of the land and sea forces arrived at Martinique.

You will participate in the joy I feel at the arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette. No event could have given me greater pleasure on a personal account, and motives of public utility conspire to make it agreeable. He will shortly have the honor to wait upon your Excellency, and impart matters of the greatest moment to these States. He announces a fresh and striking instance of the friendship of your court, which cannot fail to contribute greatly to perpetuate the gratitude of this country. I am always happy to repeat to you the sentiments of respect and inviolable attachment, with which I have the honor to be, your Excellency's, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 13 May, 1780.

SIR,

The Marquis de Lafayette will have the honor to deliver to you this letter. I am persuaded Congress will participate in the joy I feel at the return of a gentleman, who has so signally distinguished himself in the service of this country, who has given so many and so decisive proofs of his attachment to its interests, and who ought to be dear to it from every motive. The warm friendship I have for him conspires with considerations of public utility to afford me a double satisfaction in his return. During the time he has been in France, he has uniformly manifested the same zeal in our affairs, which animated his conduct while he was among us; and he has been upon all occasions an essential friend to America. He merits, and I doubt not

Congress will give him, every mark of consideration in their power. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

Morristown, 14 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette opens a prospect, which offers the most important advantages to these States, if proper measures are adopted to improve it. He announces an intention of his court to send a fleet and army to coöperate effectually with us. In the present state of our finances, and in the total emptiness of our magazines, a plan must be concerted to bring out the resources of the country with vigor and decision. This I think you will agree with me cannot

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* When M. de la Luzerne informed the French ministry of the occurrences, which took place in consequence of the Marquis de Lafayette's arrival in America, he said, — "General Washington, whose circumspection increases in proportion to the confidence reposed in him by Congress, would not take upon himself the responsibility of arranging a plan of combined operations. After having assured the Marquis de Lafayette, that he would apply himself with all possible activity to hasten forward recruits and to collect provisions, he desired him to proceed immediately to Philadelphia, and concert further measures with the French minister, and particularly as to the expediency of acquainting Congress with the secret of the expected arrival of the French troops." The minister was reluctant to act against his orders in this respect, but was induced to do it chiefly from the fact, that the enemy were already informed of the secret. A New York newspaper had announced, that M. de Ternay would command a squadron destined to aid the Americans, consisting of six vessels, and that six regiments of troops would be embarked. This left no doubt, that the British commander had been informed of particulars. There was no longer occasion to conceal the intelligence from Congress. But it was communicated with caution. The number of forces was not mentioned. The subject was debated three days, and resolutions were passed in conformity with the views of the French minister. The powers of Congress were not such as to enable them to demand forces from the States; they could only recommend, and the authority of the governors

be effected, if the measures to be taken should depend on the slow deliberations of a body so large as Congress, admitting the best disposition in every member to promote the objects in view. It appears to me of the greatest importance, and even of absolute necessity, that a small committee should be immediately appointed to reside near head-quarters, vested with all the powers which Congress have, so far as respects the purpose of a full coöperation with the French fleet and army on the continent. Their authority should be plenipotentiary to draw out men and supplies of every kind, and to give their sanction to any operations which the Commander-in-chief may not think himself at liberty to undertake without it, as well beyond as within the limits of these States. The committee can act with despatch and energy. By being on the spot they will be able to provide for exigencies as they arise, and the better to judge of their nature and urgency. The plans in con-

must be obtained. Nor could there be any longer a reason for withholding from them a secret, which was known to the enemy. — It will be seen in the above letter, that General Washington does not hint at the object of the Marquis de Lafayette's visit to Philadelphia.

In fact the British government were fully apprized of the equipment of a squadron at Brest, destined for America, long before. Notice to this effect was communicated to Sir Henry Clinton as early as the middle of March. "Intelligence received respecting the destination of the armament preparing at Brest," said the minister, "causes alarm for Newfoundland, Halifax, and Canada. The last is confidently believed to be the object of the enemy; for, besides the expectations constantly entertained by the Americans of such an attack, the dispositions they have made for acting in concert with it, and the hopes given to the Canadians of seeing French troops again in their country, the return of the Marquis de Lafayette to Boston, the nature of the clothing, arms, money, and necessaries provided to be sent with the troops, concur in pointing out that country as the ultimate destination of the armament. Measures have been taken to defeat this project. It is hoped, that you have before this time reinforced General Haldimand with the troops, whom you were disappointed in sending the last year." — *MS. Letter from Lord George Germain to General Clinton, March 15th.*

See APPENDIX, No. I.

templation may be opened to them with more freedom and confidence, than to a numerous body, where secrecy is impossible, and where the indiscretion of a single member by disclosing may defeat the project.

I need not enlarge on the advantages of such a measure, as I flatter myself they will all occur to you, and that you will be ready to propose and give it all your support. The conjuncture is one of the most critical and important we have seen; all our prudence and exertions are requisite to give it a favorable issue; hesitancy and delay would in all probability ruin our affairs. Circumstanced as we are, the greatest good or the greatest ill must result. We shall probably fix the independence of America if we succeed, and, if we fail, the abilities of the States will have been so strained in the attempt, that a total relaxation and debility must ensue, and the worst is to be apprehended. These considerations should determine Congress to forego all inferior objects, and unite with mutual confidence in those measures, which seem best calculated to insure success.

There is no man, that can be more useful as a member of the committee than General Schuyler. His perfect knowledge of the resources of the country, the activity of his temper, his fruitfulness of expedients, and his sound military sense, make me wish, above all things, that he may be appointed. I have also a very favorable opinion of Mr. Mathews's understanding and integrity; and I should be willing to trust every thing to the goodness of the other's intentions, if I had not some doubts of his discretion. I wish the Chancellor or yourself could be in the appointment. A well composed committee is of primary importance. I need not hint that the delicacy of these intimations fits them only for your private ear. The opinion I have of your

friendship induces me thus freely and confidentially to impart my sentiments on this occasion, and I shall be very happy, if you shall agree with me in judgment.

I am with the greatest esteem and regard, &c.

TO GOVERNOR JEFFERSON.

Morristown, 15 May, 1780.

SIR,

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency confidentially, that a French fleet may in the course of a few weeks be expected on this coast, and as it is uncertain what part of the land they may first make, gentlemen are to be stationed at different points, to give them signals and to make them some necessary communications immediately upon their arrival. Major Galvan, who will have the honor of delivering this to your Excellency, is appointed to go down to Cape Henry, for the purposes above mentioned; and, as he will have occasion to keep one or two boats in constant readiness to go off upon the appearance of the fleet, I shall be much obliged by your giving an order to the person, who has the superintendence of the public vessels and craft in Virginia, to supply him with the necessary number. Should the public have none of the proper kind in their possession, you will be pleased to recommend to Major Galvan the most certain and speedy method of procuring them. One or two skilful and trusty pilots will also be necessary, that, if any of the ships should have occasion to enter the bay, they may not be at a loss.

Your Excellency will no doubt see the propriety of keeping the object of Major Galvan's mission as much a secret as possible, lest the importance of the de-

spatches, with which he is charged, might be an inducement to some of the disaffected to take him off. It would add much to his security, if your Excellency would be good enough to introduce him to some gentlemen in the neighbourhood of Cape Henry, in whom he may confide, and with whom he may remain while in that quarter. It is essentially necessary that Major Galvan should be constantly informed of the operations in South Carolina; and, as he will be out of the common track of intelligence, I have desired him to keep up a communication with your Excellency. Your acquainting him therefore with what comes to your knowledge, either officially or in a manner sufficiently authentic to be depended upon, may be productive of most salutary consequences. I would beg leave to recommend Major Galvan generally to your Excellency, for every public assistance of which he may stand in need, and particularly to your personal civilities. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH, AT BOSTON.

Head-Quarters, 15 May, 1780.

Dear Sir,

I have the pleasure to inform you in strict confidence, that we have authentic advices of his Most Christian Majesty's determination to send a respectable armament of sea and land forces to operate on the continent, and that the period is not remote when we may expect their arrival. Having informed you of this, I am now to add, that the destruction of Halifax, and of the naval arsenals and garrison there, is a primary object with our allies; as, this being effected, the support of the enemy's marine in those seas and in the West Indies would be exceedingly difficult and precarious, and, in this view,

that there is nothing they seem to wish for more. It would certainly be an event of infinite importance to them, and of course to the common cause; and therefore we ought, as far as possible, to give every aid in our power to accomplish it. It may be essential to the success of any attempt, that may be made against the place, to obtain previous information with respect to the force, the corps that are there, the number, sort, and condition of the fortifications, and also the ships of war; which are points about which our allies appear to be in the dark, and as to which unhappily I cannot give the necessary satisfaction myself. I therefore earnestly request, that you will assist me in this very important business, as far as present circumstances will permit, by communicating to me by the earliest opportunity the result of such inquiries, as you shall make on the subject. You cannot be too minute and particular with respect to it; and I should hope from the frequent flags, which I think I have heard have passed between Halifax and Boston for the exchange of prisoners, that you may gain good and useful intelligence upon the occasion.

I request this as a first step; but, besides, I wish you if possible to send to Halifax, in such way as may appear the most likely to succeed, one or two persons of good understanding, and upon whose firmness and fidelity we may safely rely, to obtain the most exact account of those matters. If they could be draftsmen, they would be so much the better, as a good plan of the fortifications would be of essential service, and is what our friends are very desirous of obtaining. I have written to Mr. Bowdoin a confidential letter on these subjects; and I am persuaded that he and the Council, without disclosing the matter, on your application, if you should find it necessary to make one, will most cheerfully do any thing that may be requisite to promote the plan for

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gaining intelligence, and will assist you with money if you should have occasion for it. If you can engage proper persons to go on the business, you may stipulate with them for a generous compensation to be made to them on their return, which will be increased in proportion to the importance of the information they may bring. You will extend your inquiries in like manner to the post and garrison at Penobscot, and procure the best account of these that you can. If our allies should operate against Halifax, they will necessarily have occasion for some skilful and faithful pilots acquainted with the coast and harbour. I therefore wish you to turn your attention to the matter, and to inform me whether such may be had in case they are wanted. You will also do the same with respect to Penobscot. Indeed it might be best, if you have an opportunity, to speak to some of the pilots, who would be proper to be employed, without discovering the matter with respect to an arrival of the fleet from France, to know whether in case of such an expedition they would embark in it.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE, AT PHILADELPHIA.

Morristown, 16 May, 1780.

My dear Marquis,

Since you left me I have more fully reflected on the plan, which it will be proper for the French fleet and army to pursue on their arrival upon the coast; and it appears to me, in the present situation of the enemy at

* Very full intelligence was obtained, respecting the particulars mentioned in this letter. Mr. Bowdoin succeeded in procuring a plan of the harbour of Halifax, in which were marked the depth of the water and the position of all the military works.

New York, that it ought to be our first object to reduce that post, and that it is of the utmost importance not to lose a moment in repairing to that place. I would therefore advise you to write to the Count de Rochambeau and Monsieur de Ternay in the following spirit; urging them in the strongest terms to proceed, both fleet and army, with all possible expedition to Sandy Hook, where they will be met with further advices of the precise situation, strength, and disposition of the enemy, and of our army, and with proposals for their future movements; unless they should have received authentic accounts, that the fleet and troops now operating in the southern States have evacuated them, and formed a junction at New York. In this case, if they arrive at Rhode Island, they can disembark their troops, dispose of their sick, and wait till a more definitive plan can be concerted; or if they arrive off Cape Henry, they can proceed directly to Rhode Island, and make the same arrangements. But, in case they should not have received the accounts above mentioned of the evacuation of the southern States and junction at New York, and should proceed directly to Sandy Hook as is recommended, they can send their sick, and every thing of which they wish to be disencumbered, to Rhode Island.

The reasons for proceeding immediately to New York, in the present situation of the enemy there, are these. The enemy's whole effective land force, in regular troops, is about eight thousand men, to which may be added about four thousand refugees, and such of the militia as they would be able by persuasion or force to engage; but on the militia I should suppose they could place no great dependence. Their naval force is one ship of seventy-four guns and three or four small frigates. If the arrival of the French succour should find

them in this situation, the fleet can enter the harbour of New York without difficulty, and this is a point upon which the success of the whole enterprise absolutely turns. By stopping at Rhode Island, if they arrive there, or by passing from Cape Henry to Rhode Island, the most precious time will be lost, which will multiply the chances to the enemy of concentring their force, of receiving a naval reinforcement from England or the West Indies, of increasing their precautions to obstruct the channel and their preparations for the defence of their posts. By gaining possession of the harbour and cutting off its communications, the present garrison at New York would be unable to resist the efforts of the combined forces; and, together with their ships, must in all probability fall into our hands. On the contrary, if they have time to concentre at New York all their sea and land force on the continent, the enterprise against that place becomes extremely arduous, has much less prospect of success, and will at least exhaust the whole campaign to bring it to a favorable issue.

The enemy have in the expedition under Sir Henry Clinton about seven thousand land troops, three ships of the line, one fifty-gun, two forty-four, and some smaller frigates. If these ships were added to the force at New York, they would, I apprehend, be sufficient to exclude the French squadron, unless aided by a vigorous coöperation by land towards Sandy Hook; and the garrison, increased to fourteen or fifteen thousand regular troops, would present immense difficulties in the way of its reduction.

I observed that the French squadron would find no difficulty in entering the port of New York, with the present naval force of the enemy there. The only possible obstacles to this are the obstructions, which the enemy are preparing; but I am inclined to hope these

will be ineffectual and may be easily removed. Last fall they made an attempt of the kind, on the expectation of Count d'Estaing; but it failed from the depth of the water and the rapidity of the current. Pilots for the harbour can be ready at Black Point in the Jerseys, from which they can go on board the fleet at its first appearance. I would wish you to convey these things in the fullest light to the French commanders by way of recommendation, leaving it to them to act according to the condition of the fleet and troops with respect to health and other essential matters; and, if they prefer it, to go immediately to Rhode Island from Cape Henry; or, if they arrive at the former place in the first instance, to wait till a definitive plan is adopted. But I think every reason points to the mode here recommended.

You will be sensible, my dear Sir, that we can at present only touch upon preliminary measures. The plan for ultimate operations must be the result of mature deliberation, and a full view of our resources, and must be formed in conjunction with the general and admiral of the French forces. I refer Mr. Galvan to you for instructions; but I send you a letter to Governor Jefferson of Virginia to give him any assistance he may require, and to correspond with him on the state of southern affairs. His own discretion, and the information he will get on the spot, must chiefly govern him. He cannot be despatched too soon.

I request you, in writing to the Count de Rochambeau and Monsieur de Ternay, to assure them of all my respect and consideration, of the high sense I entertain of this distinguished mark of his Most Christian Majesty's friendship to these States, and of the happiness I anticipate in a personal acquaintance and coöperation with gentlemen, whose reputation has inspired me with

the greatest esteem for their talents and merit. You will add, that I will do every thing on my part to give success to the intended operations, and that I flatter myself they will be attended with the happiest consequences. I cannot forbear recalling your attention to the importance of doing every thing possible to engage the Count de Guichen to come upon this coast without delay. The more I reflect upon it, the more essential it appears. With this addition to our present plan, we should have reason to flatter ourselves with every thing; without it, we have a great deal to apprehend, and, instead of the happiest, the worst consequences may ensue to the common cause. I am, my dear Marquis, with the greatest truth and affection, your friend, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Morristown, 18 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I yesterday received your obliging favor. From the great importance of the subject, I confess I am infinitely anxious myself about the issue of the operations at Charleston; and I wish most cordially that we had it in our power to pursue means, which would certainly relieve it. The unhappy state of our finances is opposed to this, and lays us under every embarrassment that can be conceived. If we could once get this in a favorable train, our affairs would look up, and we might do a thousand things which are now utterly impracticable. I thank you very much for your suggestions with respect to the mode of giving succour in that quarter, and shall always be happy in the freest communication of your sentiments. The same had often been in my mind, and it would certainly be the most eligible way,

if we were in circumstances to pursue it. But besides our distresses on the score of supplies, you will painfully recollect, that this winter and spring have put a period to the service of no inconsiderable part of our force. I also thank you for your attention to the Maryland troops, and for your endeavours to assist them. A melancholy consideration indeed, that we cannot move even a small detachment, however interesting the occasion, without the greatest difficulty and delay!

I shall be very happy to see you at camp again, and hope you will without hesitation resume your command in the Pennsylvania line. I know, on a former occasion, you had some difficulty on this head; but, when you consider the point, you will see the propriety of the measure. When I have the pleasure of seeing you, I shall talk with you more fully on the subject. I am, with very sincere regard and esteem, dear Sir, &c.

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Morristown, 18 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have the happiness to inform your Excellency, that the Marquis de Lafayette has brought the interesting intelligence of a French fleet and army, which was to sail from France early in April for this continent to cooperate with us. He has gone on to Congress, and measures will, it is to be hoped, be immediately taken by them to put us in a situation to derive the advantage from this succour, which with proper exertion we have a right to expect. You will be sensible, that there will be a necessity for the concurrence of the legislatures of the different States in providing men and supplies. As I am informed, your Assembly is now sit-

ting, and may probably be about rising; and as the determination of Congress may not arrive in time to prevent its adjournment, I have thought it proper to give this intimation in confidence, that you may keep them together. If they once separate, it will be impossible to reassemble them in time to answer our purposes; and it is of infinite importance that they should be assembled. As this anticipates Congress, it is of course only intended for your private information, and is not to be officially made use of to the Assembly. In the intended coöperation, to whatever point it may be directed, we shall stand in need of all the Continental force we can collect. I am, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Morristown, 19 May, 1780.

I impatiently wait, my dear Marquis, to know the result of the arrangements you were to make with Congress. The time glides away so fast, and we have so little before us, that every moment is infinitely precious and ought to be improved. We talked of a proclamation to the Canadians. If it is not already done, I think it ought not to be delayed. It should be in your own name, and have as much as possible an air of probability. Perhaps it will be more plausible to have two different kinds made; one intimating to them the arrival of a French fleet and army in the River St. Lawrence, to coöperate by the way of Rhode Island, where to answer some important purposes they are to touch, and dwelling on the happy opportunity it will afford them to renew their ancient friendship with France, by joining the allied arms and assisting to make Canada a

part of the American confederation, with all the privileges and advantages enjoyed by the other members; cautioning them by no means to aid the enemy in their preparations for defending the province. The other proclamation should be drawn, on the supposition of the fleet and army being already arrived, and should contain an animating invitation to arrange themselves under the allied banners. In both proclamations you should hold yourself up as a French and American officer, charged both by the King of France and by Congress with a commission to address them upon the occasion. It may indeed be well to throw out an idea, that you are to command the corps of American troops destined to coöperate with the French armament. The more mystery in this business the better. It will get out, and it ought to seem to be against our intention.*

In a memorandum, which you left with Colonel Hamilton, you mention pilots to be sent to Cape Henry for conducting the fleet to Rhode Island. This does not appear to me necessary; as there will be pilots ready at Rhode Island to take the fleet into the harbour, and every navigator can answer the purpose to the entrance

* According to the above suggestion, a proclamation to the Canadians was written in French, and signed by Lafayette. It was long, and contained arguments to persuade the Canadians to join Rochambeau's army when it should arrive, and expel the British from Canada, intimating that the chief object for which the French troops were coming to America was an attack on Canada. The proclamation was intended, not to be sent to the Canadians, but to operate as a stratagem to deceive the British commander, and draw away his attention from New York. The scheme was probably in part successful, unless it may be supposed, that Arnold, who was knowing to the secret, communicated it to the enemy. Several copies fell into the hands of Sir Henry Clinton. He wrote as follows to Lord George Germain; — "I have the honor to transmit to you the copy of a proclamation, which I have reason to believe the Marquis de Lafayette intended to have published in Canada, if the proposed expedition against that province had taken place." — *August* 31*st*. In truth no such expedition had been *proposed*.

of the port. If however you think it will be expected that pilots be ready at Cape Henry, you can apply to the Marine Committee, who can easily provide them.

I forgot to observe, that something might be addressed to the savages. I mentioned to you, when here, the inserting of a paragraph in the papers somewhat to this effect; "We have it from good authority, that the Marquis de Lafayette brings the important and agreeable intelligence of a very considerable naval and land force, intended to be sent by his Most Christian Majesty to the succour of these States; and that the campaign will open with a combined operation against New York. This, there is every reason to hope, with proper exertions on our part, will put a happy period to the war; nor can there be any room to doubt that the glorious opportunity will be effectually improved. This instance of the friendship of our ally is a new claim to the lasting affection and gratitude of this country." I think such a paragraph will be useful, as the people will be roused by it; while the enemy, by the address to the Canadians and other demonstrations pointing another way, may be distracted by attending to different objects and weakened. You will judge by appearances how far it may be agreeable to Congress. I am, with all affection and sincerity, yours truly.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Morristown, 20 May, 1780.

I had written the enclosed, my dear Marquis, previously to the receipt of yours of the 17th, which arrived late yesterday. The despatches accompanying them for the eastward were sent off before day this morning.

Mr. Hamilton wrote to Captain de la Fouche on the points which you mention. I also wrote to him and to Governor Trumbull. The measures, that have been taken, are all evidently proper. The communication to Mr. Holker was necessary, and can be attended with no inconvenience. I could wish that gentleman might accompany you to camp. His knowledge of the country, and intelligence in business, will enable him to be useful in the arrangements we shall have to make. General Greene will give all the aid in his power in the article of wagons, or in any thing else in which it may be wanted and to which his means extend.

I hope the sending of the committee will not be delayed a moment. The members appointed to draw the instructions are very good men. I shall be sorry, however, if General Schuyler is not of the committee.* The sooner the Chevalier can make it convenient to honor me with a visit the better. His advice and concurrence in some points may be very important. Will you present my respects to him? The enemy are embarking more troops at New York, and heavy cannon, as it is said, for Halifax and Cape Breton. I send a letter with

* Great satisfaction was expressed by Congress on the arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette in Philadelphia. A resolve was passed, testifying, that his return to America, to resume his command, was considered by Congress "as a fresh proof of the disinterested zeal and persevering attachment, which have justly recommended him to the public confidence and applause, and that they receive with pleasure a tender of the further services of so gallant and meritorious an officer." — *Journals, May 16th.*

A committee reported, and it was resolved in consequence, that the Commander-in-chief, after receiving such communications from the Marquis de Lafayette as he had to offer, should take such measures for carrying on the operations of the campaign as would effectually promote the purposes in view. The same committee were likewise instructed to confer with M. de la Luzerne, as to the means of obtaining supplies for the French forces; and to collect intelligence by establishing a correspondence with the governors of the several States, and such other persons as the committee should think proper. — *Secret Journals, May 20th.*

this to stop Lee's corps. You will find that I have anticipated that part of your letter, which relates to pilots for Cape Henry. You will act in this matter as you think proper. As the post is just setting out, I have not time to enlarge. Finish your business as soon as you can and hasten *home*, for so I would always have you consider head-quarters and my house. Mrs. Washington sends you her affectionate compliments; the gentlemen of the family theirs. Believe me on all occasions, with the greatest tenderness and sincerity, your friend and servant.

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER.

Morristown, 21 May, 1780.

SIR,

Supposing the enemy to continue in their present divided state, where can they be attacked to the greatest advantage, and in what manner can we operate most effectually against them? Is not that part of their army and shipping, which is at the southward, more exposed and liable to a more certain blow, than the other part, which is at New York, where there is uncertainty of getting into the harbour, and where works surrounding the city are already established for its defence, and every possible exertion using to increase and strengthen them? In what danger, for want of a secure harbour for ships of the line, would the French fleet be involved on the Carolina coast? What difficulties should we have to encounter in getting there with the necessary apparatus and provisions? And how could we be supported when there, in case an enterprise of this kind should otherwise be thought eligible?

Supposing the enemy to form a junction of their force

at New York, what is practicable in that case? And what measures had best be pursued in consequence? Again, let us suppose the enemy to have succeeded at Charleston, that they have captured the garrison employed in defence of it, that they mean to leave a sufficient force in the States of South Carolina and Georgia to hold the towns of Charleston and Savannah, without aiming at any thing more in that quarter at present; and the rest arrived at New York; what is best for us to do in that case?

In a word, my wish is to have our situation and that of the enemy considered in all the points of view they can be placed in, and the most advantageous plan of operation proposed for each. What force in aid of the French army and Continental troops will it be necessary to call upon the States for, in case of an operation against New York? To answer this question, it is necessary to premise, that, in New York and its dependencies, there are at least eight thousand regular troops, besides about four thousand refugees and militia. How many of the latter, when matters become serious, can be brought to act, is more than I can tell. At the southward there are about seven thousand regular troops, under the immediate command of Sir Henry Clinton.

Supposing the enemy to continue in the divided state in which they are at present, and New York (the troops in it I mean) should be our object, how far with perfect safety would it be practicable to let the French troops act separately on Long Island, if it should be judged expedient to attack the town by a combined operation in that quarter and from York Island at the same time? Where had the French best establish their hospitals and deposit their heavy stores? Under a full view of all circumstances, what position is most eligible for the

American army to take, previously to the arrival of the French fleet and army; and when should it be taken?

Your opinion on the foregoing queries and on such other matters as relate to the business, which is unfolding and which requires the closest attention under our circumstances, will be thankfully received by your affectionate, &c.

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, JOHN MATHEWS, AND NATHANIEL PEABODY, A COMMITTEE FROM CONGRESS.

Morristown, 25 May, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,

I have attentively considered the circular letter to the different States, which you did me the honor to communicate for my perusal, and I am happy to find, that my ideas perfectly correspond with those of the committee. The view they have given of our situation is just, full, and explicit; the measures they have recommended are well adapted to the emergency and of indispensable necessity. I very freely give it as my opinion, that, unless they are carried into execution in the fullest extent and with the greatest decision and rapidity, it will be impossible for us to undertake the intended coöperation with any reasonable prospect of success.

The consequences you have well delineated. The succour designed for our benefit will prove a serious misfortune, and, instead of rescuing us from the embarrassments we experience, and from the danger with which we are threatened, will, in all probability, precipitate our ruin.* Drained and weakened as we already

* That is, unless seconded and made effectual by extraordinary efforts on the part of the Americans.

are, the exertions we shall make, though they may be too imperfect to secure success, will at any rate be such as to leave us in a state of relaxation and debility, from which it will be difficult if not impracticable to recover; the country exhausted, the people dispirited, the consequence and reputation of these States in Europe sunk, our friends chagrined and discouraged, our enemies deriving new credit, new confidence, new resources. We have not, nor ought we to wish, an alternative. The court of France has done so much for us, that we must make a decisive effort on our part. Our situation demands it, and it is expected. We have the means of success, and it only remains to employ them. But the conjuncture requires all our wisdom and all our energy. Such is the present state of this country, that the utmost exertion of its resources, though equal, is not more than equal to the object, and our measures must be so taken as to call them into immediate and full effect.

There is only one thing, which I should have been happy if the committee had thought proper to take up on a larger scale; I mean the supply of men by drafts. Instead of completing the deficiencies of the quotas assigned by the resolution of Congress of the 9th of February last, it would, in my apprehension, be of the greatest importance, that the respective States should fill their battalions to their complement of five hundred and four, rank and file. Considering the different possible dispositions of the enemy, and the different possible operations on our part, we ought not to have less than twenty thousand efficient Continental troops. The whole number of battalions from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania inclusive, if complete, would not amount to this force. The total would be twenty-three thousand one hundred and eighty-four, rank and file, from

which the customary deductions being made, there will not remain more than about eighteen thousand fit for the service of the field. To this may be added the remainder of the sixteen regiments, amounting to about one thousand.

Unless the principal part of the force be composed of men regularly organized, and on the continuance of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be attempted. The militia are too precarious a dependence to justify such an attempt, where they form a material part of the plan. Militia cannot have the necessary habits nor the consistency, either for an assault or a siege. In employing them essentially, we should run a risk of being abandoned in the most critical moments. The expense and the consumption of provisions and stores, which we are bound by every motive to economize, will be very considerably increased. As we should not be able to keep the same body in the field, during the whole campaign, we should a great part of the time have a double set of men to pay and feed, those in actual service, and those on the march to relieve them or returning home when relieved. The operations of husbandry will suffer in proportion.

The mode by draft is, I am persuaded, the only efficacious one to obtain men. It appears to me certain, that it is the only one to obtain them in time; nor can the period, which you have appointed for bringing them into the field, be delayed without defeating the object. I have little doubt, that at any time, and much less at the present juncture, the powers of government exerted with confidence will be equal to the purpose of drafting. The hopes of the people, elevated by the prospects before them, will induce a cheerful compliance with this and all the other measures of vigor, which have been recommended, and which the exigency requires. Not-

withstanding the extension of the draft, which I have taken the liberty to advise, occasional aids of the militia will be still wanted, but in much less number in this case than in the other. I have entire confidence, that the respective legislatures will be fully impressed with the importance and delicacy of the present juncture, and will second the views of the committee by the most speedy and vigorous efforts. With every sentiment of respect and esteem, I am, &c.*

* The following representations, contained in a letter from General Greene to the Commander-in-chief, convey impressions, which were doubtless common to many of the principal officers.

"From every new conversation," said General Greene, "which I have with your Excellency upon the business of the quartermaster's department, I am more and more convinced, that you are in a great measure a stranger to the difficulties and embarrassments attending it, as well as to the mortification, risk, and injury those are exposed to who engage in it. However important our cause, or valuable the blessings of liberty, it is utterly impossible to divest ourselves of our private feelings, while we are contending for them. Human nature must change, before men can act altogether regardless of their own private interest, or become insensible to what concerns their reputation; and perhaps it is best they should not, upon the great scale of human policy, though it may be inconvenient at particular seasons and to particular views. It is true, men may be influenced by motives of friendship and kindness to do that, which is contrary to their own private emolument; and so they may by interesting their pride or ambition; but when the public holds up to view neither the face of friendship nor prospects of reputation, but on the contrary adds insult to injury, and creates new and unnecessary difficulties, few men would be willing to tread the path where so little is to be gained and so much may be lost.

"Private emolument has been but a secondary object with far the greater part of the staff officers. The number of those, who have been benefited by their appointments, is very small; while hundreds have suffered in character and fortune from their employment, and are now loaded with heavy debts, without the remotest prospect of being able to pay them; and every obstacle thrown in the way of settling their accounts, to prevent their demands from being fixed. People can have but little spirit for business, where they are oppressed on every side with heavy demands, hunted by their creditors, and left to sink without support. I think I am pretty well acquainted with the temper of the people, and the disposition of the staff, in those States on whom we must depend for support, upon the present occasion; and, had your Excellency been as much exposed to

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Morristown, 27 May, 1780.

SIR,

It is with infinite pain I inform Congress, that we are reduced again to a situation of extremity for want of meat. On several days of late, the troops have been entirely destitute of any, and for a considerable time past they have been at best, at half, a quarter, an eighth allowance of this essential article of provision. The men have borne their distress in general with a firmness and patience never exceeded, and every commendation is due the officers for encouraging them to it, by exhortation and by example. They have suffered equally with the men, and, their relative situations considered, rather more. But such reiterated, constant instances of want are too much for the soldiery, and

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the murmurs of the one and the complaints of the other, as I have been, you would agree with me in opinion, that some healing measures are necessary for both, before great exertions are to be expected from either.

"With what face can the public ask further credit of the people or the staff, to increase their embarrassments, while they have no assurances respecting their present debts? I would stop all commission business; but it is a matter of more importance to attempt to smooth the ruffled temper of the people, who are public creditors, as well as to lighten the oppression of the staff officers, than it may be thought to be upon a slight view of the subject. Great objects may excite a general wish, and a seeming inclination to give support; but, without some new assurances respecting the past transactions, the returning thoughts of new loss and fresh embarrassments will cut the sinews of exertion. Our wishes often misguide our reason, especially when the object is important to ourselves or to the public. Whatever flatters our expectations gains an easy admittance, while the obstacles, which rise to view, are too often hurried over without examining their force or effect, or are discarded with impatience.

"I shall be happy to render every service in my power to promote the proposed plan of operations, notwithstanding the injuries I feel, providing they are not accompanied with circumstances of personal indignity. As to pay, I shall ask none, more than my family expenses; and all the conditions I shall ask are, to have my command in the line of the army agreeable to my rank, and to be secured from any loss in the settlement

cannot but lead to alarming consequences. Accordingly two regiments of the Connecticut line mutinied, and got under arms on Thursday night. Had it not been for the timely exertions of some of their officers, who obtained notice of it, the same might have been the case with the whole, with a determination to return home, or at best to gain subsistence at the point of the bayonet. After a good deal of expostulation by their officers and some of the Pennsylvania line, who had come to their assistance, and after parading their regiments upon the occasion, the men were prevailed upon to go to their huts; but a few nevertheless turned out again with their packs, who are now confined. Colonel Meigs, who acted with great propriety in endeavouring to suppress the mutiny, was struck by one of the soldiers. I wish our situation with respect to provision was better in other quarters, but it is not. They are in

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of the public accounts. These conditions are so reasonable and just, and so flattering to the interest of the public, that I hope there will not be a moment's hesitation in acceding to them in the fullest latitude. No man has devoted himself more to the public service than I have; and I hope I shall not be subject to the imputation of vanity if I claim some consideration for past services. Your Excellency must know me too well to suppose my spirits flag at imaginary difficulties, nor will you find the embarrassments less, but far greater, than they have been explained to you. I would wish to give you just information, neither aggravating nor lessening the obstacles that lie in our way; and I flatter myself, when you take a view of my past representations, the present state of things will agree with the picture drawn.

"Every man, whose happiness depends upon the success of the present controversy, and that sees the distress and confusion things are in, cannot help feeling alarmed and anxious to search out the cause. While our civil constitution rests upon its present basis, and the powers of Congress are so incompetent to the duty required of them, I have but little hopes, that the face of our affairs will mend; on the contrary, I fear they will grow worse and worse until ruin overtakes us. Nevertheless, if a new field should open for military exertions, my best endeavours shall not be wanting to give support to the measures that may be undertaken; and I hope your Excellency will give me such powers, and such assistance from the line of the army, as the business of the department may require."—*MS. Letter, May 21st.*

as great distress at West Point; and, by a letter from Colonel Van Schaick at Albany, he informs me, that the garrison of Fort Schuyler had then only a month's supply on hand, and that there were no more provisions to send them. From this detail Congress will see how distressing our situation is; but there are other matters which still continue to render it more alarming.

Nothing is farther from my wishes, than to add in the smallest degree to the distresses or embarrassments of Congress upon any occasion, and more particularly on one where I have every reason to fear they have it not in their power to administer the least relief. Duty however compels me to add one matter more to those I have already detailed. I have been informed by the two colonels of the Pennsylvania line, in whom I have the utmost confidence, who were called to assist Colonel Meigs to suppress the mutiny on Thursday night, that in the course of their expostulations the troops very pointedly mentioned, besides their distresses for provision, their not being paid for five months; and, what is of a still more serious and delicate nature in our present circumstances, they mentioned the great depreciation of the money, it being of little or no value at all, and yet, if they should be paid, that it would be in this way, and according to the usual amount, without an adequate allowance for the depreciation. They were reasoned with, and every argument used that these gentlemen and Colonel Meigs could devise, either to interest their pride or their passions; they were reminded of their past good conduct; of the late assurances of Congress; of the objects for which they were contending; but their answer was, that their sufferings were too great, and that they wanted present relief, and some present substantial recompense for their services. This matter, I confess, though I have heard of no further uneasiness

among the men, has given me infinitely more concern, than any thing that has ever happened, and strikes me as the most important, because we have no means at this time, that I know of, for paying the troops, except in Continental money; and as it is evidently impracticable, from the immense quantity it would require, to pay them as much as would make up the depreciation. Every possible means in my power will be directed on this and all occasions, as they ever have been, to preserve order and promote the public service; but in such an accumulation of distresses, amidst such a variety of embarrassments, which surround us on all sides, this will be found at least extremely difficult. If the troops could only be comfortably supplied with provisions, it would be a great point, and such as would with the event we expect soon to take place, the arrival of the armament from France to our succour, make them forget or at least forego many matters, which make a part of their anxieties and present complaints. I am, &c.

P. S. I enclose for your Excellency three New York Gazettes; also a small printed paper found in our camp, containing an address to our soldiers by the enemy, to induce them to desert. It is most likely, that many copies were dispersed, and that they have had a considerable effect, though this is the only one that has been seen by the officers, notwithstanding their pains to find others. Your Excellency will see the points on which the enemy particularly found their addresses.

TO JOSEPH REED, PRESIDENT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Morristown, 28 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Nothing could be more necessary, than the aid given by your State towards supplying us with provisions. I assure you, every idea you can form of our distresses will fall short of the reality. There is such a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the soldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in every line of the army the most serious features of mutiny and sedition. All our departments, all our operations, are at a stand; and unless a system, very different from that which has for a long time prevailed, be immediately adopted throughout the States, our affairs must soon become desperate beyond the possibility of recovery. If you were on the spot, my dear Sir, if you could see what difficulties surround us on every side, how unable we are to administer to the most ordinary calls of the service, you would be convinced, that these expressions are not too strong, and that we have every thing to dread. Indeed, I have almost ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a state of insensibility and indifference to its interests, that I dare not flatter myself with any change for the better.

The committee of Congress, in their late address to the several States, have given a just picture of our situation. I very much doubt its making the desired impression; and, if it does not, I shall consider our lethargy as incurable. The present juncture is so interesting, that if it does not produce correspondent exertions, it will be a proof that motives of honor, public good, and even self-preservation, have lost their influence upon our minds. This is a decisive moment; one of the most, I will go further and say, *the* most important

America has seen. The court of France has made a glorious effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we after that venture to confide, that our allies will persist in an attempt to establish what it will appear we want inclination or ability to assist them in.

Every view of our own circumstances ought to determine us to the most vigorous efforts; but there are considerations of another kind, that should have equal weight. The combined fleets of France and Spain last year were greatly superior to those of the enemy. Nevertheless the enemy sustained no material damage, and at the close of the campaign gave a very important blow to our allies. This campaign the difference between the fleets, from every account I have been able to collect, will be inconsiderable. Indeed it is far from clear, that there will not be an equality. What are we to expect will be the case, if there should be another campaign? In all probability the advantage will be on the side of the English. And then what would become of America? We ought not to deceive ourselves. The maritime resources of Great Britain are more substantial and real, than those of France and Spain united. Her commerce is more extensive, than that of both her rivals; and it is an axiom, that the nation which has the most extensive commerce will always have the most powerful marine. Were this argument less convincing, the fact speaks for itself. Her progress in the course of the last year is an incontestable proof.

It is true, France in a manner created a fleet in a very short space, and this may mislead us in the judgment we form of her naval abilities. But, if they bore any comparison with those of Great Britain, how comes it to pass, that, with all the force of Spain added, she

has lost so much ground in so short a time, as now to have scarcely a superiority? We should consider what was done by France, as a violent and unnatural effort of the government, which, for want of sufficient foundation, cannot continue to operate proportionable effects.

In modern wars, the longest purse must chiefly determine the event. I fear that of the enemy will be found to be so. Though the government is deeply in debt, and of course poor, the nation is rich, and their riches afford a fund, which will not be easily exhausted. Besides, their system of public credit is such, that it is capable of greater exertions than that of any other nation. Speculatists have been a long time foretelling its downfall; but we see no symptoms of the catastrophe being very near. I am persuaded it will at least last out the war, and then in the opinion of many of the best politicians it will be a national advantage. If the war should terminate successfully, the crown will have acquired such influence and power, that it may attempt any thing; and a bankruptcy will probably be made the ladder to climb to absolute authority. The administration may perhaps wish to drive matters to this issue. At any rate they will not be restrained, by an apprehension of it, from forcing the resources of the state. It will promote their present purposes, on which their all is at stake, and it may pave the way to triumph more effectually over the constitution. With this disposition I have no doubt that ample means will be found to prosecute the war with the greatest vigor.

France is in a very different position. The abilities of her present financier have done wonders. By a wise administration of the revenues, aided by advantageous loans, he has avoided the necessity of additional taxes; but I am well informed, if the war continues another campaign, he will be obliged to have

recourse to the taxes usual in time of war, which are very heavy; and which the people of France are not in a condition to endure for a long time. When this necessity commences, France makes war on ruinous terms, and England, from her individual wealth, will find much greater facility in supplying her exigencies.

Spain derives great wealth from her mines, but not so great as is generally imagined. Of late years the profit to government is essentially diminished. Commerce and industry are the best mines of a nation; both which are wanting to her. I am told her treasury is far from being so well filled as we have flattered ourselves. She is also much divided on the propriety of the war. There is a strong party against it. The temper of the nation is too sluggish to admit of great exertions; and, though the courts of the two kingdoms are closely linked together, there never has been in any of their wars a perfect harmony of measures, nor has it been the case in this; which has already been no small detriment to the common cause.

I mention these things to show, that the circumstances of our allies, as well as our own, call for peace; to obtain which we must make one great effort this campaign. The present instance of the friendship of the court of France is attended with every circumstance, that can render it important and agreeable, that can interest our gratitude or fire our emulation. If we do our duty, we may even hope to make the campaign decisive of this contest. But we must do our duty in earnest, or disgrace and ruin will attend us. I am sincere in declaring a full persuasion, that the succour will be fatal to us, if our measures are not adequate to the emergency.

Now, my dear Sir, I must observe to you, that much will depend on the State of Pennsylvania. She has it

in her power to contribute, without comparison, more to our success than any other State, in the two essential articles of flour and transportation. New York, Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland are our flour countries. Virginia produced little of this article the last crop, and her resources are called for to the southward. New York, by legislative coercion, has already given all she could spare for the use of the army. Her inhabitants are left with scarcely a sufficiency for their own subsistence. Jersey, from being so long the place of the army's residence, is equally exhausted. Maryland has made great exertions, but she can still do something more. Delaware may contribute handsomely in proportion to her extent. But Pennsylvania is our chief dependence. From every information I can obtain, she is at this time full of flour. I speak to you in the language of frankness and as a friend. I do not mean to make any insinuations unfavorable to the State. I am aware of the embarrassment the government labors under, from the open opposition of one party and the underhand intrigues of another. I know that, with the best dispositions to promote the public service, you have been obliged to move with circumspection. But this is a time to hazard and to take a tone of energy and decision. All parties but the disaffected will acquiesce in the necessity and give their support. The hopes and fears of the people at large may be acted upon in such a manner, as to make them approve and second your views. This matter is reduced to a point. Either Pennsylvania must give us all the aid we ask of her, or we can undertake nothing. We must renounce every idea of coöperation, and must confess to our allies, that we look wholly to them for our safety. This will be a state of humiliation and littleness, against which the feelings of every good American ought to

revolt. Yours I am convinced will; nor have I the least doubt, that you will employ all your influence to animate the legislature and the people at large. The fate of these States hangs upon it. God grant we may be properly impressed with the consequences.

I wish the legislature could be engaged to vest the executive with plenipotentiary powers. I should then expect every thing practicable from your abilities and zeal. This is not a time for formality or ceremony. The crisis, in every point of view, is extraordinary; and extraordinary expedients are necessary. I am decided in this opinion. I am happy to hear, that you have a prospect of complying with the requisitions of Congress for specific supplies; that the spirit of the city and State seems to revive, and the warmth of party to decline. These are good omens of our success. Perhaps this is the proper period to unite. I am obliged to you for the renewal of your assurances of personal regard. You are too well acquainted with my sentiments for you, to make it necessary to tell you with how much esteem and regard I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 29 May, 1780.

SIR,

I informed you yesterday morning, that I had received certain advices that a body of the enemy from Canada computed at about five hundred, under Sir John Johnson, had penetrated into the State of New York by way of the Mohawk River as far as Johnstown, and seemed as if they were about to take post there; and that there were other accounts, received through prisoners who had escaped from Canada, that a larger

force than this was assembling at Montreal about the last of April, intended, as it was said, to make an expedition against Fort Schuyler. How far this last information is true, is a matter we cannot ascertain; but it is of infinite importance, that the communication with that post should be opened, and a quantity of provisions thrown into the garrison as early as possible for the support of the troops. At present it is cut off, or at least it was when I received my advices, by the position the enemy had taken at Johnstown.

You will therefore proceed with your brigade, which is already in motion, with all the expedition you can, consistently with the health of the men, to King's Ferry by the best and most direct route, where you will embark the troops in boats directed to be prepared for the purpose, and go to New Windsor. At this place it is expected that there will be sloops provided by the State, according to a requisition which has been made, for transporting the troops to Albany, where they cannot arrive too soon. After you arrive at Albany, your future conduct must be governed by your own discretion, the information which you receive with respect to the enemy above, and the exigency of the service. You are to remember, however, that it is of the greatest importance to open the communication with the garrison at Fort Schuyler, and to throw in for their relief a quantity of provisions, both flour and salted meat; and this you will endeavour to effect by every practicable means. I wish if possible that it may be supplied at least with a hundred barrels of flour, and with the same quantity of salt meat. A greater quantity of both will be still better, if it can be procured. You will correspond and advise with his Excellency Governor Clinton upon the occasion, and with respect to all the measures it may be necessary for you to pursue; whom

you will meet, I expect, either at Kingston or Albany. You will also inform me from time to time of your proceedings, and of every occurrence which you may deem material.

With respect to provision for your troops, I do not know how you will procure it. Their supplies will depend entirely upon your occasional arrangements and the aid of the State. You will look forward to these, and of course endeavour to do the best you can to obtain them. I wish you on your march even to the North River to take every reasonable precaution to prevent your being intercepted by the enemy, who may possibly attempt it by sending a detachment from New York; and, in case you move from Albany, either against the enemy, should they remain, or to cover the provisions which may be sent to Fort Schuyler, you will use every possible means, (or the detachment which may be sent for the purpose,) to guard against a surprise or being cut off. You will take every pains to prevent desertions, and will always have your troops in readiness to rejoin the army on the shortest notice. From the situation of the fifth regiment lately commanded by Colonel Dubois, with respect to field-officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Willett will take the command till further orders. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Morristown, 31 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Although I am convinced from your late frequent representations, and my own knowledge, of the distress in which your department is involved for want of money, and consequently of your inability to make

almost any new provision of the many articles necessary for the operations of this campaign, yet there are some matters, which may be put in a state of readiness through the means of the artificers, whom we have in service, aided by the materials on hand. Of these are our carriages, old camp-equipages, and boats. To the last I would wish you to pay a particular attention, directing them to be completely provided with oars, boat-hooks, and setting-poles.

We shall probably have occasion for the materials necessary for laying bridges of boats; such as cables, anchors, plank, and scantling. Should it not be in your power to engage these articles, it may not be amiss to be inquiring where they may be most readily procured, that you may, in case you should either be furnished with the means of purchase by the treasury, or by the authority of the States, know where to apply for them without loss of time. This mode may perhaps be extended with advantage to many other articles in your line; for, should the States comply with the specific demands made upon them by the committee of Congress, they will in all likelihood be obliged to seek for assistance and information from the heads of the several departments.

There is a matter, which I would wish you seemingly to turn your attention to, with a view of distracting the enemy by an appearance of making preparations for an embarkation of troops. To this end be pleased to give your deputies in Philadelphia, Boston, and other considerable ports, directions to inquire what quantity of shipping can be procured and upon what terms. This they may do in an open manner, and, as the owners will naturally want to know the destination, they may hint at Penobscot, Halifax, or Newfoundland.

Enclosed you have an estimate of sundry articles in

the artillery and engineering line, which will be wanted in the execution of the intended coöperation. Should it not be in your power, circumstanced as you are, to procure or make contracts for the timber, you had best deliver in an estimate to the committee with the whole quantity apportioned on the States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, which, from their convenience of water carriage, can easily send it to the places where it will be wanted. I think you have the greater part of the tools already provided. The sand-bags are very essential, and must be procured in considerable quantities if possible. I am, &c.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Morristown, 31 May, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have been honored with your favor in answer to my letter respecting the appointment of a committee, with two others of later dates. Certain I am, unless Congress speak in a more decisive tone, unless they are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great purposes of war, or assume them as matter of right, and they and the States respectively act with more energy than they hitherto have done, that our cause is lost. We can no longer drudge on in the old way. By ill timing the adoption of measures, by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable jealousies, we incur enormous expenses and derive no benefit from them. One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up hill; and, while such a sys-

tem as the present one or rather want of one prevails, we shall ever be unable to apply our strength or resources to any advantage.

This, my dear Sir, is plain language to a member of Congress; but it is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long thinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen, which, instead of looking up to Congress as the supreme controlling power of the United States, are considering themselves as dependent on their respective States. In a word, I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration and respect, which are due to them as the great representative body of America, and I am fearful of the consequences.

Till your letter came to hand, I thought General Weedon had actually resigned his commission; but, be this as it may, I see no possibility of giving him a command out of the line of his own State. He certainly knows, that every State that has troops enough to form a brigade, claims and has uniformly exercised the privilege of having them commanded by a brigadier of their own. Nor is it in my power to depart from this system, without convulsing the army, which at all times is hurtful, and at this it might be ruinous. I am sincerely and affectionately yours, &c.*

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* General Weedon had retired from the service, while the army was at Valley Forge, on account of some difficulty with General Woodford respecting rank. Mr. Jones had inquired whether he could not be restored, so as to have a command in the line at large. In his reply to the above letter Mr. Jones wrote; "Congress have been gradually surrendering or throwing upon the several States the exercise of powers, which they should have claimed, and to their utmost have exercised themselves, till at length they have scarcely a power left, but such as concerns foreign transactions; for, as to the army, Congress is at present little more than

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Morristown, 1 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

We have received advice from New York, published by authority, of the surrender of Charleston. As I dare say you will have seen the handbill, and, as I am pressed for time, I shall not go into particulars.* A person from Amboy reports, that he saw the day before yesterday one hundred sail of vessels enter Sandy Hook. This, if true, can be nothing else than Sir Henry Clinton returned with the whole or part of his force. There is every reason to believe, that, encouraged by his success to the southward, and by the distresses of the garrison, he may resolve upon an immediate attempt upon West Point. You ought to be prepared for it, by collecting your force and redoubling your vigilance, especially towards the water.

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the medium through which the wants of the army are conveyed to the States. This body never had, or at least in few instances ever exercised, powers adequate to the purposes of war; and indeed such as they possessed have been frittered away to the States, and it will be found, I fear, very difficult to recover them. A resolution was passed the other day, desiring the States to inform us what they had done upon certain requirements for some time past, that we might know upon what to rely. This may serve as a basis for assuming powers, should the answers afford an opening. Other resolutions are now before us, by one of which the States are desired to give express powers to call forth men, provisions, and money for carrying on the war for the common defence. Others go to the assumption of them immediately. The first I have no doubt will pass this body, but I expect it will sleep with the States. The others I believe will die where they are; for, so cautious are some of offending the States in this respect, that a gentleman the other day plainly told us, upon a proposition to order some armed vessels to search the vessels going out, with a view to prevent the exportation of flour, that, if an embargo was laid in the Delaware as in this State, he would consent to the measure, otherwise he never would agree to such an exercise of power."

* The capitulation of Charleston took place on the 12th of May. A full account of the siege and surrender is contained in MOULTRIE's *Memoirs of the American Revolution*, Vol. II. pp. 65–106.

We shall immediately impress a number of wagons, to forward to you a considerable supply of flour from this place. I have also written to the Governor of Connecticut, to interpose the authority of government for forwarding with all possible despatch a quantity of salted meat from Connecticut, and for keeping up supplies of fresh meat. To give you, however, a temporary aid, I would have you immediately collect, principally in the counties towards the enemy, a number of cattle in the manner least distressing to the inhabitants. This will enable you to spare your salted provision. You can have the cattle in your neighbourhood. With the greatest regard, I am, &c.*

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* On the 2d of June the committee from Congress in camp sent a circular letter to all the eastern and middle States, representing the condition of the army, and the necessity of complying as soon as possible with the requisitions of Congress for troops and supplies. General Washington enforced the representations of the committee by another circular of the same date, in which he urged in a particular manner, that the quotas of men should be raised and sent to the army without the least delay. The numbers for each State, and the places in which they were to rendezvous, were specified as follows.

States.	Quotas.	Regiments.	Place of Rendezvous.
New Hampshire	945	2	Claverac
Massachusetts	4725	9	Claverac
Rhode Island	630	1	Providence
Connecticut	2520	5	Danbury
New York	1575	3	Fishkill
New Jersey	945	2	Morristown
Pennsylvania	3465	7	Easton and Trenton
Delaware	315	1	Wilmington
Maryland	2205	4	Head of Elk

The quotas from the other States were intended for the southern army, and were subject to the orders of the commander in that department.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH

Morristown, 2 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

It is expected that the fleet of our ally will in the first instance touch at Rhode Island, for the purpose of landing their sick and supernumerary stores, and to meet the intelligence necessary to direct their operations. I have already sent forward Dr. Craik to take up proper houses for hospitals, and to make some previous arrangements in that department; but, as I apprehend the French general and admiral will, upon their arrival, want the advice and assistance of a person of discretion and judgment, who is acquainted with the country, I must request you to repair immediately to Providence, and upon their arrival present yourself to them, letting them know that they may command your services. I would wish you to endeavour, in conjunction with the governor, to establish a market between the fleet and army and country, and be careful that our allies are not imposed upon in the prices of articles, which they may find necessary. This is a point recommended in the plan drawn up by the ministry of France, and which policy and generosity direct should be strictly attended to. You will by the next opportunity receive a letter from the Marquis de Lafayette introducing you to Lieutenant-General Count de Rochambeau and Admiral de Ternay. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

Morristown, 4 June, 1780.

SIR,

As the opening of the campaign is fast approaching, and it is time to form a general disposition of the army

with that view, it is essential I should know as soon as possible what general officers will be present. For this purpose I am to request that you will inform me without delay, whether the situation of your private affairs will permit you to take the field this campaign or not, and, if you do take the field, when we may hope to see you at camp. I am, Sir, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Morristown, 4 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Enclosed you have the draught of a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Canada. You will be pleased to put this into the hands of a printer, whose secrecy and discretion may be depended on, and desire him to strike off a proof-sheet with the utmost despatch, which you will send to me for correction. We shall want at least five hundred copies. The importance of this business will sufficiently impress you with the necessity of transacting it with every possible degree of caution. The printer is to be particularly charged not on any account to reserve a copy himself, or suffer one to get abroad. With great regard, I am, &c.†

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* From the time of his leaving the command at Providence in the beginning of winter, General Gates had been at his own residence in Virginia. He was unanimously appointed by Congress, on the 13th of June, to take the command in the southern department.

† This was the proclamation mentioned in the letter to Lafayette, dated May 19th, and designed to mislead the British commander. Arnold was at this time in secret correspondence with him, and it may be presumed, that he communicated intelligence so important, and thus defeated the object of the proclamation. For several months previously, Arnold had endeavoured to recommend himself to the enemy by sending intelligence concerning the movements and plans of the American army.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Morristown, 5 June, 1780.

SIR,

My time has been so entirely engrossed in the preliminary arrangements of immediate necessity towards the intended coöperation, that I have not been able till now to do myself the honor to thank your Excellency for your letter of the 21st of May. We have too many proofs of the generous zeal of your countrymen in the cause of America, not to be entirely convinced of it, and to feel all that the most grateful sensibility can inspire. I am happy in believing, that the troops and citizens of these States will eagerly embrace every opportunity to manifest their affection to the troops and citizens of your nation, as well as their gratitude and veneration to a prince, from whom they have received the most important benefits. Penetrated with a sense of these, I shall think it my duty to cultivate correspondent sentiments, as far as my influence extends.

The Marquis has given me an account of all your Excellency has done for the advancement of the combined operations. It will no doubt contribute essentially to their success, and give you a claim to the acknowledgments of the two countries. I am too sensible of the value of the permission you give me, to solicit your aid in every thing in which you can continue to afford us your good offices, not to make use of it as frequently as possible. I begin by entreating you to favor me with your advice with the greatest freedom, on whatever occurs to you interesting to our affairs at this period. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Heights above Springfield, 10 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You do well to consider the post of West Point as the capital object of your attention, and every other as secondary. This is peculiarly necessary at the present moment, as there are circumstances that authorize a suspicion of something being intended against that post. I would therefore have you by all means keep your force collected in such manner, that there may not be a possibility of your being found in a divided state, in case of a sudden movement of the enemy your way.

General Knyphausen, we have reason to believe, with all the force that he could spare from New York, made an incursion into the Jerseys on the night of the 6th instant, and proceeded early the next morning towards Connecticut Farms, about five miles from Elizabethtown. In the night of the 7th he retired to the point of his debarkation beyond Elizabethtown, where he has remained ever since and has been crossing and recrossing his cavalry and baggage. His whole conduct is inexplicable, and begins to have much the air of an amusement. It is probable that Clinton, with the whole or a part of the troops under his command, is momently expected at New York; and the present movement may be intended to draw our attention this way, while he on his arrival pushes immediately up the North River and attacks the forts, united with what troops still remain in New York.

The day Knyphausen moved out, he was very severely galled by an advanced corps of Continental troops, and the Jersey militia, who have turned out and acted with admirable spirit on the occasion. We

conjectured at first, that his coming out was to forage or to draw us down into the plain and give us battle; but, as he did not pursue the first, and as he must have seen that we shall not fight him but upon our own terms, we cannot see why he should remain in his present position so long. We are therefore led to the other conjecture respecting you. Use all possible vigilance and caution. It is not improbable that Clinton's * brigade may shortly reinforce you. The enemy have a good many cavalry, and we have none here. You will despatch immediately Moylan's regiment to join us. Sheldon's will continue with you. His infantry on an emergency may be thrown into the garrison.

You ask my opinion about giving due-bills for deficient rations. It would be but justice, if our circumstances permitted it, but they do not. We can neither afford provision, nor have we money to pay for deficiencies. No such allowance has been made to the troops here. You will order Colonel Hay to detain the ship-carpenters in his employ, even if the business now in hand should be finished; for we shall have essential need of their services hereafter. With respect to the mode of purchasing horses, as proposed by Colonel Hay, I can only say, that the necessity of the case must justify the measure, but that I wish you to procure such a number only as may be absolutely necessary. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Springfield, 10 June, 1780.

SIR,

I beg leave to inform your Excellency, that on Tuesday night the enemy landed at Elizabethtown Point,

* General James Clinton.

with the principal part of their force, under the command of General Knyphausen, and proceeded the next morning into the country, till they were within half a mile of Springfield. In their march they were most spiritedly opposed by the Jersey troops, who formed the advanced corps of the army, and by such of the militia as had an opportunity from their situation and the suddenness of the occasion to collect. The moment I received advice, that the enemy were out in force, I put the army in motion, and it reached the heights in the rear of Springfield on Wednesday afternoon. A pretty warm skirmishing was kept up through the day between the enemy and the light parties on our side, in which there is reason to believe the enemy were a good deal galled. We have received intelligence, which seems to be authentic, that Brigadier-General Sterling was wounded in the thigh shortly after the debarkation. In the night they retired to Elizabethtown Point, where they have remained ever since, having burnt in the course of the day, according to their common mode of warfare, a meeting-house and several dwelling-houses and barns.* Their movements are a little mysterious, and the design of them not easily penetrated. We can only form conjectures. The militia have turned out with remarkable spirit, and have hitherto done themselves great honor. I cannot precisely ascertain the loss we have sustained upon this occasion, but it is inconsiderable. I am, &c.†

* It was on this occasion that Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of the Reverend James Caldwell, was shot by a soldier while sitting in her house and in the midst of her children. See the particulars in MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*, Vol. IV. p. 225.

† It was supposed that the enemy, being informed of the distress and dissatisfaction in the American army, on account of a want of clothing and provisions and a deficiency of pay, made this incursion into Jersey, with a view of affording an opportunity to the American troops to revolt

TO MAJOR HENRY LEE.

Head-Quarters, near Springfield, 11 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favor of this date. The spirit which has been exhibited by your corps gives me pleasure, and, be assured, meets with my thanks and approbation. As your rapid progress must have fatigued the cavalry in some degree, I wish you for the present to take post somewhere in our rear. Perhaps Chatham, or its vicinity, is as well calculated to afford you forage as any other place. You will, however, when you have fixed on the spot, be pleased by a line to point it out to me. I shall be glad to see you at my quarters to-morrow morning. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Springfield, 15 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The enemy still remain here, and every thing indicates that they have some serious enterprise in view. My suspicions for the North River still continue and rather increase. It is some time since I have had a return of your garrison; therefore I cannot judge precisely of your force; but, if you have not two thousand five hundred rank and file fit for action, you will be pleased immediately to apply to Governor Clinton for militia to complete that number. Not knowing with certainty the state of things on our northern frontier, I

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or desert. The attempt proving unsuccessful, General Knyphausen retired with his whole force to Elizabethtown Point, where he erected three small works of defence, and threw a bridge of boats across the Sound to Staten Island.

have not thought it advisable to give a positive order for Clinton's return; but I have written to the Governor in such a spirit, that, if his presence above should not be indispensable, he will certainly reinforce you as speedily as possible. When this event takes place, you will dismiss the militia.

In my letter of the 10th instant I urged you to collect all your force for the immediate defence of the posts of West Point and its dependencies. I hope it will be done before this reaches you; but, if any part of your force remains divided, you will instantly call it in, and keep yourself compact, whatever temptations may be thrown out to induce you to detach. If the enemy's designs should be against this army, you may be useful to us by making a demonstration in your quarter. I would therefore have you collect a number of boats at West Point, sufficient for two thousand men; put the garrison under moving orders with three days' provision; circulate ideas of having the militia ready for a sudden call; apply to Governor Trumbull for the advance of the Connecticut State regiments; and take such other steps as may make a noise, without overdoing the matter, and give the enemy some alarm.

You can also send some emissary into New York with these particulars, so colored as to give them the greatest likelihood of making the desired impression. You may instruct him to tell the enemy, that he was sent in to find out the general state and disposition of the force on the Island of New York; but that his inquiries were more particularly to be directed to the magazines at Fort Washington and other places accessible by water. If any movements of the enemy should come to your knowledge, which announce an immediate attempt upon your post, you will give notice to the governor of Connecticut, and solicit suc-

cour from that State. I have desired General McDougall to join you without delay. I am, with great regard, dear Sir, &c.

TO GOVERNOR LIVINGSTON.

Springfield, 18 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received advice, which appears to be direct, that the legislature of this State has determined on a draft from the militia to serve for the campaign under their own officers, instead of being incorporated with their Continental battalions. This mode, if adopted, will be attended with so many inconveniences if followed by the States in general, and will be so absolutely pernicious to all the prospects of the campaign, that I cannot forbear taking the liberty to send Brigadier-General Knox to represent, on my part, the ill consequences of the measure, and the superior advantages of the plan recommended in preference. I entreat your Excellency to procure him the honor of a conference with the legislature for this purpose. The crisis is so delicate and important, the honor and interest of these States so essentially depend on a judicious and vigorous exertion of our resources at this juncture, that I cannot but manifest my anxiety, when I see any measures in agitation that threaten the disappointment of our hopes, and take every step in my power to prevent their being carried into execution. In military questions, the officers of the army have a right to flatter themselves their country will place some confidence in their experience and judgment; and it is the policy of every wise nation to do it. I cannot doubt, that, on reconsideration, the zeal and wisdom, which

have distinguished the councils of this State, will embrace what the true interest of America on this occasion demands. I have the honor to be, with every sentiment of respect and esteem, your Excellency's most obedient servant.

TO PHILIP SCHUYLER, JOHN MATHEWS, AND NATHANIEL PEABODY, COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS.

Springfield, 19 June, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,

From the vast importance of the thing, I hoped that I should have been informed before this, of the measures which the several States meant to adopt, in consequence of your late requisitions; but, as I have not, I am certain you remain unadvised yourselves, and I have only to lament with you the delay. This is a point of primary consequence. We are now arrived at the period when we may momently expect the fleet from France. For want of information it has been impossible for me to digest a system of coöperation. I have no data on which to proceed, and of course, were the armament to come, I should find myself in the most delicate, embarrassing, and cruel situation. The French commanders, from the relation in which I stand, the instant they reach our coast will look to me for a plan of the measures to be pursued, and I ought of right to have one prepared; but I cannot even give them conjectures. The interests of the States, the reputation of their councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies, a regard for my own character, all demand, that I should without delay be enabled to ascertain and inform them what we can or cannot undertake.

Besides, there is a point now to be determined, on

which the success of all our future operations may turn, and concerning which, for want of knowing our prospects, I am altogether at a loss what to do. To avoid involving the fleet and army of our allies in circumstances which, if not seconded by us, would expose them to material inconveniences and hazard, I shall be obliged to suspend a step, the delay of which may be fatal to our hopes. I therefore beg leave to suggest to the committee the indispensable necessity of writing again to the different States, urging them to give immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken, the success they have had, and the probable result of them. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Springfield, 20 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The posts at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point were established more with a view of preventing the communication being interrupted by a vessel or two with a small body of men, than from an expectation that they would be able to stand a regular investment, or a serious attack in force. The officers, therefore, who command them, should be directed to govern themselves by appearances and circumstances. If the enemy come up in force, they will be under the necessity of making such demonstration, by the number of their vessels and other preparations, as will evince their designs. The officers are then to withdraw their garrisons at all events, and cannon and stores if possible. To give them the better chance of effecting the latter, boats should be constantly kept at each place, appropriated to that service only. There is a bare possibility, that

the enemy may throw a force suddenly in the rear of each, and run a vessel above them. In such case the best defence that the places will admit of must be made; and, to provide for such a contingency, let ten or twelve days' provision be kept in each post, and a supply of ammunition equal to an expenditure of that time. I would not wish the officers to set fire to the works, if upon any occasion they should be obliged to leave them; because they may perhaps be induced to quit them upon appearances seemingly well grounded, and therefore, if left entire, they may return to them when the alarm is over. If the officers at present commanding at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point are men of discretion, it will be best to let them remain, with directions not to disclose their instructions to any person whatever; because, should the enemy obtain a knowledge of them, they might, by making feints, manœuvre them out of the posts.

The security of the western part of the State of New York depends so absolutely upon holding the post of Fort Schuyler, that I shall not be easy till I have thrown a handsome supply of provisions into it. You will therefore be pleased instantly to send up one hundred barrels of flour to Albany, addressed to Colonel Van Schaick, who will forward it; and, should his Excellency Governor Clinton call upon you for one hundred barrels of beef, you will deliver it to his order, or send it up to Albany if required. This will be wanted for the garrison of the fort also, and must therefore be of sound and good quality. Should it be called for, give the commissary strict orders to have it inspected, and put in the best order for keeping, before it is removed. I shall continue sending up flour to you as fast as teams can be procured to transport it.

The scarcity of cavalry has obliged me to divert the

Maréchaussée corps of horse from their proper occupation, and put them upon ordinary field duty. Enclosed you have a letter under a flying seal for General Glover, directing him to repair immediately to Springfield,* and superintend forwarding the drafts from Massachusetts Bay. Should not General Glover be arrived at West Point, you will be pleased to forward the letter immediately to him. I have written to General Heath, desiring him to order all the officers, who were upon the recruiting service in Massachusetts, to repair to Springfield, and march the drafts from thence. As they arrive they are to be distributed in proportion to the several regiments of the State, so as to keep them as nearly as possible upon a level. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Springfield, 21 June, 1780.

SIR,

By the general order of this day, you will take the command of the troops left at this post and the vicinity, consisting of Maxwell's and Stark's brigades, Lee's corps, and the militia. The objects of your command are, as far as possible, to cover the country and the public stores. The dispositions for this purpose are left entirely to your discretion, with this recommendation only, that you use every precaution in your power to avoid surprise, and provide for the security of your corps. You will pay particular attention to the obtaining of intelligence from the enemy, of their land and sea force, of their movements and intentions; giving me punctual advice of whatever comes to your knowledge. I am, &c.

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* In the State of Massachusetts.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Springfield, 21 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I yesterday evening received your two favors, and was happy to find that a part of Clinton's brigade had joined you. I hope by this time the whole will have got down, or at least all of it except the regiment detached to Fort Schuyler with provisions. From the immense importance of the post under your direction, I wish, as expressed in my letter of the 15th, that you may have and keep your force completed to two thousand five hundred efficient men. This force I hold to be necessary, and you will keep it appropriated by a proper distribution for the defence of the several works particularly, and exclusively of any other duty. This is the object, and the only one, for which I wish it to be employed; and, from the very embarrassing state of our provisions, and the evident necessity of economizing with respect to them as much as possible, I would not have your force consist of a man more, than the number I have mentioned. This has been deemed sufficient, and will be, to oppose any force the enemy can operate with; and no aid of militia, beyond what may be necessary to make it up to this number, should be called in, but in case of the most pressing emergency. I request you, so far as it can be done, to save the salt provisions. Whenever we have it in our power, fresh should be used. Our stores of the former are scanty in the extreme, and should be preserved for occasions when it may not be in our power to procure the latter, or when they may not answer.

The enemy remain in the same position, and have made no movements or alterations in their circumstances. Sir Henry Clinton is said to be on Staten

Island, with the troops, who came from the southward, and whose number is variously reported to be from four to six thousand men. I cannot yet penetrate their designs. In the present situation of things, the whole of Moylan's regiment is essential here. Sheldon's will certainly be sufficient to furnish reconnoitring parties, and parties of advance, to announce the movements and approach of the enemy, in case they proceed to operate up the river. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Whippany, 25 June, 1780.

SIR,

Since I had the honor of addressing Congress, the following movements have taken place on the part of the enemy and on our part. The conduct of the enemy and our intelligence giving us reason to suspect a design against West Point, on the 21st the army, except two brigades left under the command of General Greene to cover the country and our stores, were put in motion to proceed slowly towards Pompton. On the 22d they arrived at Rockaway Bridge, about eleven miles from Morristown. The day following, the enemy moved in force from Elizabethtown towards Springfield. They were opposed with great conduct and spirit by Major-Generals Greene and Dickinson, with the Continental troops and such of the militia as were assembled; but, with their superiority of numbers, they of course gained Springfield, burnt the village, and retired the same day to their former position.* In the night they abandoned it, crossed over to Staten Island, and took

* See General Greene's letter in the APPENDIX, No. II.

up their bridge. I beg leave to refer Congress to General Greene's report for particulars.

The enemy advanced on this occasion with so serious an aspect, that we were compelled to act upon the supposition of their menacing our stores. A brigade was detached to fall in with their right flank, and the army moved back towards Morristown five or six miles, to be more in supporting distance. On receiving intelligence of the enemy's withdrawing from the Point, all the troops were put under marching orders for the North River; but the weather prevented them from commencing their march before this morning.

The late movements of the enemy seem to have no satisfactory solution but an enterprise against West Point. Our last advices look strongly to the same object, yet there are many powerful reasons against it. But as we are now in a great degree rid of the incumbrance of our stores by the measures taken to remove them, prudence demands that our dispositions should be principally relative to West Point. We shall do every thing in our power for its security; and, in spite of the peculiar embarrassments of our situation, I hope not without success. The enemy have not made their incursions into this State without loss. Ours has been small. The militia deserve every thing that can be said on both occasions. They flew to arms universally, and acted with a spirit equal to any thing I have seen in the course of the war. With every sentiment of respect I have the honor to be, &c.*

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* It will be seen by an extract from General Clinton's letter to Lord George Germain, relating to this subject, that, so far from having any design against West Point, his object was to seek a place of security where he could give rest to his troops, just returned from the fatigues of the southern campaign.

"I arrived in New York from the south," he wrote, "on the 17th of

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Whippany, 25 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

On Friday last, the enemy moved from Elizabethtown Point to Springfield, in considerable force, supposed to be about five thousand. The bridge at Springfield was pretty obstinately defended by Colonel Angell's regiment; nor was it gained by the enemy till after a contest of nearly forty minutes. This regiment had about forty killed and wounded. Our whole loss during the day does not rise much higher; but, from all the accounts, which we have been as yet able to collect, the enemy's has been much greater. They retreated with great rapidity, after having burnt Springfield, to Elizabethtown Point, and evacuated the place between twelve and one the same night. We have not been able to ascertain, since their leaving the Jerseys, wheth-

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June, and found that General Knyphausen had made a move with the army into Jersey. At my arrival they were between Elizabethtown Creek and Newark. Washington's army was at Chatham, and an advanced corps at Connecticut Farms. In the present circumstances I could not think of keeping the field in Jersey. Washington's retreat gave me little time for deliberation. To avail myself, however, as much as I could, of our situation, I ordered, previously to quitting Jersey, a strong detachment under General Mathew, well supported by Knyphausen, to move to the last division of the rebel army and press it if possible, whilst I put the troops, just arrived from Carolina and already landed on Staten Island, afloat again, and repaired in person to Haverstraw Bay, the transports following me to Phillipsburg. I was thus in readiness to take advantage of any unguarded march the enemy might make to succour the corps attacked; or, finding no enemy for offence (as was the event), to land the troops and give a camp of rest to an army, of which many corps had had an uninterrupted campaign of fourteen months. The attack of the rear of Washington's army was conducted with judgment and spirit. The enemy were forced from two strong positions, and the troops, after remaining some hours in Springfield, retired according to my orders, and that evening without molestation evacuated Jersey, bringing off the bridge of boats, which had been thrown across the Staten Island Sound." — *MS. Letter, July 4th.*

er they have embarked with a design to proceed up the North River, or whether they have returned to New York. I thought it however advisable to give you this information, that all necessary measures may be taken to provide against the former. General Huntington is some way on his march, and is instructed to take post at Suffern's, and to communicate with you. The rest of the army is also in motion; but their progress must be governed by our intelligence.

I would just observe, with regard to the posts at West Point most exposed and most important, that they will no doubt experience your most immediate attention, and be provided specifically, not only with the proper quantity of stores and provisions, but garrisoned with troops best calculated for an obstinate resistance. At this moment, it is difficult to say what the enemy propose to themselves; but, let it be what it may, it is our principal business to be fully prepared for them at West Point. I enclose to you a letter from the Board of War, which they transmitted open in one to me. Every precaution and measure for obtaining provisions and supplying West Point have certainly been taken, which appeared practicable. The route, by which the southern supplies come, must, as has been heretofore the case, depend on the situation and movements of the enemy; on which head the quartermaster and commissary will always be advised. You will direct the receiving commissary to keep a particular account of the provisions forwarded by the Associators, and to give receipts for them. I am, &c.

TO PRESIDENT REED.

Head-Quarters, Whippany, 25 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I very much admire the patriotic spirit of the ladies of Philadelphia, and shall with great pleasure give them my advice, as to the application of their benevolent and generous donation to the soldiers of the army. Although the terms of the Association seem in some measure to preclude the purchase of any article, which the public is bound to find, I would nevertheless recommend a provision of shirts, in preference to any thing else, in case the fund should amount to a sum equivalent to a supply of eight or ten thousand. The soldiery are exceedingly in want of them, and the public have never, for several years past, been able to procure a sufficient quantity to make them comfortable. They are, besides, more capable of an equal and satisfactory distribution than almost any other article. Should the fund fall short of a supply of the number of shirts I have mentioned, perhaps there could be no better application of the money, than laying it out in the purchase of refreshments for the hospitals. These are my ideas at present. When I have the pleasure of hearing more particularly from Mrs. Reed, I shall probably be able to form a more complete opinion.*

* This was in reply to a letter in which Mr. Reed had written; — "The ladies have caught the happy contagion, and in a few days Mrs. Reed will have the honor of writing to you on the subject. It is expected she will have a sum equal to one hundred thousand pounds to be laid out according to your Excellency's direction, in such a way as may be thought most honorable and gratifying to the brave old soldiers, who have borne so great a share of the burden of this war. I thought it best to mention it in this way to your Excellency for your consideration, as it may tend to forward the benevolent scheme of the donors with despatch. I must observe, that the ladies have excepted such articles of necessity as clothing,

I shall, agreeably to your Excellency's request, send down a few officers to take charge of and bring forward the drafts. As to the business of recruiting by voluntary enlistments, you may be assured, that its operation, if attended with any tolerable success in the end, will be too slow to answer our present purposes. I would therefore most earnestly recommend to you to place no dependence upon any such measure; but, by an immediate augmentation of drafts, to supply the men required from Pennsylvania by the committee of Congress.

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which the States are bound to provide. We have just heard, that Mrs. Washington is on the road to this city, so that we shall have the benefit of her advice and assistance here, and if necessary refer afterwards to your Excellency." — *MS. Letter, June 20th.*

A further account of this contribution was communicated in a letter from Mrs. Reed to General Washington, in which she wrote as follows.

"The subscription set on foot by the ladies of this city for the use of the soldiers is so far completed, as to induce me to transmit to your Excellency an account of the money I have received, which, although it has answered our expectations, does not equal our wishes. But I am persuaded it will be received as a proof of our zeal for the great cause of America, and of our esteem and gratitude for those, who so bravely defend it. The amount of the subscription is 200,580 dollars, and £625, 6*s.* 8*d.* in specie, which make in the whole in paper money 300,634 dollars. The ladies are anxious for the soldiers to receive the benefit of it, and wait your directions how it can best be disposed of. We expect considerable additions from the country; and I have also written to the other States in hopes that the ladies there will adopt a similar plan to render it more general and beneficial." — *Philadelphia, July 4th.*

The depreciation at this time was a little more than forty for one. Hence the actual amount subscribed in specie value was about seven thousand five hundred dollars.

The example was followed by ladies in New Jersey. Miss Mary Dagworthy wrote to the Commander-in-chief; — "By order of Mrs. Dickinson and the other ladies of the committee, I have transmitted to your Excellency fifteen thousand four hundred and eighty-eight dollars, being the subscriptions received at this place, to be disposed of in such manner as your Excellency shall think proper for the benefit of the Continental soldiers. As the other subscriptions come in, they will be forwarded without delay." — *Trenton, July 17th.* This amount also is estimated in the depreciated currency.

They make so considerable a part of the force estimated as necessary to give a probability of success to our expected operations, that they cannot be dispensed with. Be kind enough to deliver the enclosed to Mrs. Washington. I am infinitely obliged to your Excellency and to Mrs. Reed for your polite attention to her. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, Ramapo, 27 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Before this time, the Connecticut division will probably have joined you. The rest of the army arrived here yesterday. The delay, which has occurred, makes it probable, that the enemy either had not any intention, or have relinquished the project, of attacking West Point, and only intend to retard our operations by menacing us at different points and obliging us to call out the militia. I believe what they have done hitherto will rather be of service than disservice to us, as it seems to have given a stimulus to the States. But this would not be the case, if we should continue to keep in the field a considerable body of militia, which, besides interfering with the drafts for the Continental battalions, will injure the operations of agriculture. The removal of our stores in the Jerseys to remoter deposits, and the present disposition of our Continental force, seem to supersede the necessity of the services of the militia, and to give us tolerable security without them. I have therefore written to send back the militia, marching from Massachusetts and Connecticut. The letters for this purpose are enclosed. You will be pleased to forward them without delay.

With the augmentation of the Connecticut line I take it for granted, that your garrison will amount in Continental troops to the number mentioned in a former letter. You will, therefore, dismiss all the militia, who may be in the garrison. If your number should not be complete without them, you can detain one of the Connecticut State regiments. You will be pleased to send to me immediately an exact field return, on the honor of the officers commanding brigades, of the number of Continental troops under your command fit for action, of the serviceable stores of every kind, and of your provisions, specifying the quantity at each of the works, that I may form a judgment with certainty upon your situation. These returns may be sent successively as they may be completed.

I am, with the greatest esteem and regard, &c.*

* The following particulars, contained in a letter from M. de la Luzerne to Count de Vergennes, afford an explanation of some of the opinions and motives, which at this time influenced both parties in the contest.

"After the taking of Charleston the English practised much greater moderation towards the inhabitants of the south, than they had done towards those of the middle and eastern States. Their plan was to sever the Carolinas and Georgia, and they seemed at this time to have abandoned the idea of reducing the northern States. They commenced publishing a gazette at Charleston, in which they circulated insinuations, that the northern States had abandoned the south, and that they were about to make an arrangement with England, which would exclude the Carolinas and Georgia. These attempts had an effect. The members of Congress are divided as to their interests and objects. Some are for using all efforts for rescuing the south. Others think the people there have shown too little zeal and activity in the cause, and that it is not expedient to put in jeopardy the safety of the north by rendering extraordinary aid to people, who are so indifferent about their own independence. One party speaks secretly of an expedition against Canada, another magnifies the difficulties of taking New York; one insists on an expedition to the south during the summer, and another is for a combined enterprise against Quebec. The British at the south talk of peace, and encourage the people to return to their former allegiance. It is possible that the British will make a proposition to the ten northern States tending to assure their independence; and their scheme will be to form into a new government the

TO GOVERNOR TRUMBULL.

Ramapo, 27 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I can omit no occasion of repeating my earnest entreaties to your Excellency to use all your influence to forward the measures recommended by the committee of coöperation. I assure you with the greatest sincerity and truth, that nothing short of them will answer our purpose, and that I am fully persuaded from a general view of European and American affairs, that the fate of our cause depends on the exertions of this campaign. The sparing system has been tried, till it has brought us to a crisis little less than desperate; and, if the opportunity now before us be neglected, I believe it will be too late to retrieve our affairs. These are ideas that I may safely trust to your judgment, though I know they would be slighted by those indolent and narrow politicians, who, except at the moment of some signal misfortune, are continually crying, *All is well*, and who, to save a little present expense and avoid some tem-

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two Carolinas, Georgia, East Florida and the Bahama Islands, which together would make a respectable possession." — *MS. Letter, June 24th.*

A letter from Mr. Duane in Congress to General Schuyler confirms in part the impressions above communicated. "That the reinforcements ordered to the southward should be halted," said he, "is obvious for the reasons you assign. But do you expect such a proposition from a northern member, deeply interested in strengthening the main army? It is a question of the utmost delicacy and even danger; for, however groundlessly, an opinion has been propagated, that Congress means to sacrifice the two southernmost States, and it has been productive of the greatest animosity and discontent. We have privately stated the subject to some of the southern gentlemen, who, though I believe convinced of the propriety of the measure, did not choose, after great deliberation, to have it adopted, much less to propose it. There is but one person from whom it can originate with any prospect of success. If *we* had undertaken it, nothing would have resulted but disappointment and the loss of personal confidence." — *MS. Letter, May 21st.*

porary inconvenience, with no ill designs in the main, would protract the war, and risk the perdition of our liberties. As I always speak to your Excellency in the confidence of friendship, I shall not scruple to confess, that the prevailing politics for a considerable time past have filled me with inexpressible anxiety and apprehension, and have uniformly appeared to me to threaten the subversion of our independence. I hope a period to them is now arrived, and that a change of measures will save us from ruin. I beg your Excellency to accept my warmest acknowledgments for your exertions in support of West Point. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON, IN CONGRESS.

Ramapo, 29 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your favor from Trenton, and thank you for the aid you have been pleased to afford in getting the provisions and stores removed from that place. Happily for us, the transportation is in a better train, and in greater forwardness, than I had reason a few days ago to expect it would be at this time. I am under no apprehension now of danger to the post at West Point, on the score either of provisions, the strength of the works, or of the garrison. I am sorry, however, to find there are apprehensions on account of the commandant, and that my knowledge of him does not enable me to form any decisive judgment of his fitness to command; but, as General McDougall and Baron Steuben, men of approved bravery, are both with him, and the main army is within supporting distance, I confess I have no fear on the ground of what I

presume is suspected. To remove him, therefore, under these circumstances, and at this period, must be too severe a wound to the feelings of any officer, to be given but in cases of real necessity. When a general arrangement is gone into, and a disposition made for the campaign, I can with propriety, and certainly shall, bring him into the line of the army, and place the general you have named at that post, if the operations of the campaign are such as to render it expedient to leave an officer of his rank in that command.*

If the States mean to put the army in a condition to adopt any offensive plan, the period cannot be far off

* Mr. Livingston had suggested his fears, that General Howe, in case of an exigency, would not inspire such a degree of confidence in the New York militia, as would be essential for engaging their efficient services. He solicited the appointment for General Arnold. "If I might presume so far," he said, "I should beg leave to submit it to your Excellency, whether this post might not be safely confided to General Arnold, whose courage is undoubted, who is the favorite of our militia, and who will agree perfectly with our governor."— *MS. Letter, June 22d.*

Arnold had some time before written on the same subject to General Schuyler, who was then in camp as one of the committee from Congress. "I know not," said Arnold, "who is to have the command on the North River. If General Heath joins the army, as I am told he intends, that post will of course, I suppose, fall under his command. When I requested leave of absence from General Washington for the summer, it was under the idea, that it would be a very inactive campaign, and that my services would be of little consequence, as my wounds made it very painful for me to walk or ride. The prospect now seems to be altered, and there is a probability of an active campaign, in which, though attended with pain and difficulty, I wish to render my country every service in my power; and, by the advice of my friends, I am determined to join the army; with which I beg you will do me the favor to acquaint General Washington, that I may be included in any arrangement that may be made."— *MS. Letter, May 25th.*

The application, on the part of Mr. Livingston, was no doubt made at the request of General Arnold, who immediately afterwards visited the camp and West Point. On the 30th of June, General Howe wrote to General Washington from that post;—"I have taken General Arnold round our works, and he has my opinion of them, and of many other matters. I have long wished to give it to you, but I could not convey it by letter."

when this measure must take place. Your sentiments, my dear Sir, upon this occasion required no apology. The opinion and advice of friends I receive at all times as a proof of their friendship, and am thankful when they are offered. I am so well persuaded of the safety of West Point, the necessity of easing the militia as much as possible, and of husbanding our provisions and stores, that I have dismissed all the militia, that were called in for the defence of the posts on the North River. With the greatest esteem and regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MESHECH WEARE, PRESIDENT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Ramapo, 30 June, 1780.

SIR,

I send Brigadier-General Stark to your State to collect, and forward to the appointed place of rendezvous, the drafts for your battalions and the levies for three months. The zeal, which the State of New Hampshire has always manifested, gives me the fullest confidence that they have complied with the requisitions of the committee of Congress in all their extent; though we have not yet heard from thence what measures have been taken. This is the time for America, by one great exertion, to put an end to the war; but for this purpose the necessary means must be furnished. The basis of every thing else is the completion of the Continental battalions to their full establishment. If this is not done, I think it my duty to forewarn every State, that nothing decisive can be attempted, and that this campaign, like all the former, must be chiefly defensive. I am sorry to observe, that some of the States have taken up the business on a less extensive scale. The conse-

quences have been represented with candor and plainness; and I hope, for the honor and safety of America, the representation may have the weight it deserves.

The drafts cannot be forwarded with too much expedition; but, as to the militia, under present appearances, I think it advisable to suspend the time fixed for their rendezvousing to the 25th of next month, at which period I hope they may be without fail at the place appointed; and it would be my wish that they should come out under the command of General Stark. I entreat your Excellency to employ all your influence to give activity and vigor to the measures of your State. Every thing depends on the proper improvement of the present conjuncture. We have every thing to hope on one side, and every thing to fear on the other.

With perfect respect, I am, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL STARK.

Head-Quarters, Ramapo, 30 June, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You will be pleased to repair immediately to the State of New Hampshire, in order to receive and forward to the army the levies required of the State by the honorable the committee of Congress for filling their three battalions. I have not heard from the State upon the subject, and therefore cannot inform you of the place which may have been appointed for their rendezvous. But this you will learn, and, if you do not find the levies assembled there, you will exert every degree of industry in your power to effect it. You know how precious moments are to us, and I am persuaded your efforts, both to collect and forward the levies, will correspond with the exigency. That the

business may be the more facilitated, you will take with you four officers from General Poor's brigade, to whom I write on the subject, (if this number should not be already in the State,) and with whom you will forward the levies, either in a body, or in detachments of one hundred and fifty or two hundred men, as circumstances may best suit, and with all possible expedition. If there are more officers than this number in the State, you may retain them on this service. In receiving the men, you will pay particular attention to their being sound and healthy, and in every respect fit for service; and none but such as answer this discription must be taken, as they would otherwise prove an incumbrance and a great expense, without being of the least advantage.

Besides the levies for filling these battalions, it has been deemed essential, to render the success of our operations the more certain, to call upon the State for between nine hundred and one thousand militia to join the army and continue in the service for three months from the time of their arriving at Claverac on the North River, the place assigned for their rendezvous, by the 25th of next month. It is much my wish, that you should have the direction and command of these. You will therefore use your best endeavours to have them assembled, armed, and equipped, in every respect in the best manner circumstances will admit, for taking the field, and march with them so as to arrive with certainty at Claverac by the time I have mentioned. I shall only add, that I shall be happy to hear from you very frequently on the subject of this important and interesting business, as it respects both the levies for the battalions and the militia; and that, entirely confiding in your address and assiduity to promote it, I am, dear Sir, with much regard and esteem, &c.

TO PRESIDENT REED.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 4 July, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

Motives of friendship, not less than of public good, induce me with freedom to give you my sentiments on a matter, which interests you personally as well as the good of the common cause. I flatter myself that you will receive what I say in the same spirit which dictates it, and that it will have all the influence which circumstances will possibly permit.

The legislature of Pennsylvania has vested you, in case of necessity, with a power of declaring martial law throughout the State, to enable you to take such measures as the exigency may demand. So far the legislature has done its part. Europe, America, the State itself, will look to you for the rest. The power vested in you will admit of all the latitude, that could be desired, and may be made to mean any thing, which the public safety may require. If it is not exerted proportionably, you will be responsible for the consequences. Nothing, my dear Sir, can be more delicate and critical than your situation; a full discretionary power lodged in your hands in conjunction with the Council; great expectations in our allies and in the people of this country; ample means in the State for great exertions of every kind; a powerful party on one hand to take advantage of every opening to prejudice you, on the other popular indolence and avarice, averse to every measure inconsistent with present ease and present interest. In this dilemma, there is a seeming danger whatever side you take; it remains to choose that, which has least real danger and will best promote the public weal. This in my opinion clearly is to exert

the powers entrusted to you with a boldness and vigor suited to the emergency.

In general I esteem it a good maxim, that the best way to preserve the confidence of the people durably is to promote their true interest. There are particular exigencies when this maxim has peculiar force. When any great object is in view, the popular mind is roused into expectation, and prepared to make sacrifices both of ease and property. If those, to whom the people confide the management of their affairs, do not call them to make these sacrifices, and the object is not attained, or they are involved in the reproach of not having contributed as much as they ought to have done towards it, they will be mortified at the disappointment, they will feel the censure, and their resentment will rise against those, who, with sufficient authority, have omitted to do what their interest and their honor required. Extensive powers not exercised as far as was necessary have, I believe, scarcely ever failed to ruin the possessor. The legislature and the people, in your case, would be very glad to excuse themselves by condemning you. You would be assailed with blame from every quarter, and your enemies would triumph.

The party opposed to you in the government are making great efforts. I am told the bank, established for supplying the army, is principally under the auspices of that party. It will undoubtedly give them great credit with the people, and you have no effectual way to counterbalance this, but by employing all your influence and authority to render services proportioned to your station. Hitherto I confess to you frankly, my dear Sir, I do not think your affairs have been in the train which might be wished; and if Pennsylvania does not do its part fully, it is of so much importance in the general scale, that we must fail of success, or limit our

views to mere defence. I have conversed with some gentlemen on the measure of filling your battalions. They seemed to think you could not exceed what the legislature had done for this purpose. I am of very different sentiments. The establishment of martial law implies, in my judgment, the right of calling any part of your citizens into military service, and in any manner which may be found expedient; and I have no doubt the draft may be executed.

I write to you with the freedom of friendship, and I hope you will esteem it the truest mark I could give you of it. In this view, whether you think my observations well founded or not, the motive will, I am persuaded, render them agreeable. With the greatest regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL PUTNAM.

Head-Quarters, 5 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am very happy to learn from your letter of the 29th, handed to me by Captain Humphreys, that the present state of your health is so flattering, and that it promises you the prospect of being in a condition to make a visit to your old associates some time this campaign. I wish it were in my power to congratulate you upon a complete recovery. I should feel a sincere satisfaction in such an event, and I hope for it heartily, with the rest of your friends in this quarter. I am, dear Sir, &c.*

* In the preceding autumn General Putnam had visited his family, and in December, while at Hartford, on his way back to camp he was seized with a paralysis, which disabled him to such a degree, as to render it necessary for him to return home. Although a partial recovery

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters near Passaic, 10 July, 1780.

SIR,

At this time I do not think, that the circumstances of the campaign would admit at any rate an inquiry to be gone into respecting the loss of Charleston; but, if it were otherwise, I do not see that it could be made, so as to be completely satisfactory either to General Lincoln or to the public, unless some gentlemen could be present, who have been acting in that quarter.* This, it seems, would be necessary on the occasion, and the more so, as I have not a single document or paper in my possession concerning the department, by which the court could be enabled to form a right conclusion in the case. Whenever the business can be undertaken, I should apprehend it will be requisite for the court to have before them such papers as Congress may have respecting the department, and a copy of the instructions and orders, which they may have been pleased to give General Lincoln from time to time, and of their correspondence. And, besides the reasons against the inquiry at this time, General Lincoln being a prisoner of war, his situation it appears to me must preclude one until he is exchanged, supposing every other obstacle were out of the question. If Congress think proper, they will be pleased to transmit to me such papers as they may have, which concern the matters of inquiry, that there may be no delay in proceeding in the business when other circumstances will permit.

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ensued, his health was never sufficiently restored to permit him to rejoin the army.—HUMPHREY'S *Life of Putnam*, p. 161, ed. 1818.

* At General Lincoln's request, Congress had passed a resolve, directing the Commander-in-chief to cause an inquiry to be made concerning the loss of Charleston, and the conduct of General Lincoln while commanding in the southern department.

With respect to an exchange of prisoners, I most earnestly wish that Congress, apprized of the situation of our affairs in the fullest manner, and of the prospects of the campaign, had been pleased to determine the point themselves. But as they have not done it, and they have thought proper to refer it to me, I cannot but observe, if motives of policy are ever to prevail over those of humanity, they seem to apply at present against a general exchange. As to officers, their exchange either on the principle of equal rank, or of composition where that will not apply (confining the exchange to composition for officers only), is favored both by policy and humanity, and therefore in every point of light it is to be desired; and there is now a negotiation on foot between us and the enemy in consequence of a late proposition from them for the exchange of all their officers, who are prisoners of war, and for such of those of the convention (General Phillips, General Riedesel, and their families excepted), as are in New York on parole, for an equal number of ours of their rank and in the order of their captivity; which, if carried into effect, will give relief to a few. But the exchange of privates, though strongly urged by humanity, would certainly be against us in a political view. It would throw into the enemy's hands a very respectable permanent augmentation to their present force, already great, while it would add but inconsiderably to ours, as a large proportion of the men, whom we should receive, would not belong to the army, and many others would probably be soon released from it by the expiration of their enlistments. This is one among the innumerable ill consequences that result from short enlistments. Indeed, if the case were otherwise, and the whole of the privates, whom the enemy have to exchange, were enlisted for the war, the advantages derived from an ex-

change would not be equal at this time. These considerations seem to make the release of the privates ineligible for the present; but Congress will themselves decide. If they think that their exchange should be deferred, or if we should not be able to effect that of the officers, I should hope that every exertion, which our circumstances will authorize, may be made to render their situation easy and comfortable. They have a claim to this, and nothing in our power should be omitted to effect it.*

General Lincoln informed me, when he arrived here, that, from some correspondence which had passed between him and Sir Henry Clinton, he hoped his exchange might be effected for one of the major-generals of the convention; and for this purpose he wrote to him just before his departure for Boston with my approbation. The proposition falls within the principle of equality of rank, by which exchanges between us hitherto have been governed; and his release will not be injurious to the claims of any other officer of ours in captivity, and therefore it appeared to me not objectionable. I hope it will be considered in the same light by Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.

* When this letter was considered in Congress, a resolve was passed, "That General Washington be authorized to effectuate an exchange of officers, either on the footing of equal rank, or on composition, or both, as the cases may respectively require, confining the exchange on that of composition to officers only, and having due regard to the order of captivity; such exchange to be rendered as extensive as possible in its execution, so as not only to include, on the part of the enemy, prisoners of war, but also the officers of the convention troops, now on parole at New York."— *Journals, August 7th.*

TO MAJOR HENRY LEE.

Head-Quarters, 11 July, 1780.

SIR,

You will proceed to Monmouth and establish yourself in that vicinity. When you arrive there, you will see General Forman, who is charged with despatches for a French fleet expected at the Hook, and to keep a look out for its arrival. You will give such assistance as will be necessary. Pilots will be stationed in that quarter, who will put themselves under your protection. Should a fleet appear, which you have good reason to believe is a French fleet, General Forman and you will immediately go on board with the despatches, and offer your service to the general and admiral for every thing in which you can be useful to them.

You will instantly impress every kind of refreshment the country affords, cattle, vegetables, and the like, for the use of our allies; for which purpose you will make previous arrangements, and execute them in the manner most effectual, and least grievous to the inhabitants, giving certificates for every thing taken. Should there be any State troops or militia in service, not under a superior officer, you will take command of them. If there should be a superior officer, you will endeavour to engage him to coöperate with you. Advise me instantly of any thing important, that happens on the coast; of all vessels coming in and going out; and of whatever may be doing at the Hook and in the Bay. On the appearance of the fleet, send immediately a dragoon to head-quarters, and another to the minister of France, with advice of the arrival. I am, &c.*

* Directions were also given to several pilots to be in readiness to go on board the French fleet as soon as it should arrive on the coast.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

Head-Quarters, 14 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have determined upon a plan of operations for the reduction of the city and garrison of New York, which is to be pursued in conjunction with the French forces daily expected from France. The number of troops to be employed upon this occasion may be about forty thousand men. You are hereby directed, therefore, to make every necessary arrangement and provision in your department for carrying the plan of operations into execution. You will apply to the States for what they are bound to furnish, agreeably to the several requisitions of Congress and their committee at camp. All such articles as the States are not bound to furnish, which will be necessary for conducting the operations, you will provide; and for this purpose you will apply to the Treasury Board for the requisite supplies of cash.

I have been in anxious expectation, that some plan would be determined upon for your department; but, as it has not hitherto taken place, and as it is impossible to delay its operations a moment longer, I have to desire, that you will yourself arrange it in some effectual manner, to give despatch and efficacy to your measures equal to the exigency. Your knowledge and experience in the business will be sufficient to direct your conduct, without my going into more particular instructions. It is my wish, that your provisions should be ample, as nothing is more fatal to military operations, than a deficiency in the great departments of the army, and particularly in yours, which will be the hinge on which the whole enterprise must turn. The committee

of Congress, in their applications to the States, have requested them to deliver the supplies raised, at such places as the quartermaster-general and the commissary-general should point out for the articles in their respective departments. The committee informed me, that they had given you and Colonel Blaine information on this head. But, if any thing remains to be done, you will immediately do it; and I should be glad, that you would see the commissary, Mr. Blaine, if present; if not, Mr. Stewart, to concert the arrangement with him.

I am informed, that there is at Albany a quantity of plank and timber, sufficient for constructing about forty batteaux, which may be procured. If you have not a sufficiency of boats, you will endeavour to procure the abovementioned plank and timber. General Schuyler will give you more particular information. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 14 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform Congress, that I have this moment received a letter from General Heath, dated at Providence on the 11th instant, informing me that on the afternoon of the 10th the French fleet arrived off Newport, that the signals of recognizance had been made, and the fleet was standing into the harbour when the express came way. I congratulate Congress on this important event, and entreat them to press every measure in their power to put us, as soon as possible, in a condition to begin the intended coöperation with vigor and efficiency.

I enclose a plan, which, in conjunction with the inspector-general I have framed for the consideration of

Congress. It is indispensable that the department should be put into full activity without loss of time. The speedier the decision, the better. A large additional allowance, at least nominally, for the inspectors is proposed, but it is a very imperfect compensation for the additional trouble; and, unless some extra privileges and emoluments attend the office, it will not be undertaken by officers of rank and abilities.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL KNOX.

Head-Quarters, 15 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The period for commencing our operations is so near, that not a moment is to be lost in bringing forward all the cannon and stores in our possession, proper for a siege and necessary for the service of the campaign, to the North River. New York will be the object, with an army of thirty thousand men, which you will receive in confidence. I request, that you will take immediate measures for the above purpose, and apply to the Board of War, to the quartermaster-general, and to the executives of those States where the cannon and stores now are, for the requisite assistance. The exigency of the moment, in a matter which is essential to the commencement of our operations, will, I am persuaded, induce the States to give you instant and effectual aid. I am, dear Sir, &c.

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*_Extract from General Heath's Letter._—"A little before one o'clock this morning an express arrived here from Newport with advice, that yesterday afternoon the long expected fleet of our illustrious ally appeared off that place; that the signals were all made, and the fleet was standing into the harbour, when he was sent off. I thought it my duty to give your Excellency this instant notice."—_Providence, July 11th._

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters 16 July, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I have received your favor of this date, and thank you for the sentiments contained in it. You have totally misconceived my meaning, if you think I have or shall relinquish the idea of an enterprise against New York, till it shall appear obviously impracticable, from the want of force or means to operate. I have not as yet relaxed in any preparation tending to this end; nor shall I, till I am convinced of the futility of the measure. I would, by all means, have it understood as my wish, that the French squadron, if superior to Arbuthnot's since the junction, should take a station, while it can do it with safety, off Sandy Hook. This, and our exertions in the mean while, will demonstrate, long before the equinoctial gales, to what we are competent.

What I had in view, by discouraging the first draft of the letter to the French general and admiral, was, first, with our ignorance of their strength, I thought we ought not to give them more than the information of Graves's arrival; and, secondly, not to hold up strong ideas of success, which probably would not be warranted by the issue; because I never wish to promise more than I have a moral certainty of performing.

I am, most sincerely, yours, &c.*

* Immediately after receiving this letter the Marquis de Lafayette set out on his journey to Newport, with full instructions to concert measures for future operations with the French general and admiral. Letters from those officers met him at Peekskill, copies of which he forwarded to General Washington. A paper, containing the general instructions to the Marquis de Lafayette may be found in the APPENDIX, No. III.

TO THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, New Jersey, 16 July, 1780.

SIR,

I hasten to impart to you the happiness I feel at the welcome news of your arrival; and, as well in the name of the American army, as in my own, to present you with an assurance of our warmest sentiments for allies, who have so generously come to our aid. As a citizen of the United States, and as a soldier in the cause of liberty, I thankfully acknowledge this new mark of friendship from his Most Christian Majesty, and I feel a most grateful sensibility for the flattering confidence he has been pleased to honor me with on this occasion.

Among the obligations we are under to your prince, I esteem it one of the first, that he has made choice, for the command of his troops, of a gentleman whose high reputation and happy union of social qualities and military abilities promise me every public advantage and private satisfaction. I beg, Sir, that you will be the interpreter of my sentiments to the gentlemen under your command. Be pleased to assure them, that, to the pleasure I anticipate of an acquaintance with them, I join the warmest desire to do every thing that may be agreeable to them and to the soldiers under their command. But in the midst of a war, the nature and difficulties of which are peculiar and uncommon, I cannot flatter myself in any way to recompense the sacrifices they have made, but by giving them such opportunities in the field of glory, as will enable them to display that gallantry and those talents, which we shall always be happy to acknowledge with applause.

The Marquis de Lafayette has been by me desired from time to time to communicate such intelligence, and

make such propositions, as circumstances dictated. I think it so important, immediately to fix our plan of operations, and with as much secrecy as possible, that I have requested him to go himself to New London, where he will probably meet you. As a general officer, I have the greatest confidence in him; as a friend, he is perfectly acquainted with my sentiments and opinions. He knows all the circumstances of our army and the country at large. All the information he gives, and all the propositions he makes, I entreat you to consider as coming from me. I request you will settle all arrangements whatsoever with him; and I shall only add, that I shall exactly conform to the intentions of his Most Christian Majesty, as explained in the several papers put into my hands by his order, and signed by his ministers.

Permit me to refer you to the Marquis de Lafayette for more particular assurances of what I feel on this occasion, which I the more readily do, from a knowledge of his peculiar affection and regard for you. Impatiently waiting for the time when our operations will afford me the pleasure of a personal acquaintance with you, I have the honor to be, with the most perfect consideration, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 19 July, 1780.

SIR,

On the first account of your arrival, I did myself the honor to write to you the letter annexed; but, in momentary expectation of hearing from you, I thought it best to delay the departure of the Marquis till the arrival of your despatches. These Monsieur de Roche-

fontaine delivered to me yesterday afternoon. The assurance you give me of the ulterior intentions of his Most Christian Majesty adds to our obligations and to our hopes. On our part we shall make every effort in our power.

The contrarieties you experienced, which have retarded your arrival, were unfortunate; but they depended on events not at your command, and I hope will have no ill influence on the issue of our measures. My opinion perfectly corresponds with the motives, which determined you in the first instance to Rhode Island, and upon which you have calculated your present disposition. I shall be happy to hear, that the health of such of your troops, as were indisposed by the voyage, is speedily restored, and that you receive every refreshment and supply from the country, which can contribute to the comfort and convenience of the whole.

I cannot sufficiently express to you my sensibility for the marks of confidence, and for the assurances of your sentiments, contained in your letter, and I shall be happy in seizing every opportunity to convince you how entirely I reciprocate them. I have the honor to be, with the highest esteem and regard, Sir, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 19 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

By despatches received last evening from the Count de Rochambeau, I am informed, that the French fleet

* As soon as Count de Rochambeau arrived at Newport, he wrote to General Washington, and enclosed a copy of his instructions from the King, and an account of his voyage. See the letter in the APPENDIX, No. IV.

and army, consisting of eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bombs, and upwards of five thousand men, have arrived at Newport.* This makes them rather inferior to the combined naval force of Arbuthnot and Graves; but, as a second division of ships and land forces (a circumstance you will keep to yourself) may be expected in a few weeks, it is probable we shall gain a superiority at sea by the time we can be ready to operate, as Count de Rochambeau is of the opinion, that his land force will not be sufficiently recruited under four weeks from the 12th instant. Should a superiority at sea be established, it would lessen our land transportation in so considerable a degree, that little or no doubt would remain of our being able to keep up the requisite supply of provision, forage, and military stores, during the time of an operation against New York. But, as that is a matter which cannot be ascertained, and as New York seems, for reasons which have presented themselves since the arrival of the fleet, to

* Letters were also received from General Heath. "I arrived here last night," said he, "and this morning I had the honor of congratulating M. de Rochambeau and M. de Ternay on their safe arrival. The inhabitants appear disposed to treat our allies with much respect. The town, by a vote of the inhabitants, is to be illuminated this evening. I am myself charmed with the officers. Count de Rochambeau has desired me to publish an advertisement inviting the inhabitants to bring small meats, vegetables, and the like, to market, and that they shall receive hard money in payment. This the Count intended with a good view to our currency. I have told him it would have a different effect. I shall therefore only assure the farmers, that they will receive a handsome price."— *Newport, July 12th.*

Again; "The French troops are landed, and encamped in a fine situation south-east of the town, and extend nearly across the Island. They make a good appearance. The legion under the command of the Duke de Lauzun, the officer who took Senegal last year, is as fine a corps as I have ever seen. It is about six hundred strong. The officers express the highest satisfaction with the treatment they receive. The markets are become very good, and great regularity is preserved. In short, hitherto every thing appears agreeable and satisfactory."— *July 16th.*

be the only object we can attempt, it remains to be considered whether it would be possible to maintain an army proportioned to such an undertaking, when wholly dependent upon a land transportation, aided by a contingent one by the way of the Sound.

In making your estimates, you are to observe, that the directors of the Bank of Philadelphia engage to deliver upwards of two month's supply of flour for the American army in the camp, if so ordered; and, as we have little reason to doubt the abilities and activity of these gentlemen, we may with tolerable safety count upon so considerable an aid. Meat will chiefly be brought to us on foot. The matter, then, for which we shall be principally apprehensive, will be the transportation of forage and military stores. To insure this, there are but three ways; a competent sum of money to pay the hire of the teams upon performing the service; the exertion of the States to draw them out upon requisition; or military coercion in case of extremity. Upon the first, deranged as our finances are, we ought to place but little dependence. As to the second, you can as well judge as myself from the present temper of the States, and from what they are actually doing. And, although the third method is a disagreeable one, yet I shall not hesitate, if the resources of the country are equal to it, to execute it to the utmost of our means, if the attainment of so great an object, as that which is now before us, is made to depend upon it. With this assurance, I beg to know candidly your opinion of the probable practicability of supporting the operation so far as it depends on transportation. While we do not underrate difficulties on one hand, we should not overrate them on the other; nor discourage ourselves from a very important undertaking by obstacles, which are to be surmounted. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, near Passaic, 20 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have received a letter from Brigadier-General Maxwell, requesting me to accept his resignation, and assigning his reasons for the same. Having never acted on an application of this sort from an officer of his rank, I beg leave to lay the matter before Congress, and to transmit a copy of his letter, by which they will be more fully informed of his request. The merits of this general are known to Congress, and therefore it is unnecessary for me to say any thing with respect to them; but I will take the liberty to add, that I believe him to be an honest man, a warm friend to his country, and firmly attached to her interests. In this view, and from the length of time he has been in service, and the decided part he took at the commencement of the controversy, I would further observe, that I think his claim to such compensation, as may be made to other officers of his standing to the present time, no more than equitable, and I hope it will be considered in this light by Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Head-Quarters, Colonel Dey's, 20 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You will proceed with the first and second Pennsylvania brigades, and Colonel Moylan's regiment of dragoons, upon the execution of the business planned

* General Maxwell's resignation was accepted by Congress on the 25th of July.

in yours of yesterday. I do not at present think of any necessary alteration, except that of detaching a few horse this afternoon to patrol all night, and to see that the enemy do not, in the course of the night, throw over any troops to form an ambuscade. They need not go so low down, nor in such numbers, as to create any alarm. They may inquire as they go for deserters, after whom they may say they are in pursuit. The enemy have so many emissaries among us, that scarce a move or an order passes unnoticed. You are so well acquainted with the critical situation of the ground, that it is needless in me to recommend the extreme of caution. I most heartily wish you success, being, with real esteem, &c.*

* At a place called Bull's Ferry, and near Fort Lee on the west bank of Hudson's River, was a blockhouse, protected on one side by the perpendicular rocks, which rise from the margin of the river, and surrounded on the other sides by an *abatis* and stockade, with a kind of ditch or parapet, serving as a covered way. It was occupied by a party of Refugees under the command of Colonel Cuyler. A plan had been formed by General Wayne to take this post by assault, and at the same time to collect and drive off the cattle belonging to the Tories in that neighbourhood.

In the afternoon of the 20th of July the two Pennsylvania brigades, with four pieces of artillery belonging to Procter's regiment, and Moylan's dragoons, commenced their march from camp, and arrived at the New Bridge on the Hackensac River, about nine at night. After resting at that place four or five hours, they moved forward, and by the dawn of day they advanced towards Bull's Ferry; General Irvine with part of his brigade proceeding along the summit of the ridge; and the first brigade under Colonel Humpton, with the artillery and Moylan's horse, by the direct road. About ten o'clock in the morning of the 21st, part of the first brigade had reached the post. Moylan's horse and a detachment of infantry remained at the fork of the road leading to Paulus Hook and Bergen, prepared to receive the enemy if they should approach from that quarter. General Irvine was directed to halt in a position from which he could move to any point where the enemy might attempt to land, either in the vicinity of Bull's Ferry or Fort Lee. Near this latter place two regiments were likewise concealed, with orders to wait the landing of the enemy, and then at the point of the bayonet to dispute the pass in the gorge of the mountain until supported by General Irvine. One regiment

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 22 July, 1780.

I have received, my dear Marquis, your letter enclosing me those you had received from Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay. As I speak to you in confidence, I am sorry to find that the objections made by M. de Ternay are of a nature to prevent his entering the harbour, notwithstanding any superiority he will probably have. I certainly would not wish him to endanger his fleet in any enterprise not

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was posted in a hollow way on the north side of the blockhouse, and another on the south side, with orders to keep up a constant fire into the port-holes, to favor the advance of the artillery.

When the field-pieces arrived, they were stationed at the medium distance of sixty yards, and a cannonade commenced, which continued without intermission from eleven till twelve o'clock. The fire was returned with spirit by the besieged. It was at length found that the cannon, owing to the lightness of their metal, made no impression upon the thick walls of the blockhouse, and the troops were ordered to retire. At this moment, however, a regiment in reserve rushed through the *abatis* and advanced to the stockades, but the troops were so much exposed to a galling fire within, that they were withdrawn. During the cannonade several vessels and boats were seen moving on the river, but no troops were landed by the enemy. A detachment of infantry destroyed the sloops and wood-boats at the landing, and took three or four prisoners. The cattle were driven off, according to the original plan, and the whole party returned the same evening across the Hackensac River at the New Bridge. The number of troops killed during the attack was fifteen, and wounded forty-nine. The enemy reported six killed and fifteen wounded. The expedition was a failure, which General Wayne ascribed to the smallness of his cannon. He had in person reconnoitred the post, but the strength of the works seems not to have been ascertained. He was disappointed, also, that the enemy did not land troops from the other side of the river during the cannonade, which he had expected, and had made such preparations for receiving them as promised success. — *General Wayne's MS. Letter, July 22d.*

The incidents of this expedition afforded the groundwork of the doggrel written by Major André, called the "*Cow Chase*," which, with much that is coarse and crude, contains several stanzas of genuine humor and satire.

warranted by prudence, and by a sufficient prospect of success and security; and I shall acquiesce in his better judgment of maritime affairs. But I should hope, that, whenever he shall have a decided superiority, he may possess the port; and certainly, without this, our operations must be infinitely more precarious, and success much less decisive.*

Another thing that gives me concern is the non-arrival of our arms and powder. Of the former we have not one half a sufficiency for our recruits, and in the latter, including the quantity expected, we were defective. Unless, therefore, our allies can lend us largely, we certainly can attempt nothing. With every effort we can make, we shall fall short at least four or five thousand arms, and two hundred tons of powder. We must of necessity, my dear Marquis, however painful it is to abuse the generosity of our friends, know of them whether they can assist us with a loan of that quantity of arms and ammunition. I do not believe we can make out with less; but, before we can enter into any engagements, we must ascertain what they will be able to spare us. I entreat you to speak to the Count on this subject without delay, and let me know the result by express. If the arms can be obtained, endeavour to have them forwarded as quickly as possible,

* Alluding to the harbour of New York. The Chevalier de Ternay declined attempting to pass Sandy Hook in any event, being convinced, as he said, by the experience of Count d'Estaing, and by such charts as he had examined, that such an attempt with his large ships would be extremely hazardous. "I have therefore concluded," he wrote, "that, if it is possible to sustain the fleet at Long Island without entering the Hook, this arrangement will be preferable on all accounts. I will combat the English squadron at sea, should it attempt to oppose the passage of troops. All my vessels are actually without water. I have landed thirteen hundred men sick. It was with difficulty, that I was enabled to supply the wants of the frigates, which I despatched yesterday to endeavour to intercept some of the enemy's vessels." – *MS. Letter to Lafayette, July 16th.*

to be put into the hands of the recruits, that we may be training them a little, and putting them in condition to act.

With respect to the Count's desire of a personal interview with me, you are sensible, my dear Marquis, that there is nothing I should more ardently desire than to meet him; but you are also sensible, that my presence here is essential to keep our preparations in activity, or even going on at all. I entreat you to impress the Count with a proper idea of this matter, and convince him with what pleasure I should hasten to meet him, if it would not be injurious to our affairs. I am persuaded, that, however ardent may be your wishes to undertake the reduction of a certain place, you will not fail to take a candid and full view of the difficulties. We owe it to our allies. We owe it to ourselves.

Colonel Hamilton informed you yesterday of the advices received from New York of an intended embarkation, said to be destined for Rhode Island. Assure the Count and the Chevalier of all the esteem and attachment I feel for them, and receive the assurances of the affection with which I am, dear Marquis, &c.*

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* *From the Orderly Book.* — "The Commander-in-chief has the pleasure to congratulate the army on the arrival of a large land and naval armament at Rhode Island, sent by his Most Christian Majesty to cooperate with the troops of these States against the common enemy, accompanied with every circumstance that can render it honorable and useful. The generosity of this succour, and the manner in which it is given, is a new tie between France and America. The lively concern, which our allies manifest for our safety and independence, has a claim to the affection of every virtuous citizen. The General with confidence assures the army, that the officers and men of the French forces come to our aid, animated with a zeal founded in sentiment for us, as well as in duty to their prince, and that they will do every thing in their power to promote harmony and cultivate friendship. He is equally persuaded, that on our part we shall vie with them in their good dispositions, to which we are excited by gratitude as well as by a common interest; and that the only contention between the two armies will be to excel each other in

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 22 July, 1780.

SIR,

The committee has done me the honor to communicate to me a copy of their letter to Congress, containing a state of the measures they had taken, and of our present prospects. The knowledge I have of facts perfectly coincides with their representation; and the consequences they draw are so just and important, that they ought to engage, and I am persuaded will engage, the closest attention of Congress. I think it my duty to add, that, pressed on all sides by a choice of difficulties, in a moment which required decision, I have adopted that line of conduct, which suited the dignity and faith of Congress, the reputation of these States, and the honor of our arms. I have sent definitive proposals of coöperation to the French general and admiral. Neither the season, nor a regard to decency, would permit delay. The die is cast, and it remains with the States either to fulfil their engagements, preserve their credit, and support their independence, or to involve us in disgrace and defeat. Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the committee, I shall proceed, on the supposition that they will ultimately consult their own interest and honor, and not suffer us to fail for want of means, which it is evidently in their power to afford. What has been done, and is doing, by some of the States, confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in the country. As to the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangements for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground to

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good offices, and in the display of every military virtue. This will be the pledge of the most solid advantages to the common cause, and of a glorious issue to the campaign."—*July 20th.*

doubt. If we fail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments, I trust the responsibility will fall where it ought, and that I shall stand justified to Congress, to my country, and to the world.

Congress are sensible, that I have made it a rule to speak with the most scrupulous delicacy of the measures of the States, generally or particularly, and will do me the justice to believe, that the plainness of my present remarks is dictated by a sense of duty, by the importance of the conjuncture, and by the necessity of giving them a just view of our situation. I beg leave to observe, that, from present appearances, it seems to me indispensable, that Congress should enlarge the powers of their committee. We have every reason to believe it will become unavoidable to exert powers, which, if they have no sanction, may be very disagreeable to the people, and productive of discontents and oppositions, which will be infinitely injurious. With perfect respect and esteem, I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HOWE.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 24 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The intelligence I have received from different quarters is of the same nature as that of yours, and speaks of an embarkation destined against our allies at Rhode Island. The communications, which you made to Major-General Heath on this subject, were very proper, whether the enemy mean only a demonstration for the purpose of delaying, or serious operations in that quarter. You will be pleased to order forward the militia from New Hampshire and Massachusetts, arrived and arriving at Claverac, either to Fishkill or the

most eligible situation in its vicinity on either side of the river. However, as Claverac is considered a place of rendezvous for the militia, it will be expedient to have a small deposit of provision at that post for temporary purposes. I wish you immediately to put the troops within your command under orders to march at the shortest notice, and to concert measures with the quartermaster to give the order efficiency, as soon as its execution becomes necessary. Pray inform me whether the arms from Albany have arrived, and in what number. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, 26 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I transmit the enclosed letter from Sir Henry Clinton, in answer to yours of the 5th instant. I am exceedingly sorry to find, that he seems to involve your exchange with that of the southern army, and to make one depend on the other. At this time, for the reasons I mentioned to you, and others which will readily occur, an exchange of privates could not possibly be gone into with the least degree of policy; and, under any circumstances of an extensive exchange, the release of the officers on Long Island, who have been so long in captivity, must be first attended to. If you think a personal interview between yourself and Major-General Phillips may conduce in the smallest degree to your own liberation, I should be happy to promote it, so far as it can depend on me. Wishing you health and happiness, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, 26 July, 1780.

SIR,

I have been duly honored with your Excellency's letter of the 19th instant, and am pleased to find, that the proposition I had the honor of communicating to General Knyphausen, and afterwards to your Excellency, on the 5th of this month, for mutually appointing agents for prisoners, has met your approbation. I should have been happy, if you had in your letter delineated your ideas of the powers and restrictions, under which they are to act; but, as you have not done it, I beg leave to offer the enclosed propositions on this head for your consideration, and to request your answer to them as soon as it may be convenient, with any additional ones your Excellency may think proper to subjoin. It will be perfectly agreeable for the agent, that shall be appointed on your part, to reside at Lancaster, as your Excellency has proposed, which will also be made the place of confinement for the privates, prisoners of war in our hands, so far as circumstances will reasonably permit.

Your Excellency's despatches on the subject of the troops of convention, have been received. I am exceedingly obliged by the favorable sentiments you are pleased to entertain of my disposition towards prisoners; and I beg leave to assure you, Sir, that I am sensible of the treatment, which those under your direction have generally experienced. There is nothing more contrary to my wishes, than that men in captivity should suffer the least unnecessary severity or want; and I shall take immediate occasion to transmit a copy of the report you enclose (the truth of which I can neither deny nor admit) to the commandant at Char-

lottesville, with orders to inquire into the facts, and to redress grievances wherever they may exist. At the same time, that I will not pretend to controvert the justice of the matters complained of by Mr. Hoaksley (the report transmitted being the first and only communication I have had with respect to them), I cannot but think the terms of General Phillips's letter to your Excellency rather exceptionable, and that this gentleman's own experience and good understanding should have led to a more favorable and just interpretation, than the one he has been pleased to make upon the occasion. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, Preakness, 27 July, 1780.

I have received your letter from Hartford. I perceive, my dear Marquis, that you are determined at all events to take New York, and that obstacles only increase your zeal. I am sorry that our prospects,

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* Mr. Hoaksley, wagon-master to the British army which capitulated at Saratoga, had lately returned to New York from Charlottesville, and reported that the prisoners were not properly supplied with provisions. General Phillips, in representing the matter to Sir Henry Clinton, used the following language. "Such severities and hardships upon the troops of convention will force them to disperse and desert, and in doing so to cease from abiding by the treaty of Saratoga, which the Americans perhaps wish to have dissolved. By this starving, as it were, the troops of convention, they are driven to seek refuge in the country, or, by deserting, to become prisoners of war, under the supposition that, in detached and scattered parties, they may be able to procure provisions, which seem to be denied them in a collected body." A copy of the letter containing these words was enclosed to General Washington by Sir Henry Clinton, who added, "You cannot but be informed, Sir, that our conduct towards your prisoners here is humane and liberal, and I am persuaded your wish must be to maintain this system of benevolence towards men, who have the misfortune of enduring captivity." — *July 19th.*

instead of brightening, grow duller.* I have already written to you on the subject of arms. There is no probability of our getting the number we want from the States; so that, without the timely arrival of those we expect, or the assistance of our allies, this alone will prove an insuperable obstacle. Our levies come in even slower than I expected; though we have still an abundance of fair promises, and some earnest of performance from the eastern States. Pennsylvania has given us not quite four hundred, and seems to think that she has done admirably well. Jersey has given us fifty or sixty. But I do not despair of Jersey.

Mr. Clinton still continues to threaten your countrymen with a combined attack. You will judge, as well as I, of the probability of his being sincere; but I have put the troops here under marching orders, and have ordered those at West Point to King's Ferry. If Clinton moves in force to Rhode Island, we may possibly be able to take advantage of it; or we may embarrass him a little and precipitate his movements. In this case, there are but two things, that would hinder us from taking New York before your return, the want of men and arms to do it with. If this letter should not meet you on your way back, a visit from you to the Council of Massachusetts may have a good effect. Urge the absolute necessity of their giving us their full complement of men, and of doing every thing else that has been asked of them. Dwell upon the articles of arms and ammunition. With the truest affection, I remain, my dear Marquis, your assured friend, &c.

* In his progress to Newport, the Marquis de Lafayette called on Governor Trumbull, General Parsons, Mr. Wadsworth, and other persons in Connecticut, and used his personal efforts to engage them to procure and hasten forward the quota of troops, and such supplies of arms and ammunition as could be spared from that State.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paramus, 30 July, 1780.

SIR,

The committee address Congress by this opportunity to inform them of the most disagreeable crisis, to which our affairs are brought in the quartermaster-general's department. I think it my duty to assure Congress, that I entirely agree with the committee in opinion, and that, unless effectual measures are immediately taken to induce General Greene and the other principal officers of that department to continue their services, there must of necessity be a total stagnation of military business. We not only must cease from the preparations for the campaign, but in all probability shall be obliged to disperse, if not disband the army, for want of subsistence.

With every effort it will be possible for us to make, embarrassed on every side as we are, it will be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to keep the great departments of the army in motion. Any interruption, therefore, in addition to what arises from the present posture of affairs, must be ruinous at this important juncture. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Highlands, State of New York, 31 July, 1780.

SIR,

Sir Henry Clinton has sailed with the principal part of his force to attack you, estimated at about eight thousand men. It cannot be more, nor do I suppose

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* See APPENDIX, No. V.

he would hazard the enterprise with a much less number. I am glad the inactivity of the enemy has given you time to prepare; and, relying on your abilities, and the excellence of your troops, I hope you will send them back with disgrace. Had I any prospect of arriving in time I would march to your support; but, as I think there is no probability of this, the only way I can be useful to you is to menace New York, and even to attack it, if the force remaining there does not exceed what I have reason to believe. I am pressing my movements for that purpose, with all the rapidity in our power. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* Admiral Graves arrived at New York with six ships of the line, and joined Admiral Arbuthnot, on the 13th of July, three days after the French squadron reached Newport. This junction made the British naval force at New York decidedly superior to that of M. de Ternay; for the armament under Admiral Arbuthnot consisted of four ships of the line, three frigates of forty-four guns, and three of a smaller size. On the 19th, four British vessels appeared off the harbour of Newport, and the next morning, as soon as the wind would permit, three frigates of the French squadron went in pursuit of them; and two days afterwards nine or ten British vessels of the line came in sight, with five frigates and four small vessels. The three French frigates and a despatch-boat were chased into the harbour. The British fleet continued near Block Island. From these movements it was evidently the object of the British commander to blockade the French squadron; and an attack was also feared before preparations could be made to resist it. General Heath immediately ordered Colonel Greene's regiment of Continental troops, and the recruits for that service, to take post at Howland's Ferry, Bristol Ferry, and Butts's Hill. He called on the governor of Rhode Island for fifteen hundred militia, and requested eight hundred more from Bristol County in Massachusetts. He likewise wrote to the Council of Massachusetts, desiring that all the militia in the State, who had been detached to serve for three months in the main army, except those in Hampshire and Berkshire counties, should be sent immediately to Newport. A like requisition was made on Governor Trumbull for one thousand militia from Connecticut. With these forces, if they could be speedily collected, Count de Rochambeau thought he should be able to withstand an attack.

The Marquis de Lafayette arrived at Newport on the 25th of July, and intelligence had already come from various quarters, that Sir Henry Clinton was preparing to proceed in person from New York, with a large part of his army, to give battle to the French. The most vigorous efforts were

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Robinson's, in the Highlands, 31 July, 1780.

My dear Marquis,

I received your two obliging favors, just as I was commencing yesterday our second day's march for the North River. There is no doubt that Sir Henry Clinton means to attack the Count de Rochambeau, and that a considerable force has sailed for the purpose, of which you will have the greatest certainty by the time this reaches you. I am happy in the measures, which have been taken for calling in aid from the militia, and I hope it will arrive and prove effectual. I cannot help wishing, that the Count had taken post on the main; and, if circumstances would admit, this might be still best. In such case he would derive much greater support from the country; and the island of Rhode Island is not an object for which we should put any thing of importance to hazard.

On account of the great distance between this place and Rhode Island, I do not think it probable that any succour from this army could be there in time; and, were it to be attempted by a rapid march, a great part of the men detached would be unfit for service when

made to meet the event. As Lafayette was well acquainted with the environs of Newport, having examined them at the time of General Sullivan's expedition, the French officers arranged with him a plan of defence. Connanicut Island was to be abandoned, and all the force to be concentrated on Rhode Island. The transports were to be secured in the harbour, and the ships to be stationed at anchor from Brenton's Point northward, where they would be protected by batteries. A frigate and a cutter were to be placed in Seaconnet Passage. The army was to remain encamped at its usual station, till the enemy should appear, and then move and attack them wherever they should disembark. If unsuccessful, the troops were to retreat and rally behind the old lines, which had been thrown up by the British, and there maintain a defence. A body of militia was likewise to be posted within those lines. — *MS. Letters of Lafayette and Heath, July 21st, 26th.*

they arrived. Besides, in the present state of things, I do not know how they would be subsisted with bread. These considerations leave me but one line of conduct to pursue, which is to move against New York. I am making every effort to accomplish this, and would willingly hope that it will relieve the Count, if nothing more. It appears to be the most probable mode of doing it, and indeed the only practicable one, so far as his relief can depend upon the troops here. That part of the army, which was with me in Jersey, will pass the River at King's Ferry this morning or forenoon; and part of those at this post moved yesterday evening, and will be followed by the remainder to-day, except so many as may be essential to be left in the garrison.*

With respect to your remaining with General Heath, you will use your own pleasure in the matter. Wherever you are, your best services will be rendered and will be interesting. I am exceedingly hurried in arranging and preparing a variety of matters, which must justify me to you for not adding more, than that I am, with the most affectionate regard and esteem, my dear Marquis, &c.

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* *From the Marquis de Lafayette's Letter.* — "If the enemy mean regular approaches, the French generals say, that this would give time for succour to come. In any event I do not think the French will be able to form a junction with you for some time, as they cannot leave this place before the 15th of August, even if they are not attacked. The number of sick is such, that by a return it appears they have but three thousand six hundred men fit for duty. The fleet has a great proportion of sick, and the ships are therefore poorly manned for the present. Count de Rochambeau has asked me so often whether you would not send a body of Continental troops to their relief, if within twelve days the enemy should not arrive, that I knew he wished me to write to you about it, and at length he told me so; but this must be between ourselves. The Count says he will stand a storm, but, if the enemy make a long work of it, a corps of Continental troops in their rear would have the best effect." — *July 26th.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Robinson's House, 31 July, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Immediately upon hearing, that the transports with the troops, who had been some days on board, had sailed eastward, I put the army in motion again. They will cross the Ferry to-day, and will be joined by the troops from hence. I propose moving as rapidly as possible down towards Kingsbridge, which will either oblige the enemy to abandon their project against Rhode Island, or may afford us an opportunity of striking them to advantage in this quarter, if Sir Henry Clinton has carried with him the number of men reported (eight thousand), with less than which I think he would scarcely venture an attempt upon Count Rochambeau, reinforced by the militia. I entirely approve of the measure you have taken for calling in aid, and I have the strongest hopes, that, if Sir Henry should venture upon an attack, he will meet with a reception very different from what he expects. You know the critical situation in which this army will be below, and how much depends upon constant intelligence of the motions of the enemy. I shall direct relays of expresses the whole way between this army and you, to convey intelligence in the most expeditious manner.

The nearest express to you will be upon Tower Hill; and General Greene advises, that you should keep two whale-boats to communicate with him by South Ferry, so long as that passage shall be safe, and, if that should be interrupted, by Bissell's Harbour.

I am, &c.*

* General Clinton had formed a plan of a joint operation of his land and naval forces against the French at Newport, and on the 27th of July

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL FELLOWS, MASSACHUSETTS MILITIA.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 31 July, 1780.

SIR,

By advices just received, I hear that the enemy have cut off the communication with Fort Schuyler; and, as the place is not well supplied with provision, there is reason to fear the loss of that valuable post, unless it is speedily relieved. You will therefore be pleased instantly upon the receipt hereof to detach five hundred of the militia under your command properly officered, with direction to the officer to march and put himself under the command of Brigadier-General Van Rensselaer of Tryon county. I have written to Colonel Van Schaick at Albany, to supply provisions, wagons, and whatever else may be necessary to expedite the marching of the detachment. Governor Clinton has written to the same effect to Colonel Van Schaick, and to General Van Rensselaer. When you consider how

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he actually embarked six thousand troops at Frog's Neck on board transports to proceed through the Sound for that purpose. In the mean time there had been so much delay, and the French had been enabled so far to make preparation and strengthen their works of defence, that the prospect of a successful assault was very doubtful; and the situation of affairs in New York would not admit of a protracted absence. It appears, moreover, that there was not a harmony of sentiment between Admiral Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the measures that should be pursued. Hence, after the troops were embarked, and all things were in readiness, Sir Henry Clinton concluded to abandon the enterprise. He crossed the Sound to Huntington Bay, and disembarked the troops at Whitestone on the 31st of July. See his Letter in the *Remembrancer*, Vol. X. p. 260. — It is probable, however, that the rapid march of Washington towards New York was the principal motive with General Clinton for retracing his steps. As soon as this counter movement was known at Newport, the militia were dismissed, except those that had been raised for three months. Admiral Arbuthnot remained off the port to blockade the French fleet, and to intercept the second division, which was expected from France.

very essential the post of Fort Schuyler is to the security of our whole frontier, and that the saving of the harvest of the fine country upon the Mohawk River depends upon an immediate removal of the enemy, I am convinced you will not lose any time in marching off the detachment, that they may form a junction with the militia of the State of New York. Ammunition will be ready at Albany. I am, &c.

TO GOVERNOR LIVINGSTON.

Peekskill, 1 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

From our present advices a considerable part of the enemy's force are gone to Rhode Island, with a view of reducing the armament from France. We can give them no succour from hence by detaching, on account of the distance and the difficulty there would be, if not impracticability, of subsisting the troops with bread. There is no other mode, which promises them relief, so far as it may depend on us, but our moving against New York immediately, and acting against it with rapidity and vigor, as far as circumstances will admit. For this end the whole of the Continental troops are in motion, and, as every aid will be essential, I entreat that your Excellency will order your State regiment, and the militia called for by the committee of Congress, to march as soon as possible for Dobbs's Ferry, subject to my direction, where the officers will receive further orders. I would also beg leave to suggest, that I think it advisable that your Excellency should order the whole of the militia to hold themselves in readiness to march in case of orders; as events may arise to make their aid highly essential and important for a few days.

They will not be called for but in this case, and I have the utmost confidence that they will give me support whenever it may be requisite.

I am much concerned, that so few levies have joined the regiments belonging to the State. They amount but to a mere handful. I pray that your Excellency will use your best endeavours to have them forwarded with all possible expedition. The service and our most essential interests require it. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL DICKINSON, NEW JERSEY MILITIA.

Peekskill, 1 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

From our present advices, a considerable part of the enemy's force has gone to the eastward, with a view of striking the armament from France. In consequence of this, I am moving with our Continental force towards New York, there to act as circumstances may justify. Events may arise to make the aid of the Jersey militia essential, of which I have apprized his Excellency the governor, and requested that they might be in readiness to move, and to give us succour, should it be requisite. If this should be the case, I need not tell you, that I shall be happy to see you at their head. I am confident it will be the case; and my principal design in troubling you with this is to advertise you, that the militia may be called for, and that you may turn your eyes towards the event, and have it the more in your power to expedite their movement whenever it may be proper. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Peekskill, 1 August, 1780.

We are thus far, my dear Marquis, on our way to New York. To-morrow the whole army was to have taken up its line of march, and would have moved with all the rapidity in our power to this object, had we not a few hours since received advice from the Sound, dated yesterday, that the fleet of transports had put back, and were steering westward. Colonel Sheldon, by a letter this instant come to hand, writes me to the same effect. We shall therefore govern our subsequent motions agreeably to our original plan.

The express, who takes this, comes from the minister, and only leaves me time to beg you to communicate to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay the force of this information, and to tell you that I am most affectionately, my dear Marquis, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

Head-Quarters, 1 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

You will perceive by the orders of this day, that the corps of Light Infantry is immediately to be formed. The command of it for the campaign is promised to the Marquis de Lafayette, for reasons, which I dare say will be to you obvious and satisfactory. If we attack New York, the part, which this corps will take, will make it a most desirable command. Should it be agreeable to you to take it until the return of this gentleman, which is uncertain, it would give me great pleasure. I wish

you however to consult your delicacy, and determine without the least restraint. I want your answer.

I am, with the greatest regard, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

The blunders which have been made with respect to arms, ammunition, and clothing, are serious disappointments. I think, however, from a closer inspection of our means, that we shall be able to collect nearly arms enough to put into the hands of our recruits, and powder enough to undertake the enterprise, if in the course of the operation we can depend on the fifty tons expected from France, and can obtain fifty tons more from the fleet.

I would not wish you to press the French general and admiral to any thing, to which they show a disinclination, especially to the withdrawing of their troops from Rhode Island before the second division arrives to give them a naval superiority. Should they yield to importunity, and an accident happen either there or here, they would lay the consequences to us. Only inform them what we can do, what we are willing to undertake, and let them entirely consult their own inclination for the rest. Our prospects are not so flattering, as to justify our being very pressing to engage

* The corps of Light Infantry consisted of six battalions, each composed of eight companies selected from the different lines of the army. These battalions were arranged in two brigades, one of which was commanded by General Hand and the other by General Poor. The Light Infantry were stationed in advance of the main army. The Marquis de Lafayette returned from Newport, and took command of the Light Infantry on the 7th of August.

them in our views. I shall, however, go on with all our preparations, and I hope circumstances will ultimately favor us. If a part of the West India fleet should come this way, it will powerfully contribute to our success.

Should not the second division arrive so as to enable us to commence our operations by the first of September, I shall have no great expectation of effecting the object. When we calculated on having twice the force of the enemy, we included the whole succour expected from France. It will be difficult, if not impracticable, to accomplish this before the second division arrives. The number of men hitherto come in rather falls short of than exceeds our calculation.

Nothing appears to me more evident, than that a communication may be secured with Long Island by land batteries. The narrowness of the Sound, the Islands, the sinuosity and other difficulties of the channel about Hell Gate, show the impracticability of vessels interrupting the communication you may establish there. All the experiments I have seen demonstrate, that shipping cannot be under the fire of land batteries, nor will they venture to try their strength with them except when they are low, or there is a bold shore, and they can annoy them from their tops; neither of which would be the case there.

I wrote to you two days ago by a French gentleman on his way to Rhode Island with despatches from the minister of France. You will find by that letter, that, on the 31st of July, the enemy's fleet returned towards New York. In all probability our movement this way occasioned them to relinquish their expedition to Rhode Island. To-morrow we shall recross the River and proceed to Dobbs's Ferry; our motives for recrossing are to save transportation and forage. Your Light In-

fantry is formed, about two thousand fine men; but the greater part of them without clothing.

Adieu, my dear Marquis, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Before this comes to hand, you will have been informed, that the fleet in the Sound, which it is generally believed was designed to proceed to Rhode Island, has returned. We have so many accounts of this, that we have no doubt of it, and are pursuing measures accordingly. With respect to the return of the militia,

* By advices, which Sir Henry Clinton had received from the ministry, he was prepared to expect the French armament; and other intelligence had convinced him, that its destination was probably Rhode Island. This opinion he communicated seasonably to Admiral Arbuthnot, and requested that transports for six thousand men might be kept in readiness to receive troops, in case an enterprise should be deemed expedient as soon as the French should arrive. Although the French fleet entered the harbour of Newport on the 10th of July, the news did not reach New York till the 18th. Sir Henry Clinton determined, nevertheless, to attempt an attack either by land or by a combined operation with the fleet, and immediately gave notice of his design to the admiral. He proceeded with his troops to Frog's Neck, but the transports did not arrive till the 27th, when it was too late to hope for success by a *coup de main*. He embarked his troops; but, receiving information that the French had been very active in fortifying themselves at Newport, and that the militia were assembling at that place, he considered it impossible to secure success by land forces alone, and crossed the Sound to Huntington Bay, where the troops were disembarked on the 31st. The approach of Washington to New York also rendered it necessary for him to hasten back. By his first plan he hoped, with the aid of the fleet, to make a rapid descent upon Rhode Island, and return to New York before Washington should be able to move with his army upon that city. His scheme was defeated by the delay in furnishing transports. There was a want of harmony between Admiral Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, which already began to produce ill effects, and which in the end proved very unfavorable to the public service.

who were called for under the persuasion that the enemy meant to attack Count de Rochambeau, it will rest with him and you to determine the point. But, as it is of consequence, on account of the state of our provisions, that we should not have more of these in the field, than prudence and necessity may require, and as it is not very probable, that the enemy will now return upon their steps and prosecute their supposed original plan, it might be best to permit the militia to go to their homes.*

As to your coming to the army immediately, I shall leave it entirely with yourself to act in the affair as you please. Your command is, and will always be, ready for you. However, if you find your presence where you are necessary, and that it will contribute to the accommodation of our allies, and to the cultivation of harmony, matters about which I am very anxious, it may possibly be more eligible for you to remain longer, as we shall not, probably, have any instant active operations. But, as I have already said, do in the matter as you like, and as circumstances may decide.

I find by a letter from his Excellency Governor Greene, of the 24th, that nearly the whole of the State's quota of levies for filling her two regiments had assembled, and were doing duty under the command of Colonel Greene. It is of consequence that Colonel Greene's regiment and the levies should join the army, in order to complete our arrangements, and

* The militia had come in with great promptness and alacrity from Rhode Island and Massachusetts. As soon as it was known, that General Clinton had suspended or abandoned his enterprise against Newport, it was agreed between General Heath and Count de Rochambeau, that all the militia should be sent home except three thousand five hundred. Of these, two thousand were stationed between Quaker Hill and the town, and the remainder at Butts's Hill. The militia, that were retained, had been called out to serve for three months.

that they may be disciplined. However, I would not wish them to be ordered on, without your consulting the Count and obtaining his approbation of the measure. If they do not march immediately, you will impress Colonel Greene with the necessity of his strictest and most constant attention to disciplining them, and for his being ready to proceed the moment he is ordered, or that the Count shall judge his remaining longer unnecessary. You will also direct him to transmit to me a return of his regiment and of the levies. I am, dear Sir, with great regard, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

SIR,

You are to proceed to West Point, and take the command of that post and its dependencies, in which all are included from Fishkill to King's Ferry. The corps of infantry and cavalry, advanced towards the enemy's lines on the east side of the river, will also be under your orders, and will take directions from you; and you will endeavour to obtain every intelligence of the enemy's motions. The garrison of West Point is to consist of the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts; for which reason, so soon as the number from those States amounts to twelve hundred, the New York militia under the command of Colonel Malcom, are to join the main army on the west side of the river; and, when the number from Massachusetts Bay alone shall amount to fifteen hundred, rank and file, the militia of New Hampshire will also march to the main army. Colonel James Livingston's regiment is, till further orders, to garrison the redoubts at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point.

Claverac, upon the North River, is appointed for the place of rendezvous of the militia of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, from whence you will have them brought down as fast as they arrive. A supply of provision will be necessary at that place, which you will order, from time to time, as there may be occasion. You will endeavour to have the works at West Point carried on as expeditiously as possible by the garrison, under the direction and superintendence of the engineers, the stores carefully preserved, and the provision safely deposited and often inspected, particularly the salted meat. A certain quantity of provision has been constantly kept in each work, to be ready against a sudden attack. Where there are bomb-proofs, they serve for magazines; but in the smaller works, where there are none, you will have places erected sufficiently tight to preserve the provision from damage and pillage.

You will, as soon as possible, obtain and transmit an accurate return of the militia, who have come in, and inform me regularly of their increase. Should any levies from the State of New York, or those to the eastward of it, intended for the Continental army, arrive at West Point, you will immediately forward them to the lines to which they respectively belong. The difficulty we shall certainly experience, on the score of provisions, renders the utmost economy highly necessary. You will, therefore, attend frequently to the daily issues; and, by comparing them with your returns, you will be able to check any impositions. I am, &c.*

* Although there had been various intimations to the Commander-in-chief, that Arnold wished the command at West Point, yet he had delayed conferring it, probably because he considered the services of so efficient an officer much more important in the main army. In the arrangement of the army, therefore, published in general orders on the 1st of August, the command of the left wing was assigned to Arnold. When it was found, that he was disappointed and dissatisfied, and complained that his wound would not allow him to act in the field, Washington complied with his request to be stationed at West Point.

TO COLONEL THADDEUS KOSCIUSZKO, ENGINEER AT WEST POINT.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 3 August, 1780.

SIR,

The artificers are drawn from the post at West Point for a particular and temporary service only; and, as there is a necessity for a gentleman in the engineering department to remain constantly at that post, and as you, from your long residence there, are particularly well acquainted with the nature of the works and the plans for their completion, it was my intention that you should continue. The infantry corps was arranged before the receipt of your letter. The southern army, by the captivity of General Duportail and the other gentlemen of that branch, is without an engineer; and, as you seem to express a wish for going there, rather than remaining at West Point, I shall, if you prefer it to your present appointment, have no objection to your going. I am, &c.*

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Head-Quarters, 5 August, 1780.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,

I approve the steps you have taken. I am sorry to find, however, that the Chevalier de Ternay is so

* Kosciuszko replied to this letter as follows. "The choice your Excellency was pleased to give me in your letter of yesterday is very kind; and, as the completion of the works at this place during this campaign, as circumstances are, will be impossible in my opinion, I prefer going to the southward to continuing here. I beg you to favor me with your orders, and a letter of recommendation to the Board of War, as I shall pass through Philadelphia. I shall wait on your Excellency to pay due respects in a few days." — *West Point, August 4th.*

averse to entering the harbour * in case of superiority. I believe he will find it impracticable, without entering, effectually to interrupt supplies and blockade the enemy; and, in my opinion, our principal chance of success is in a complete blockade. I am however willing to go on with the chances of a siege, if agreeable to our allies. But let me entreat you to ascertain the probability of a succour coming from France and the West Indies; for, to be keeping so large a body of militia in the field, with a slender hope of being able to operate, will be unadvisable on every account. We shall exhaust ourselves to no purpose, and every day will add to the impressions, that relinquishing the enterprise will make on the minds of the people. We ought to stand upon pretty sure ground, or dismiss our preparations for offensive measures at once.

Though I seriously intended to attack New York, if Clinton had gone to Rhode Island, yet I did not send for you, because I thought it not improbable he would return in consequence of our movement, as has happened, and because your presence where you are, in the other case, would have been of great utility to the French fleet and army; but above all, because I was of opinion, that it would be impracticable for you to arrive in time, as I intended to operate with the utmost celerity. I rejoice in the approbation your countrymen give to mine, and in the marks of mutual good will. The alliance ought to be cemented in affection, and you will be justly dear to both countries for the share you have in binding it by those powerful and pleasing ties. You know all my friendship for you. Adieu.†

* The harbour of New York.

† See the letter from the Marquis de Lafayette, to which this is a reply, in the APPENDIX, No. VI.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 5 August, 1780.

SIR,

I applaud all the measures you have taken, which appear to me precisely such as the occasion required; and I am very happy to hear, that the neighbouring States manifested so much ardor in doing what their interest, their duty, and their gratitude demanded from them. It is my wish that you should detain the levies, as long as you think they can be useful to you.

The Marquis de Lafayette will have informed you, by my desire, that Clinton returned with his fleet the 31st of July. He has since landed his troops on Long Island, and I think will hardly resume the project, which he certainly entertained, of attacking you. In consequence of his return, the army is recrossing the river and will proceed to Dobbs's Ferry, about ten miles from Kingsbridge, where we intend to establish a communication that will save us a considerable land transportation, in case New York is our eventual object. The reason for preferring the west side of the river to the other, which at first sight will appear most natural, is to meet our supplies of flour, and save the forage on this side; both of which in our circumstances are objects of importance. By the enclosed copy of a letter to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, you will see the opinion I have ventured to give respecting the second division and those of the Chevalier de Ternay, with a plan for a junction of the fleets as suggested in my letter. No other changes have taken place in the situation of the enemy at New York. I am, &c.

P. S. The minister, agreeably to the application to him, has sent out fast sailing cruisers from all the parts of the coast where it is probable they may fall in with the second division.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD, WEST POINT.

Head-Quarters, Peekskill, 5 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Enclosed is a letter, which I received this day from Colonel Malcom. His observations may perhaps be of use to you. He was a considerable time in command at the post, and is well acquainted with what relates to its security. It would be well to make inquiry into the cases of the number of persons, who are confined in the fort. Some of them may have been committed on frivolous occasions, and no charges, that can be supported, left against them. If so, they had better be discharged than kept. Some of the others may be usefully employed, in the way Colonel Malcom mentions. The quartermaster-general expects some camp-kettles shortly. He will, if possible, spare some to the militia. I imagine they are what are principally wanting. In the mean time, they must endeavour to make a shift with the few cooking utensils they have. I believe the matter of changing the officers of the light infantry companies has been settled between Governor Clinton and the Baron. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

Peekskill, 6 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have received your letter of yesterday. When you quit the department I shall be happy to give you my sense of your conduct; and, I am persuaded, it will be such as will be entirely satisfactory. I cannot, however, forbear thinking, that it would be unadvisable for



you to leave the department before the success of the letters, written from Paramus by the committee and myself to Congress, is known, and I entreat you to wait the issue of the application. I am, Sir, with great respect and regard, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.

Head-Quarters, 6 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to transmit to you a letter, which I have just received for you from the Chevalier de la Luzerne. Congress have directed a junction of the Continental frigates with your fleet, and for this purpose have put them under my orders. They were to rendezvous in the Delaware; from whence they were to proceed to join you. As this at present seems impracticable, I should be glad of your advice in what mode they may be employed usefully to your fleet; and that you will send me signals of recognizance for them. I request that you will also impart these to the captains of the frigates in Boston harbour, if they have not left that place. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 8 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am exceedingly happy at the conduct of the militia in turning out with so much spirit and alacrity. It does them great honor; at the same time that it is very interesting to the common cause. The Count de Rochambeau has expressed himself highly pleased with

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them, and in such terms as have given me much satisfaction. Gratitude, interest, and policy combined in the strongest manner to lead us to give him the earliest and most effectual support. The Count will have received long before this my letters advising him of the certain return of General Clinton to New York, and will have made every arrangement in consequence of it. You will see, by my letter of the 3d, that your joining the army is entirely with yourself. Sir Henry Clinton's return having put an end to the plan I had formed of an immediate attempt on New York, while he should be operating to the eastward, the army has passed the river; and we are now going, agreeably to my original design, to establish as soon as possible a communication for the present across the river at Dobbs's Ferry, in order to aid our land transportation and facilitate our supplies of bread; which, at any rate, will be found sufficiently difficult, but much less so, than if the flour were to be carried around the circuitous route by King's Ferry and thence to the Plains.

I very much wish, that the fleet, reported to have been met at sea, may have been the second division from France, and that it may get safe into port. In order to give it the better chance for this, it would be well if the intelligence should remain a secret; for, if it should reach the enemy, they would try every measure they could devise to intercept it.

I am dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 11 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received intelligence, that the British troops, who lately returned from the eastward and debarked

upon Long Island, have orders to embark again. I cannot suppose, that they mean again to go towards Rhode Island; neither can I think, that, in the present situation of matters, they can expect any success from an attempt upon West Point; but, in order that we may run no risk, I shall write to Colonel Malcom, directing him to halt in the neighbourhood of Haverstraw till further orders. He will from thence be within supporting distance of the posts, should a serious move up the river take place. You will also detain all the militia of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, who may come in, until we receive more certain intelligence of the views and intentions of the enemy. You will put all your posts upon their guard. They can be affected by nothing but a surprise, while this army is so near them.

We shall have occasion to throw up some small works at Dobbs's Ferry, to secure the intended communication at that place; and, in order that we may be enabled to finish them in the most expeditious manner, you will be pleased to order sixty of Colonel Baldwin's artificers to come immediately down here.

Colonel Hay writes, that he shall be able to lay up some stock of hay at Fishkill, provided orders are given, that none shall be issued while grass or pasture is to be had, except upon such occasions as you, or the deputy quartermaster-general at the post, shall think proper. This measure appears to be necessary; and you will, therefore, be pleased to give orders to have it carried into execution. A new quartermaster-general (Colonel Pickering) is appointed. Whether he will be supplied with the means of procuring what is necessary in the department, or whether the new system is calculated to produce them, is yet to be known. In the mean time, you can only proceed in working up the materials, which you find on hand. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GATES.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 12 August, 1780.

SIR,

We are impatiently awaiting the arrival of the second division of the French fleet and army, upon which the commencement of operations in a great measure or entirely depends. In my letter of the 18th of July, I desired you to make frequent communications of the situation of affairs at the southward. I cannot forbear repeating my wish on this subject, as circumstances may require a very sudden alteration of our present plans; and, should the transfer of the whole or a part of the force of our allies to the southward be deemed eligible, it will be necessary that we should be acquainted beforehand with your strength, expectations, and resources, and also with the number, position, and circumstances of the enemy. You may depend upon every intelligence from me, which can in an way affect or be interesting to the operations in your quarter.

I have taken the opportunity of writing by Colonel Kosciuszko, with whom I part reluctantly, as I have experienced great satisfaction from his general conduct, and particularly from the attention and zeal with which he has prosecuted the works committed to his charge at West Point. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Orangetown, 13 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The providing of wood in season for the garrison is so essential a matter, that you will be pleased to furnish Colonel Hay with the men required. I expect that

those men, who were detained at Rhode Island while there was an expectation of General Clinton, will soon come forward. Colonel Sheldon may be directed to send down a flag with Captain Benedict and Mr. Stevens. If the former can obtain liberty to be admitted into New York, I have no objection to his going. The general directions, which have been given respecting flags, have been as follows; To discourage the frequent use of them as much as possible; to permit no persons, inhabitants of the States, to go into New York without permission in writing from the respective governors, except in such a case as that of Captain Benedict, who shows good cause for going; and always to grant flags upon the application of the governors of the neighbouring States.

Several prisoners have lately made their escape from the provost at West Point, and voluntarily surrendered themselves here. Two of them, who came in to-day, say that they were induced to break out for want of water, as a practice has been made of keeping it from them, and obliging them to pay exorbitantly for it. Be pleased to inquire into this matter, and let the officer of the guard look to it in future. I am confident it is an imposition without the knowledge or concurrence of any but the inferior officers. I am, &c.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 13 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The subject of this letter will be confined to a single point. I shall make it as short as possible, and write it with frankness. If any sentiment therefore is delivered, which might be displeasing to you as a member of

Congress, ascribe it to the freedom which is taken with you by a friend, who has nothing in view but the public good.

In your letter without date, but which came to hand yesterday, an idea is held up, as if the acceptance of General Greene's resignation of the quartermaster's department was not all that Congress meant to do with him.* If by this it is in contemplation to suspend him from his command in the line, of which he made an express reservation at the time of entering on the other duty, and it is not already enacted, let me beseech you to consider well what you are about before you resolve. I shall neither condemn nor acquit General Greene's conduct for the act of resignation, because all the antecedent correspondence is necessary to form a right judgment of the matter; and possibly, if the affair is ever brought before the public, you may find him treading on better ground than you seem to imagine; but

* Mr. Jones had written from Congress; — "We have been greatly perplexed the last week with General Greene's refusal to act in the office of quartermaster-general, unless the new system was totally repealed, and he was allowed to conduct it under your direction in such a manner as he should think most conducive to the public service. If General Greene thought the new system wanted amendment, and had pointed out the defect, Congress would have considered the matter, and I doubt not would have made the necessary alteration. But the manner of these demands, made in such peremptory terms at the moment of action, when the campaign was opened, the enemy in the field, and our ally waiting for coöperation, has lessened General Greene, not only in the opinion of Congress, but I think of the public; and I question whether it will terminate with the acceptance of his refusal only.

"On Saturday Colonel Pickering was appointed to the office of quartermaster-general, with the rank of Colonel and the pay and rations of a brigadier-general, and to hold his seat at the Board of War without pay or right to act while in the office of quartermaster-general. This gentleman's integrity, ability, and attention to business will, I hope, not only prevent the evils to be apprehended from a change in so important a department at this time, but be able to reform some of the abuses, which have crept into that business."

See further particulars on this subject in the APPENDIX, No. V.

this by the by. My sole aim at present is to advertise you of what I think would be the consequences of suspending him from his command in the line (a matter distinct from the other) without a proper trial. A procedure of this kind must touch the feelings of every officer. It will show in a conspicuous point of view the uncertain tenure by which they hold their commissions. In a word, it will exhibit such a specimen of power, that I question much if there is an officer in the whole line, that will hold a commission beyond the end of the campaign, if he does till then. Such an act in the most despotic government would be attended at least with loud complaints.

It does not require with you, I am sure, at this time of day, arguments to prove, that there is no set of men in the United States, considered as a body, that have made the same sacrifices of their interest in support of the common cause, as the officers of the American army; that nothing but a love of their country, of honor, and a desire of seeing their labors crowned with success, could possibly induce them to continue one moment in service; that no officer can live upon his pay; that hundreds, having spent their little all in addition to their scanty public allowance, have resigned, because they could no longer support themselves as officers; that numbers are at this moment rendered unfit for duty for want of clothing, while the rest are wasting their property, and some of them verging fast to the gulf of poverty and distress.

Can it be supposed, that men under these circumstances, who can derive at best, if the contest ends happily, only the advantages which accrue in equal proportion to others, will sit patient under such a precedent? Surely they will not; for the measure, not the man, will be the subject of consideration, and each will

ask himself this question; If Congress by its mere fiat, without inquiry and without trial, will suspend an officer to-day, and an officer of such high rank, may it not be my turn to-morrow, and ought I to put it in the power of any man or body of men to sport with my commission and character, and lay me under the necessity of tamely acquiescing, or, by an appeal to the public, exposing matters, which must be injurious to its interests? The suspension of Generals Schuyler and St. Clair, though it was preceded by the loss of Ticonderoga, which contributed not a little for the moment to excite prejudices against them, was by no means viewed with a satisfactory eye by many discerning men, though it was in a manner supported by the public clamor; and the one in contemplation I am almost certain will be generally reprobated by the army.

Suffer not, my friend, if it is within the compass of your abilities to prevent it, so disagreeable an event to take place. I do not mean to justify, to countenance, or excuse, in the most distant degree, any expressions of disrespect, which the gentleman in question, if he has used any, may have offered to Congress; no more than I do any unreasonable matters he may have required respecting the quartermaster-general's department; but, as I have already observed, my letter is to prevent his suspension, because I fear, because I feel, that it must lead to very disagreeable and injurious consequences. General Greene has his numerous friends out of the army as well as in it; and, from his character and consideration in the world, he might not, when he felt himself wounded in so summary a way, withhold himself from a discussion, that could not at best promote the public cause. As a military officer he stands very fair, and very deservedly so, in the opinion of all his acquaintance. These sentiments are the result of my

own reflections, and I hasten to inform you of them. I do not know that General Greene has ever heard of the matter, and I hope he never may; nor am I acquainted with the opinion of a single officer in the whole army upon the subject, nor will any tone be given by me. It is my wish to prevent the proceeding; for, sure I am, that it cannot be brought to a happy issue, if it takes place. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 15 August, 1780.

SIR,

As you are retiring from the office of quartermaster-general, and have requested my sense of your conduct and services while you acted in it, I shall give it to you with the greatest cheerfulness and pleasure. You have conducted the various duties of it with capacity and diligence, entirely to my satisfaction, and, as far as I have had an opportunity of knowing, with the strictest integrity. When you were prevailed on to undertake the office, in March, 1778, it was in great disorder and confusion, and by extraordinary exertions you so arranged it, as to enable the army to take the field the moment it was necessary, and to move with rapidity after the enemy when they left Philadelphia. From that period to the present time, your exertions have been equally great. They have appeared to me to be the result of system, and to have been well calculated to promote the interest and honor of your country. In fine, I cannot but add, that the States have had in you, in my opinion, an able, upright, and diligent servant.

I am, Sir, &c.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.

Head-Quarters, Orangetown, 16 August, 1780.

SIR,

The reasons, which you assign for preferring the harbour of Boston to that of Delaware for the rendezvous of the second division, are certainly well founded, and I hope, from the steps which have been taken to give it notice of the position of Admiral Arbuthnot's fleet, that the division will reach one or the other of those ports in safety. I immediately communicated to the Board of Admiralty at Philadelphia your opinion of the most advantageous manner of employing the American frigates and sloop Saratoga, until circumstances shall admit of our commencing serious operations against the enemy; and I have advised them, should it not interfere with any arrangements which may have been previously made, to adopt the measures recommended by you. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* M. de Ternay objected to the Delaware as the place for the rendezvous of the second French squadron expected soon to arrive in the American waters, on account of the difficult navigation of that bay for large ships, and the danger of being blockaded there by the British fleet. He considered Boston harbour as more secure, and as affording greater advantages for future operations. The merchant vessels, which were convoyed by the fleet of the second division, he thought might enter the Delaware. "I write accordingly," said he, "to M. de la Luzerne, that, if the second division should arrive in the Chesapeake Bay, it may be at the option of Count de Rochambeau or General Washington to cause the transport vessels to enter the Delaware, and that afterwards the vessels of war should proceed to Boston."

It was the advice of the French admiral, that the American frigates should cruise on the coast, to intercept British vessels sailing from Charleston to New York. He requested that the sloop Saratoga might be sent to St. Domingo with despatches to Count de Guichen, who was then commanding a French squadron in the West Indies. It was hoped that Guichen would join the French armament in the United States, and thus form a decided superiority to the British naval force, by which a successful combined attack might be made on New York. M. de Ternay had instructions from the King to call on M. de Guichen for a reinforcement.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Orangetown, 17 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

With respect to the militia, or three months' men as they are called, I do not wish them to leave the Count, so long as he shall think their services really essential; but, when he judges that he can part with them, without injury or inconvenience, the whole, as well those furnished by Rhode Island as those from Massachusetts, will proceed to Peekskill. When they march, you will advise me of it, that I may meet the officer commanding them with orders for his further destination when he arrives.

As to your wish to join the army, I have observed to you before, that your aid may be very material to the Count; and, as we have no prospect of immediate active operations, I would rather wish you to remain with him longer. I thought it essential, in the first instance, that there should be an officer of rank sent to him; and a variety of reasons concurred to induce me to believe, that you would answer the important objects I had in view as well, at least, as any I could choose. I have not been disappointed in the least in my expectations; and the Count himself judges your continuing very essential, and expressed himself in the following manner upon the subject several days ago. "I shall keep with me, if you think proper, General Heath, whose ardor, spirit, and activity are absolutely necessary to me." For these several considerations, I wish you to reconcile yourself to remaining with him for a while; which will be the more easy, when you consider that you will be fully advertised, whenever we are in a situation to attempt any thing offensive on a great scale, and that you will have your command.

I return to you the proceedings of the court-martial, as your powers are fully competent to the case it respects; and you will act in the affair as you shall judge proper. I am exceedingly happy to hear of the success of the eastern cruisers against the fleet bound to Quebec, and hope that the sixteen prizes, already arrived, will be followed by the remainder of the fleet, or the greater part of it. A stroke of this kind against the provision vessels expected from Cork, to follow this, would be very interesting. I hope it will happen.

From advices I have received, the enemy are again preparing an embarkation. The number of troops is said to be about two thousand; and, from several circumstances, it would seem, that they are intended for some coasting expedition. I am, dear Sir, &c.

P. S. On further consideration, the Rhode Island militia, or three months' men, will not proceed till further orders, or till the French troops advance.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Orangetown, 20 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have been duly honored with your Excellency's letters and their enclosures. I have a grateful sense of the confidence of which those acts are expressive, and shall labor to improve it to the utmost extent of the means with which I am entrusted. I sincerely wish our prospects were more favorable than they are.*

* Hitherto the operations of the Commander-in-chief had been restricted within the limits of the United States. To enable him to act effectually in concert with the French forces, it seemed necessary to remove this restriction, which was done by a resolution of Congress on the

The enclosed copy of a letter to the committee of coöperation will give Congress an idea of our situation at this time, and how little reason we have to expect we shall be able to prosecute our original intentions in this quarter, even should the event correspond with the expectations of our allies on their part. The same obstacles will oppose in a great degree the operations recommended at the southward; for, from all the accounts we receive from thence, the affairs of the southern States seem to be so exceedingly disordered, and their resources so much exhausted, that whatever may be undertaken there must chiefly depend on the means carried from hence. If these fail, we shall be condemned to a disgraceful and fatal inactivity. It is impossible to be more impressed with the necessity of the reverse than I am. I think our affairs absolutely require it, and if any efforts of mine can enable us to act with vigor either here or elsewhere, it shall be done. But there is a complication of embarrassments, that menaces us on every side with disappointment.

At this very juncture I am reduced to the painful alternative, either of dismissing a part of the militia now assembling (though by the way they were to have rendezvoused the 25th of last month), or let them come forward to starve, which it will be extremely difficult for the troops already in the field to avoid. If we adopt

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2d of August. In the vote on this question, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Virginia, were unanimously in the affirmative; Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina were unanimously in the negative; Georgia was divided; Connecticut and Pennsylvania gave one negative vote each, but the majority of the delegates were in the affirmative. It was singular, that South Carolina and Georgia should oppose the resolution, as it was mainly intended to enable the Commander-in-chief to operate with more vigor, in concert with the French, and with the Spanish in the West Indies, to drive the enemy from those two States. — See the *Secret Journals of Congress*, Vol. I. p. 161.

the first, we shall probably not be able to get them out again in time to be of any service this campaign, and to let them come on without the means of subsistence would be absurd. Every day's experience proves more and more, that the present mode of obtaining supplies is the most uncertain, expensive, and injurious, that could be devised. It is impossible for us to form any calculations of what we are to expect, and consequently to concert any plans for future execution. No adequate provision of forage having been made, we are now obliged to subsist the horses of the army by force, which among other evils often gives rise to civil disputes and prosecutions, as vexatious as they will be burthensome to the public. This is the spirit prevailing among the inhabitants, and its effects cannot be prevented by us, without an open rupture with the civil magistrate. Influence and persuasion begin now to be unavailing; we of course have no other remedy.

In our present state of suspense, I would not propose any specific requisitions for the southern States, other than those already made. They should be urged to exert themselves to comply with these, and in general to do every thing in their power to form as ample magazines of bread, forage, and salted meat, as the resources of the country will afford, at such places of deposit as the commanding officer in that quarter may point out, having regard, as far as circumstances will admit, to transportation by water. Congress, I doubt not, are better acquainted with the abilities of those States than I am, or any person I can consult, and will be better able to direct calculations of what they can furnish. If they think any further specific demands necessary to answer the purpose of forming magazines, I shall be much obliged to them to take the proper measures, calculating for an army of eight thousand American

troops. If possible, this force should be kept up and supplied in any case, while the enemy remain there with their present strength.

If any thing more can be done to stimulate the States this way to a compliance with the requisitions made of them, particularly in the articles of flour and forage, in which we seem most defective, it will conduce more than any thing else to enable us to act both here and to the southward; for, as I before observed, it appears to me evident, that the means for southern operations, as well with respect to supplies as men, must be principally carried from hence.

But while we are meditating offensive operations, which may either not be undertaken at all, or being undertaken may fail, I am persuaded Congress are not inattentive to the present state of the army, and will view in the same light with me the necessity of providing in time against a period (the 1st of January), when one half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army, that will remain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, to abandon the service, without the hope, which has hitherto supported them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and certainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth, of which every spectator of the distresses of the army cannot help being convinced; those at a distance may speculate differently, but on the spot an opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale, would be chimerical. The committee of Congress, who have seen and heard for themselves, will add their testimony to mine, and the wisdom and justice of Congress cannot fail to give it the most serious attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their pres-

ent train. If either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America, in America, upheld by foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all our confidence and all our gratitude, but it is neither for the honor of America, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the work entirely to them.

It is true that our enemies as well as ourselves are struggling with embarrassments of a singular and complicated nature, from which we may hope a great deal. But they have already more than once disappointed the general expectations, and displayed resources as extraordinary as unexpected. There is no good reason to suppose those resources yet exhausted. Hitherto they have carried on the war with pretty equal success, and the comparative forces of this campaign are, I believe, less disadvantageous to them than they were the last. At present, indeed, their affairs wear a critical aspect, but there are chances in their favor; and, if they escape, their situation will be likely to take a more prosperous turn, and they may continue to prosecute the war with vigor. Their finances are distressed, they have a heavy debt, and are obliged to borrow money at an excessive interest; but they have great individual wealth, and while they can pay the interest of what they borrow, they will not want credit, nor will they fear to stretch it. A bankruptcy, which may be the result, will perhaps be less terrible to the King and his ministers than giving up the contest. If the measures leading to it enable them to succeed, it will add so much to the influence and power of the crown, as to make that event a ladder to absolute authority, supposed by many to be the object of the present reign. Nor are there wanting enlightened politicians, who

maintain that a national bankruptcy is not only a necessary consequence, but would be a national benefit. When we consider the genius of the present reign, and the violent counsels by which it has been governed, a system of this kind will be judged less improbable.

As to the domestic dissensions of the enemy in Ireland, we see they have hitherto not only diverted, but in some measure appeased them; and by pursuing their plan of taking off the leaders, and making plausible concessions to the people, we ought not to be surprised, if they keep matters in that country from going to extremity. In England it is much to be feared, that the overbearing influence of the crown will triumph over the opposition to it, and that the next Parliament will be nearly as obsequious as the last. A change of some of the ministry, to make way for a few of the principal heads of opposition, would perhaps allay the ferment. But even without this, considering the complexion of the British nation for some time past, it is more probable these appearances will terminate in a partial reform of abuses, than in any revolution favorable to the interests of America. The ministry may be perplexed for a time, and may be obliged to make a few sacrifices in favor of public economy, which may finally promote their views by leaving more money in the treasury to be applied to the purposes of the war.

The general disposition of Europe is such as we could wish; but we have no security that it will remain so. The politics of princes are fluctuating, often more guided by a particular prejudice, whim, or interest, than by extensive views of policy. The change or caprice of a single minister is capable of altering the whole system of Europe. But, admitting the different courts at this time ever so well fixed in their principles,

the death of one of their sovereigns may happen, and the whole face of things be reversed. This ought to be the more attended to, as three of the principal potentates are at so advanced an age, that it is perhaps more probable one of them should die in the course of a year, than that all three should survive it.

The inference from these reflections is, that we cannot count upon a speedy end to the war, and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give consistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to this will be immediately to devise a plan, and put it in execution, for providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of the year, and for subsisting the officers and soldiers and making them a reasonable allowance. The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and such as will execute itself. Experience has shown, that a peremptory draft will be the only effectual one. If a draft for the war or for three years can be effected, it ought to be made on every account. A shorter period than a year is inadmissible. To one, who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description, and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown, that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line are to be attributed to this cause.

Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding

winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of every thing, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak, as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force, which the country was completely able to afford; and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause.

Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war, and the paper emissions, have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had, a great part of the time, two sets of men to feed and pay, the discharged men going home and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in

1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present levies we find there are some, who have received a hundred and fifty dollars in specie for five months' service, while our officers are reduced to the disagreeable necessity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that, by the time they have taught those men the rudiments of a soldier's duty, their services will have expired, and the work recommence with a new set. The consumption of provision, arms, accoutrements, and stores of every kind, has been doubled in spite of every precaution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours, order and economy have been impracticable. No person, who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs, can doubt that our currency has depreciated without comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments, than it would have done otherwise.

There is every reason to believe, that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since.

If the army is left in its present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put upon a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect, and nothing, I believe, will tend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. It will be an interesting winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favorable terms in forcible language; an army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, and crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim, that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.

I am inclined to hope that a draft for the war, or for three years, would succeed. Many incentives of immediate interest may be held up to the people to induce them to submit to it. They must begin to consider the repeated bounties they are obliged to pay as a burthen, and will be willing to get rid of it by sacrificing a little more once for all. Indeed it is probable, that the bounties may not be much greater in that case than they have been. The people of the States near the seat of war ought to enter into such a plan with alacrity, as it would ease them in a variety of respects; among others, by obviating the frequent calls upon the militia.

I cannot forbear recurring in this place to the necessity of a more ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this head have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are many symptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to unite both officers and men in a general refusal of the money, and some corps now actually decline receiving it. Every method has been taken to

counteract it, because such a combination in the army would be a severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist, that the accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods, and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not be satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good.

This is one instance of complaint. There are others equally serious. Among the most serious is the inequality of the provision made by the several States. Pennsylvania maintains her officers in a decent manner; she has given them half-pay for life. What a wide difference between their situation and that of the officers of every other line in this army, some of whom are actually so destitute of clothing as to be unfit for duty, and are for that cause only obliged to confine themselves to quarters. I have often said, and beg leave to repeat it, that the half-pay provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can be adopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not done, the army (already so much reduced in officers by daily resignations, as not to have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it,) must either cease to exist at the end of the campaign, or it will exhibit an example of more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance, than has perhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm.

The dissolution of the army is an event, that cannot be regarded with indifference. It would bring accumulated distresses upon us; it would throw the people of America into a general consternation; it would discredit our cause throughout the world; it would shock our allies. To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary; the loss of the veteran soldiers could not be repaired; to attempt to carry on the war with

militia against disciplined troops would be to attempt what the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to Congress, were I to dwell on observations of this kind in a letter. But having gone into a detail of our situation, I shall beg leave to make one observation more.

It is a thing, that has been all along ardently desired by the army, that every matter which relates to it should be under the immediate direction of Congress. The contrary has been productive of innumerable inconveniences. Besides the inequality of provision already mentioned, all the confusion we have experienced by irregular appointments and promotions has chiefly originated here; and we are again relapsing into the same chaos. I have daily complaints of palpable mistakes and deviations from those rules on which the tranquillity of the service depends, of which I might cite recent instances if it were necessary to trouble Congress with such a detail. I shall however mention one in the Jersey line, by way of example. A vacancy happened in July, 1779, by Lieutenant-Colonel Brearly's being appointed chief justice of the State. This was not filled till March following, by which the officer entitled to succeed has lost several months' rank in the line of the army. The vacancies, which his promotion made, still continue open to the prejudice of those next in order; and yet, as I have been informed, new appointments have been made by the State on the ground of those vacancies. As this is a fruitful source of discontent, it is naturally in my province to point it out; but, if I were to permit myself to touch upon the political consequences, I might easily show, that it has a direct tendency to enfeeble our civil union by making us thirteen armies instead of one, and by attaching the

troops of each State to that State, rather than to the United States. The effects of this spirit begin to be visible. But this is a topic on which I may not be permitted to enlarge.

In this delicate and perplexing conjuncture, which I cannot but contemplate with extreme inquietude, I have thought it my duty to lay my sentiments with freedom before Congress, and to give them the fullest and truest information in my power; and I hope I have done it with all possible deference. I trust they will receive what I have said with all the indulgence, which must flow from a conviction, that it is dictated by a sincere attachment to their honor, and by an anxious concern for the welfare of my country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, 21 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I received your favor of yesterday late last evening. Should you receive intelligence, upon which you can depend, that any considerable number of the enemy's shipping have sailed eastward, or any other matter, which you may think interesting to the French army and navy, you will be pleased to communicate it to General Heath at Newport as well as to me. There is a chain of expresses from Colonel Sheldon's quarters to Tower Hill. Baron Steuben wishes you to make inquiry, whether there is an officer in Colonel Livingston's regiment at King's Ferry, capable of doing the duty of deputy adjutant-general and sub-inspector at your post; if there is, he will depute him, and send him proper instructions. I am, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Orangetown, 21 August. 1780.

SIR,

In the idea of an operation against New York, it has always been a fundamental principle with me, that there ought to be a naval superiority to give such a prospect of success as would justify the undertaking. Relying, however, upon a moral certainty of this event shortly happening, if you had found yourself in a good condition to desire a commencement of operations, previously to the arrival of the second division, I should have concurred in it. The reflections you make on the difficulty of effecting a debarkation on Long Island, without a naval superiority, are natural and judicious, from the view you must have of it; but, from a knowledge in part of the local situation, and from particular inquiries of others, I think the debarkation would be practicable. From the shape of the ground on both sides, and the narrowness of the Sound in several parts, there are different points of debarkation; and the enemy could not with propriety uncover New York so much (especially if we had once thrown ourselves upon that Island) as to have a sufficient force on Long Island to give effectual opposition at each point. The attempt in question supposes a number of boats collected to throw over at once a force superior to the part of the enemy's force opposed to you, which might I believe have been done. Their vessels might have been compelled to keep stations too remote to interrupt your descent, by land batteries erected at different places on the main, and on the intermediate Islands.

But notwithstanding the practicability of such an operation, I entirely agree in opinion with you, for several reasons, that it will be best to defer the commence-

ment of the enterprise till we get a superiority at sea. One of the most powerful is, that you could not leave the fleet in security without a considerable part of the land force to coöperate with it, and in this case our collective force would be smaller than would be requisite to act with vigor and confidence.

As to the particular mode of operating against New York, we may at this time combine different possibilities; but we cannot fix a definitive plan. There are three ways in which we may accomplish our purpose; first, by acting in the first instance with our whole force on York Island; secondly, by beginning our operations against Brooklyn with the principal part of our force, leaving a corps of observation for the security of our communication well intrenched on York Island or on the main; or, thirdly, by dividing our force into two parts to act against the works on both Islands at once. Which of these plans will be preferable must depend on the time we begin to act, and the force we have to act with. If these circumstances correspond with our wishes, I should prefer the last of the three. In this case, we ought, if possible, as a preliminary, to establish ourselves on the Island of New York, and then detach to Long Island a force equal to the whole, which the enemy may be able to bring to act there.

In taking post on Long Island, a force equal to the whole of the enemy may be prudent to guard against possibilities; but, after we have taken post and the usual precautions, two thirds of their whole force will in my opinion be sufficient both for security and for the reduction of the works there. Notwithstanding the facility with which the enemy can pass from one island to the other, they will never hazard the withdrawing of more than two thirds of their force from York Island to attack the corps on Long Island, while there is an army

of more than their whole force in front ready to fall upon the remainder. This would be to expose their essential point, where all their magazines are, to imminent danger. Nor even with their whole force would they have great hopes of success against two thirds of the number in intrenchments.*

These, Sir, are my sentiments, which I am happy to find in the main correspond with yours. A naval superiority we both consider as the basis of offensive operations. We both propose the same distribution of force, if circumstances will permit; with only this difference, that I think a small number will suffice for

* After the Marquis de Lafayette returned from Newport, he wrote a very long letter to Count de Rochambeau, containing a plan for an attack upon New York, and recommending it to the adoption of the French general and admiral. See APPENDIX, No. VI. This letter was written with the approbation of General Washington, but it did not accord with the views of the French commanders, who believed that one of the three following conditions ought to be verified, before it would be advisable to act on the offensive. First, the arrival of the second division of French troops, with a maritime force sufficient to give a superiority to the French fleet. Secondly, succours from Count de Guichen, after his enterprise in the West Indies. Thirdly, a decrease of the enemy's force at New York, by a detachment to the West Indies or the southern States. Unless one of these cases should occur, Count de Rochambeau had laid it down as an axiom, that he was to remain on the defensive. He was not well pleased, therefore, with Lafayette's letter, and he presented his objections to the plan of an attack, which it contained. The above explanation was in reply to the letter, in which those objections were stated.

Count de Rochambeau touches upon the matter in his *Mémoires*. He gives an account of the particulars, and adds, "I ought to say, nevertheless, in justification of Lafayette, that he expressed substantially the sentiments of General Washington. That commander feared, and not without foundation, considering the absolute discredit of the finances of Congress, that the struggles of this campaign would be the last efforts of expiring patriotism. He wished, at any hazard, to risk an attack upon the enemy in their strong-hold, while he had the French troops at his disposal. But he perceived the consequences, and adopted the principles of my letter; and, during a long correspondence between us, I could never too highly praise the solidity of his judgment and the amenity of his style." — *Mémoires Militaires, Historiques et Politiques de Rochambeau*, Tom. I. p. 248.

Long Island. I ardently desire, that the interview you mention could take place. I am sensible it would infinitely facilitate our arrangements, and it would gratify the desire I feel of assuring you and the admiral personally of my esteem. But, to my great mortification and regret, there are difficulties in the way not easily surmounted. We are about ten miles from the enemy. Our popular government imposes a necessity of great circumspection. If any misfortune should happen in my absence, it would be attended with every inconvenience. I will however endeavour, if possible and as soon as possible, to meet you at some convenient rendezvous. I entreat you to inform me in your next to what distance the admiral and yourself would think it prudent to absent yourselves from the fleet and army.*

In one of my last letters I informed you, that Sir Henry was preparing an embarkation, of which it appears you had also received advice. I have received several pieces of similar intelligence, and there has been lately a very hot press for seamen. I cannot, however, suppose he has resumed his intention to attack you, as it would imply too much inconsistency. It is suspected by some, that he is making a detachment to the West Indies. If he means any thing serious, this seems to me as probable as any other supposition. But I doubt his having any thing serious in view. I am much obliged to you for the frankness with which you have given me your opinions, and for the favorable sentiments you entertain of me. Your conduct since your arrival has confirmed the prepossession, which your reputation had given me of your abilities; and I

* Count de Rochambeau replied, that he and the admiral could go as far as Hartford to a rendezvous, and if necessary even to Danbury. He requested General Washington to decide upon the time and place, and desired that the meeting might be held without delay.

promise myself from them, from your counsel, and from your exertions, the most important advantages to the common cause. Let me entreat, that you will oblige me with your opinions upon all occasions, and be assured of the perfect esteem and attachment, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 24 August, 1780.

SIR,

You are appointed to the command of the Light Infantry, and four brigades from your own wing, to be employed upon a forage down to Bergen, and from thence up to the English neighbourhood. You will make the necessary disposition for your own security and the wagons employed on the occasion. Such are the necessities of the army, and such the situation of the inhabitants, being all within the power of the enemy, that you will make the forage as extensive as possible in the articles of hay and grain, as well as in cattle, hogs, and sheep, fit for slaughter; and horses fit for the use of the army. All the articles are to be receipted for by the respective departments to which they belong; and the whole are to be sent up to the army, and delivered over to the officers in the several departments to be appointed to receive and receipt for the same, except such articles of provision and forage, as may be necessary for the subsistence of the party under your command.

As soon as you have completed the forage, you will draw off the troops and join the army. Should the enemy attempt to interrupt you in the business, you must govern yourself according to circumstances. I

leave you at liberty either to attack or retire, as you may think prudent, from the force in which they appear. Particular care is to be taken, that the men do not straggle, and that no unnecessary distress or oppression is brought upon the inhabitants. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 26 August, 1780.

SIR,

I am this moment favored with your letter of this day. I need scarcely inform you of the extreme pain and anxiety, which the licentiousness of some of the soldiery has given me. Something must and shall be done, if possible, to put an effectual check to it. I entirely approve of the prompt punishment, which you propose to have inflicted on the culprits in question. You will, therefore, be pleased to order one of the soldiers detected in plundering, and also the deserters you mention, to be immediately executed. I am, with great esteem, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Head-Quarters, 28 August, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

The late European intelligence has so altered the immediate prospects of the campaign, that I think it advisable to dismiss the militia now in service, and prevent any other coming out for the present. You will, therefore, let those now with you return home, so soon as their services are no longer thought necessary by Count de Rochambeau; for, as the probability of ope-

rating in this quarter is greatly diminished, and that of an operation elsewhere remote, it becomes our duty to lessen our expenses and economize our supplies as much as possible.

With respect to what you mention concerning the works on Butts's Hill, if our allies expect we are to contribute to the expense of them, we shall be obliged in delicacy to do it; but, if it could have been avoided, it would have better suited the present state of our affairs. I do not consider the works raising on the Island as of any great utility to us, farther than they contribute to the safety of our allies; and the expense, which may be incurred, will, in my opinion, have little other equivalent than this. You will therefore easily conceive, that I should be glad that every thing of this kind might be avoided, so far as it can be done without impeaching the generosity of the States; for, while our allies are sending fleets and armies to our assistance, and maintaining them at their own expense in our country, it might not be decent to refuse bearing such little expenses as they seem to expect. But we ought not to volunteer any thing of this kind, and I am persuaded you will not. You will act agreeably to these ideas.* With respect to the culprits you mention, you have my consent to pardon such of them as you may think proper. I am, with great regard, &c.

* An opinion prevailed with some persons, that the French government did not contribute so largely to the aid of the United States, as the conditions of the alliance and the importance of the common cause required. Among these were Mr. Izard, who had recently returned from France, and who complained that Dr. Franklin neglected to make proper representations to the French ministry. These things came to the ears of M. de la Luzerne, who said, in reporting them to Count de Vergennes, that, according to the views of Mr Izard and others of his way of thinking, the American minister ought instantly to alarm the French court with vivid pictures of the critical situation of the United States, and redouble his applications and requisitions; that France should be informed, that,

TO JAMES BOWDOIN, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Head-Quarters, 28 August, 1780.

SIR,

I am much obliged to you for the interesting intelligence you do me the favor to communicate. The blockade of the port of Brest, by delaying the sailing of the second division, makes a material change in our prospects.* I fear it will put it out of our power to operate against New York; but, if we are not unfortunate in Europe, and if vigorous measures are taken to give us magazines, we may still hope for some important operation, but it will probably be in a different quarter. I think, however, as I have mentioned in my official letter to you, that we ought not to discontinue

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without a subsidy of twenty millions of livres annually, and the aid of twenty vessels of war, the United States would be in danger of falling into the hands of England; and even if these should not all be obtained, it was necessary to make France fear, that the people of America, discouraged with the burdens and length of the war, would finally be driven to make a separate arrangement with England.

To this statement Count de Vergennes replied, that nothing could be more pernicious than an attempt to alarm the French ministry by false and exaggerated accounts; that, as they were well acquainted with the state of affairs, this proceeding would destroy confidence in any future representations, and put the reports of the American minister in contradiction with those of M. de la Luzerne, who was on the spot; that it would excite suspicions and distrust, instead of the frankness and good faith, which had hitherto prevailed; and that it would be returning deception and imposture for the generous conduct and benefits of the King, the only ally of the United States in their greatest distress. — *MS. Letter from Count de Vergennes to M. de la Luzerne, August 18th.*

* The frigate Alliance arrived in Boston from L'Orient, on the 16th of August, and brought the intelligence, that the French squadron and troops, which were to constitute the second division of Count de Rochambeau's army, were blockaded in the harbour of Brest by an English fleet of thirty-two sail. The Alliance had on board two thousand stands of arms, several cannon, and a quantity of powder for the United States.

raising men for the Continental battalions, as there is a possibility that we may still operate here, from the movement of the Cadiz fleet, or by a reinforcement from the Islands; or, if an operation here should not be practicable, the increasing of our force will enable us the better to detach to the southward.

I should be happy to comply with the wishes of the Council respecting the arms; but our present deficiencies, and the casualties that daily arise, will make us stand in need of all that have arrived in the Alliance. We expect a further supply shortly, and the State may depend, that as soon as possible its loan shall be replaced. I entreat your influence to have all the arms, powder, cannon, and clothing ready made, forwarded without delay to Springfield; for the officers in the service of the continent have not the necessary means of transportation.

I am informed of a set of resolutions lately entered into by a convention of delegates from the four eastern States, which, if rightly represented to me, and should they be carried into execution, will be the most likely means that could be adopted to rescue our affairs from the complicated and dreadful embarrassments under which they labor, and will do infinite honor to those with whom they originate. I sincerely wish they may meet with no opposition or delay in their progress. Our situation is truly delicate, and demands all our wisdom, all our virtue, all our energy. Great Britain no doubt encounters many serious perplexities and dangers, but there will be no miracle in her surmounting them. In Europe, by the last advices, there was a critical moment where the chances were too equally balanced. On this continent the affairs of the enemy are too prosperous; in the West Indies at this season, the elements may fight against our allies, but here is our best hope.

As to domestic dissensions, though they will no doubt embarrass, I confess I have no great confidence in them. We have every motive to be in earnest, and to exert ourselves to the utmost to take care of ourselves. With the truest esteem, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters 28 August, 1780.

SIR,

The intelligence brought by the Alliance, of the second division being blocked up in Brest by thirty-two British ships of the line, has made a material change in the prospects of the campaign. This, and the extreme distress of our magazines, have determined me to dismiss all the militia in service, except such as were wanted for immediate purposes. The probability of our being able to act in this quarter is become too precarious and remote to justify our keeping a large body of militia in the field, as it would be attended with much expense and additional consumption of provision and stores, neither of which are we in any condition to afford. This would have been the less eligible, as in all probability the periods for which they were called out would have expired before they could be made use of, if at all. Indeed, I have little hope of any thing decisive in this quarter this campaign. The enclosed copy of a circular letter to the States respectively will inform Congress of the extremity of our present necessities, and the shocking consequences that are resulting from them.*

* The circular was principally taken up in describing the distresses of the army for want of provisions, and the hopeless prospect of obtaining timely or effectual relief.

The army being in motion at the time Mr. Mathews left head-quarters, in order to return to Philadelphia, I could not then do myself the honor to testify to Congress the grateful sense I have of the cheerful and vigorous exertions of the committee during their residence with the army. This I now beg leave to do, and to assure Congress, that I feel myself under the greatest obligations to them for having done all in their power to accomplish the objects of their appointment, and forward the measures, which the good of the service and the exigency of the conjuncture demanded. With perfect respect and esteem I have the honor to be, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HALDIMAND, QUEBEC.

Head-Quarters, 30 August, 1780.

SIR,

I think it my duty to inform your Excellency, that it has been represented to me, that several American officers, who are your prisoners, are suffering a close and rigorous confinement in the jails of Quebec, without any good reason to warrant such treatment. I will not pretend to decide that these facts are authentic, as they have not come to me in such a way as is entirely satisfactory, and as they are opposed to that humanity and liberality of character, which I have always supposed your Excellency to possess. They have, however, been so represented, that I could not but make the communication, as well in justice to yourself, as to the officers of Colonel Warner's regiment, who are mentioned as the parties suffering; and I will not doubt it will have your attention, and that these, and all others, prisoners under your direction, will receive a treatment consistent with their rank, and with the principles

of humanity. And as the officers and soldiers, who are prisoners in your hands, are very remote from their friends and the means of support, I would submit to you, whether they might not be sent to Sir Henry Clinton at New York, with proper lists, where they would be exchanged in the due order of their capture with respect to the other prisoners in his possession. I do not perceive, that any inconvenience to yourself can result from the measure, or I would not propose it; especially when I add, that, if the prisoners are retaken or lost at sea in their passage, they shall be accounted for in the order of exchange. I am, &c.

TO COLONEL ETHAN ALLEN.

Head-Quarters, 30 August, 1780.

SIR,

I have been favored with yours of the 16th instant. I cannot, without deviating from the rule of conduct, which I have constantly observed, exchange the officers of Colonel Warner's regiment at this time, because there are a great many who have been much longer in captivity, and have therefore a just right to a preference. But, to endeavour to afford them the best relief the nature of the case will admit, I have written to General Haldimand, and proposed to him to send them and the other prisoners of war in his possession to New York, where we can furnish them with supplies of several kinds, which we cannot, from the great distance, forward to Quebec, and where they will be exchanged in due course. I have also represented to General Haldimand what you report of the treatment of our prisoners in Canada; and I hope my remonstrance will have the desired effect, should the cause of complaint be well grounded. I am, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 2 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Having received intelligence, that the enemy are in preparation for some important movement, I thought it advisable, that you should be apprized of it, because it is uncertain, if the information should prove true, whether their object will be an attack on the main army, or an attempt on the posts in the Highlands. I wish you, therefore, to take every precaution to put the latter in the most defensible state which is possible. Orders are already given for the two State regiments of Connecticut to form a junction with Colonel Sheldon; * and, in case the enemy should make demonstrations seriously of attacking the fortifications on the North River, you will call this force immediately to your assistance, collect all your detachments, and withdraw the garrisons from the post at King's Ferry; at the same time removing the stores from thence. For this and other purposes you will, without delay, be pleased to order sixty boats to that place, with five men each, to be ready to act as circumstances may require.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 3 September, 1780.

SIR,

A few days ago I moved the army to this place to cover a forage, which we thought it advisable to make

* These regiments had been stationed at Danbury and on the Sound, with the view of protecting Connecticut against any inroads the enemy might make into that State. They were commanded by General Parsons.

in the lower parts of this country, which, by its proximity to New York, has afforded the enemy considerable supplies. Having effected our purpose, we shall to-morrow take a new position on the other side of the Hackensac, about two miles from this and about five miles from the North River, where we shall remain till there is a solution of the present designs of the enemy; as soon as possible after which, I shall do myself the honor to meet you at one of the places you mention.

I have pretty good information, that Sir Henry lately endeavoured to engage a person to go to Rhode Island in the character of a spy, who was to be met by a frigate in some part of the Sound, after having collected all the knowledge he could of your situation, and that of the fleet. The person declined the errand; but circumstances lead to a suspicion, that Clinton's movements look your way. I cannot, however, easily persuade myself that this is the case. Nor am I yet satisfied, notwithstanding the appearances are so strong, that he can be making a detachment to the West Indies. In all probability the fate of Jamaica would be decided one way or the other before it could arrive. If the object should be to save the other Islands, a month hence would answer the purpose, as the season will not till the latter end of October admit of operations in the Windward Islands, and New York would be less exposed in the mean time. Indeed I cannot easily believe, that the enemy will venture at this period to make any considerable division of their force at New York. Yet I confess their affairs have somewhat this aspect.

In consequence of the advices brought by the Alliance, I have dismissed the principal part of the militia, who were called out for three months. From the

position of the fleets in Europe, there is reason to apprehend the second division will arrive too late to enable us to avail ourselves of their services, which, with respect to a great part of them, will expire in October. If fortunate events should bring the second division here sooner than I now expect, and in time for an operation against New York, we must assemble all the militia in the neighbouring country, till those more remote can come to our aid. Another inducement for dismissing the militia is to economize our supplies.

The visit you have had from the Indians gives me great pleasure. I felicitate you on that, which you must have had in the company of such agreeable and respectable guests. I dare say the reception they met with will have a good effect. It has been the policy of the English, in regard to them, to discredit the accounts of an alliance between France and America; a conviction of which, on the substantial evidence of your army and fleet, and not less of your presents and good cheer, will not fail to have a happy influence.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

* It was deemed good policy by General Schuyler and others, that a deputation of Indians should be encouraged to visit the French army and fleet at Newport. Many of the Iroquois Indians had been strongly attached to the French in former times, particularly during the last war, and they still retained a lively remembrance of the amicable intercourse that had then existed. When M. de Vaudreuil surrendered Canada to the British, he gave to the Indians, as tokens of recognisance, a golden crucifix and a watch; and it was supposed, that a renewal of the impressions, which had been in some degree preserved among the tribes by these emblems of friendship, would have the effect to detach them from the influence of the British, and strengthen their union with the Americans and French. For this end their journey to Newport was planned.

General Schuyler, who was at Albany, selected eighteen Indians for this deputation. Thirteen of these were Oneidas and Tuscaroras, and the other five Caghnawagas from the Sault of St. Louis near Montreal. They were accompanied by Mr. Deane, who was thoroughly acquainted

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 6 September, 1780.

SIR,

I cannot forbear expressing my wishes, for the sake of harmony, which our affairs essentially require, that the business of depreciation, so far as it is not to be provided for by the different States, could be a matter of speedy and general arrangement, so as to exhibit at one view all the parties, who are to have their pay made good. For I would beg leave to observe, that the mentioning of one part or class of the army, and postponing another, though they should eventually be placed on the same footing, is the source of uneasiness and of apprehensions that injurious discriminations may obtain; and it is said, that all officers and persons of every description, who have constantly served for a fixed pay, which has not been increased from time to

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with their language. They arrived at Newport on the 29th of August, and were received with a good deal of ceremony and attention by the French commanders. Entertainments and military shows were prepared for them, and they expressed much satisfaction at what they saw and heard. Suitable presents were distributed among them; and to the chiefs were given medals representing the coronation of the French King. When they went away, a written address was delivered to them, or rather a kind of proclamation, signed by Count de Rochambeau, copies of which were to be distributed among the friendly Indians. It was in the following words.

"The King of France, your father, has not forgotten his children. As a token of remembrance I have presented gifts to your deputies in his name. He learned with concern, that many nations, deceived by the English, who are his enemies, had attacked and lifted up the hatchet against his good and faithful allies the United States. He has desired me to tell you, that he is a firm and faithful friend to all the friends of America, and a decided enemy to all its foes. He hopes, that his children, whom he loves sincerely, will take part with their father in this war against the English."

This paper was written in both the French and English languages, and sealed and signed in due form. — *Rochambeau's MS. Letter, August* 31*st.*

time with the depreciation, stand upon the same principle and are entitled to the same consideration.

I am sorry to inform Congress, that our distresses for meat still continue. The army in general have been entirely destitute for two and three days, and at most have not drawn more than one day's supply in four or five. Such injury to the discipline of the army, and such distresses to the inhabitants, result from these frequent wants, that my feelings are hurt beyond description at the cries of the one and at seeing the other. Your Excellency's very interesting letter of the 31st, by Mr. Izard, came yesterday to my hands. The event, which its enclosures announce, is an unfortunate one indeed. News of it had arrived in camp from Philadelphia before your despatches were received.* I have the honor to be, &c.

* The event here alluded to was the total defeat of General Gates's army on the 16th of August, in the battle of Camden. This intelligence was received with the greater disappointment and surprise, as recent accounts had given very flattering prospects of the state of affairs in that quarter. The first letters after the action, from General Gates to Washington, are chiefly remarkable as showing the subdued feelings of the writer, and the change of tone, compared with his communications during the season of his prosperity. At the close of a general statement of facts he added;

"Anxious for the public good, I shall continue my unwearied endeavours to stop the progress of the enemy, reinstate our affairs, recommence an offensive war, and recover all our losses in the southern States. But, if being unfortunate is solely a reason sufficient for removing me from command, I shall most cheerfully submit to the orders of Congress, and resign an office, which few generals would be anxious to possess, and where the utmost skill and fortitude are subject to be baffled by difficulties, which must for a time surround the chief in command here. That your Excellency may meet with no such difficulties, that your road to fame and fortune may be smooth and easy, is the sincere wish of your most obedient servant." — *Hillsborough, August 30th.*

Again; "Too much honor cannot be paid by Congress to the memory of the Baron de Kalb. He was every thing an excellent officer should be, and in the cause of the United States he has sacrificed his life. If I can yet render good service to the United States, it will be necessary it

TO THOMAS S. LEE, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 6 September, 1780.

SIR,

In consequence of the disagreeable intelligence of the defeat of the army under Major-General Gates, which I have just received, I think it expedient to countermand the march of the troops, who were ordered from Maryland to join the main army. I am therefore to request your Excellency to give directions for the regiment enlisted to serve during the war, as well as for all the recruits, as soon as they can possibly be collected and organized, to march immediately to the southward, and put themselves under the orders of the commanding officer in that department.

Although I have not had the particulars of the late disaster, yet it is certain the exigency is such, as will demand the most spirited and vigorous measures to retrieve our affairs and check the enemy. And I cannot entertain a doubt, that your Excellency and the State will use every exertion to give activity and despatch to the march of the troops, and to all the measures necessary for the protection of the southern States. I have enclosed this letter open to the Board of War, that, in case the regiment in question is on its march

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should be seen, that I have the support of Congress and of your Excellency; otherwise some men may think they please my superiors by blaming me, and thus recommend themselves to favor. But you, Sir, will be too generous to lend an ear to such men, if such there be, and will show your greatness of soul rather by protecting than slighting the unfortunate. If, on the contrary, I am not supported, and countenance is given to every one who will speak disrespectfully of me, it will be better for Congress to remove me at once from a command, where I shall be unable to render them any good service. This, Sir, I submit to your candor and honor, and shall cheerfully await the decision of my superiors. With the warmest wishes for your prosperity, and the sincerest sentiments of esteem and regard, I am, &c." — *September 3d.*

from Maryland, it may be ordered to return without delay. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WAYNE.

Head-Quarters, 6 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your letter of the 3d, and return you my warmest thanks for your professions of friendship. They are the more pleasing, as I am convinced they are founded in the strictest sincerity, and I hope it is needless for me to tell you at this time, that an equal regard for you prevails on my part. I am concerned, however, that you should have given yourself the trouble of writing to me on the subject of your letter. I did not want any assurances or any proofs upon the point, because I entertain no idea, that you encouraged the unhappy measure, to which you allude, and which I wish to be buried in oblivion. Your former assurances, your anxiety to which I was a witness, the interesting part you took to compromise and settle the matter, were sufficient to remove every belief of the sort.

I do not know with certainty the person to whom you allude, as having attempted to injure you; but, from what I have heard, and not without much pain, it is probable I could conjecture who it is. If I am not

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* A council of general officers was held on the 6th of September, and the Commander-in-chief, after stating to them the condition and prospects of the army, requested them to send to him, in writing, their opinions respecting the plan of operations that ought to be pursued. The result was an almost unanimous voice, that it was not advisable to make any attempt against New York, till the second French division should arrive, or till there should be a naval superiority to coöperate with the movements on land. Several of the officers recommended detachments to the southward, and some of them thought that the southern army should be supported at all events.

mistaken with respect to the person I mean, I can with the greatest truth assure you, that he never mentioned a syllable to me in his life injurious to you, in the least possible degree, nor have I any reason to believe that he ever did to any gentleman of my family. The bare report of a coolness, which is said to subsist between you and the gentleman I have in view, has given me great concern, because I have a warm friendship for both, and consider harmony essential to our interest. There is nothing, if he is the person, which would give me more pleasure than to hear that you were in perfect amity again. Let it be the case; let all differences subside; the situation of our affairs never required it more; and in the emphatical terms of your and General Irvine's letter, of which you enclosed a copy, let all be as a band of brothers, and rise superior to every injury, whether real or imaginary, and persevere in the arduous but glorious struggle in which we are engaged, till peace and independence shall be secured to our country. I am certain you will do it; and I will only add, that I am, with the most perfect regard, yours, &c.*

* A promotion of an officer in the Pennsylvania line, which was thought by the other officers to be unjust to their claims, had excited a ferment among them, threatening the most alarming consequences to the whole army. General Wayne and General Irvine had used all their efforts to quell the storm, which, by the aid of the Commander-in-chief, had proved successful. It had been reported to General Wayne, that some person had insidiously represented him as being at the bottom of the affair, and as acting a treacherous part. This was the subject of his letter, to which the above was a reply.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, 7 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favor of the 5th, enclosing your instructions to Colonel Livingston, which perfectly comprehend my ideas of the rule of conduct, which is to be observed, should the enemy come up the river in force. I hear nothing further of any extraordinary preparations; but our precautions should be continued, because, if they do operate against you, it will be rapidly. I have no objection to the appointment of Captain-Lieutenant Hubbell to do the duty of deputy adjutant-general and sub-inspector. We have very disagreeable accounts from the southward. General Gates's letter does not go into particulars, but only mentions, that the army under his command had been totally defeated on the 16th of August, about eight miles from Camden. I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 8 September, 1780.

SIR,

Since the letter, which I did myself the honor to write to Congress the 20th ultimo, I have been more attentively considering the import of the resolutions of the 5th of August, and am at a loss to satisfy myself as to its precise extent, whether it be meant to authorize me to extend my views beyond the present campaign, and even to apply to the ministers of France and Spain in Europe, or only to concert plans for the present fall and winter with the ministers and officers of those powers in America, on the continent, or in the West

Indies. The latter appeared to me the most natural construction, and was the one I had adopted; but intimations have been given to me, by particular gentlemen, that Congress understood the resolve in the first sense. If I have been mistaken in my interpretation, I request to have the resolve explained in a full and explicit manner. If I am right no explanation will be necessary.* I also take the liberty to request to be informed whether Congress, in two or three months from the present period, can rely on being able to furnish specie or bills on Europe for the maintenance of a body of four or five thousand men in a country, where the paper of these States will not serve as a currency.

I should also be glad, if Congress will have the goodness to assist me with some light, as to the extent in which the States of South and North Carolina have ability to contribute to the support of an army in the articles of bread, meat, forage, horses, and wagons. I suppose an army to be there, sufficient to secure to us the full command of those States.

I entreat as speedy an answer as possible on these points, which are of the greatest consequence in determining our future plans; particularly I wish for immediate information on the subject of money. But the basis of every plan we can form is an army, and the means of subsistence. Without immediate measures to supply the places of the men, who leave us by the 1st of January, we shall scarcely have any thing that deserves the name of one. Our whole efficient force in this quarter will then probably be less than six thousand men. In proposing plans of coöperation, I must engage that something specific shall be performed on our

* This was probably the view of the matter taken by Congress, as no explanation has been found.

part. Congress will be sensible, that I cannot do this as to any plan for future execution, when I know that our army will be reduced one half in less than four months, and when, so far from being certain that we shall have it in our power to replace the men in time, I do not even know what measures will be attempted for the purpose, nor when they will be undertaken. The honor of Congress and of the States, as well as my own reputation, forbid me to enter into engagements, which I have no assurances of our being able to fulfil. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 8 September, 1780.

SIR,

The great preparations of General Clinton have hitherto resulted in nothing more, than the sailing of a fleet of about ninety vessels of different sizes for Europe with a few invalids. We are however still amused with rumors of an embarkation; but these now go upon a new and more probable ground, a descent upon Virginia. We have just received the most disagreeable advices from General Gates, of a defeat of the army under his command near Camden in South Carolina, in which the greater part of his best troops were cut off. We have not yet the details. This event must have the worst effect upon the affairs of the southern States. Nor is it easy to say how far its influence may extend. On this account, I should not be astonished if the enemy should really make a detachment of three or four thousand men to Virginia.

If convenient to you, I have the honor to propose the 20th instant for our interview at Hartford, where I

hope we shall be able to combine some plan of future operation, which events will enable us to execute. Our plans, however, can only turn upon possibilities; which is the more unfortunate, as the affairs of this country absolutely require activity, on whatever side they are viewed. I intend to conceal here the time of the intended interview. I dare say you will think it advisable to do the same on your part. The Marquis de Lafayette and the commandant of artillery and engineers will accompany me. I am, &c.*

TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 9 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have heard that a new arrangement is about to take place in the medical department, and that it is likely it will be a good deal curtailed with respect to many of its present appointments. Who will be the persons generally employed I am not informed, nor do I wish to know. However, I will mention to you that I think Dr. Cochran and Dr. Craik, from their services, abilities, experience, and close attention, have the justest claim to their country's notice, and are among the first officers in the establishment. Doctors Latimer, Tilton, Hagan, and Townshend, who are now senior surgeons, are also

* General Washington wrote to General Heath; "I should have been very glad, had the situation of the works, which Count de Rochambeau is constructing for the defence of the Island, admitted of the immediate dismission of the three months' Massachusetts militia; but, as it does not, and as the Count seems very desirous of completing them, we cannot but consent to their staying out their term of service, should it be necessary. I make no doubt but the State will do every thing possible to accommodate the French troops, should circumstances require them to take up their winter-quarters in Rhode Island." — *September 8th.*

gentlemen of great merit, and have a just claim to be continued, from their abilities, attention, and other considerations. They are all single men, and therefore, being otherwise well qualified, are the most eligible. I have received too the most favorable reports of the merits and attention of Dr. Jenifer, a junior surgeon, who is in the same situation. Dr. Craigie, the present apothecary-general, a gentleman not personally known to me, has been reported as very deserving of the appointment.

The several gentlemen I have mentioned, as I have observed, appear to me to have the fairest pretensions to the public esteem, and, if they are honored with proper places, I am satisfied the public will be greatly benefited by their services. There are many other gentlemen in the department, whom I have omitted to name. The reason of my mentioning these particularly proceeds from a hint given me, that the new arrangement might possibly be influenced by a spirit of party out of doors, which would not operate in their favor. I will add no more, than that I am, dear Sir, with the most perfect regard, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Head-Quarters, 10 September, 1780.

SIR,

By a letter I have received from Sir Henry Clinton, I find that the interview, which has been proposed between you and General Phillips, is to take place on the 19th of the month at Elizabethtown. I presume that Sir Henry Clinton has informed you of this by the letter I now transmit; and I need not add, that it will give me the highest pleasure, if you can effect your

exchange, either for Major-General Phillips or Major-General de Riedesel.

From the prospect I had, founded on the correspondence which I had seen, that there would be a meeting between you and General Phillips on the subject of your exchange, and the earnest desire I had of extending this business still farther, I was induced to inform Sir Henry Clinton, by a letter of the 26th ultimo, that "I should direct our commissary of prisoners to be present at the time, who would be instructed to execute with the commissary on his part, if he should think proper to send him, an exchange of officers, prisoners of war, on the footing of equal rank or composition, so far as the number in our hands would admit, and to include also the whole of the officers of convention now on parole in New York or in Europe." General Clinton has answered my letter, and informed me, that "his commissary of prisoners will attend." I shall accordingly order Mr. Skinner, our deputy commissary of prisoners, to be at Elizabethtown on the 19th, who will be fully instructed to carry my propositions to Sir Henry Clinton into execution. The business, as to the main points, will rest on the most simple footing, and such as Mr. Skinner is perfectly acquainted with. He has also a familiar knowledge of the few more particular cases, which can arise on the occasion, as he has been long in office, and has not only had repeated instructions, but has acted upon the subject. From these considerations, I will not give you any trouble in the matter, more than to wish you to interest General Phillips, so far as you can with propriety, if you should find it necessary to promote and countenance the exchanges, which are mutually interesting to both parties. Before you set out for Elizabethtown, I

will show you the instructions, which Mr. Skinner will receive. I am, &c.*

TO COUNT DE GUICHEN.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 12 September, 1780.

SIR,

The Marquis de Lafayette arrived in America in April last, charged by the court of France to announce to me its intention to send a fleet and army to co-operate with the troops of these States. Foreseeing that this succour would not have the intended effect,

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* A meeting took place at Elizabethtown, according to the tenor of the above letter, between General Lincoln and General Phillips; but the parties could not agree, and nothing was effected, either in regard to the personal exchange of these two officers, or a general exchange proposed in the instructions to Mr. Skinner. There was a misunderstanding as to the object of the interview. General Phillips had got the idea, that he and General Lincoln were to discuss the whole subject of exchanges, and also the appointment of commissaries to reside with the respective armies, and said he went out with powers to that extent; whereas General Lincoln had no other authority than to make an arrangement for his own exchange. "I shall decline giving any opinion upon this fruitless meeting," said General Phillips in a letter to General Washington, "but I must be allowed to acknowledge my extreme surprise, that it should be conceived by any person necessary for General Lincoln and myself to confer upon the matter of his partial and personal exchange, which depended so entirely and absolutely upon Sir Henry Clinton and your Excellency, and might have been settled by the receipt and return of a letter on either side." — *Elizabethtown, September 23d.* The mistake was on the part of Sir Henry Clinton, because, in his letter on the subject of the meeting for an exchange of prisoners, he had said that Mr. Loring, the commissary, would be sent out for the purpose, and had not mentioned General Phillips as being designed to take any other part, than that of concerting his own exchange with General Lincoln. He wrote a letter to Washington dated the 19th, the day on which the meeting took place, stating that he had entrusted General Phillips with full powers respecting the business of exchange. But General Washington was absent when the letter arrived in camp, nor was it received till it was too late to send similar powers to General Lincoln.

from an insufficiency of the naval force, which would probably be found inferior to the enemy, I requested the Marquis to represent to you the situation of affairs on this continent, the necessity of an active campaign, and the great utility of a detachment from your fleet to reinforce the one expected from Europe, and give efficacy to the generous intentions of your court. I was persuaded, that, if it were compatible with your instructions and the plans in contemplation in the Islands, you would cheerfully afford your assistance in a coöperation so necessary to this country, so beneficial to the common interest.

It appears since to have been the intention of your court to send a larger succour than was at first mentioned, and that a second division was to have followed that, which has arrived at Rhode Island. The late advices from Europe show, however, that the execution of this project will at least be suspended by the appearance of the British fleet off the port of Brest; and there is little hope that the second division can arrive in time to undertake any operations against the enemy in this part of the continent.

The Chevalier de Ternay has informed you of his being blockaded in the port of Rhode Island by a superior British fleet; and the French troops are of course under a necessity of remaining there for the security of the fleet against a combined attack by sea and land. Nor indeed could they be more useful to us in any other position, a naval superiority being essential to every enterprise in these States. In consequence of the expected aid, great exertions have been made on our part for offensive operations. An additional expense, immense for this country in its present exhausted state, has been incurred; great expectations have been excited among the people; and if events

do not permit us to derive correspondent advantages, the disappointment will no doubt be attended with effects very injurious to our affairs.

The situation of America at this time is critical. The government is without finances. Its paper credit is sunk, and no expedients can be adopted capable of retrieving it. The resources of the country are much diminished by a five years' war, in which it has made efforts beyond its ability. Clinton, with an army of ten thousand regular troops (aided by a considerable body of militia, whom, from motives of fear and attachment, he has engaged to take arms), is in possession of one of our capital towns, and a large part of the State to which it belongs. The savages are desolating the frontiers. A fleet, superior to that of our allies, not only protects the enemy against any attempts of ours, but facilitates those, which they may project against us. Lord Cornwallis, with seven or eight thousand men, is in complete possession of two States, Georgia and South Carolina; and, by recent misfortunes, North Carolina is at his mercy. His force is daily increasing by an accession of adherents, whom his successes naturally procure in a country inhabited by emigrants from England and Scotland, who have not been long enough transplanted to exchange their ancient habits and attachments in favor of their new residence.

By a letter received from General Gates, we learn, that, in attempting to penetrate and regain the State of South Carolina, he met with a total defeat near Camden, in which many of his troops have been cut off, and the remainder dispersed, with the loss of all their cannon and baggage. The enemy are said to be now making a detachment from New York for a southern destination. If they push their successes in that quarter, we cannot predict where their career may end.

The opposition will be feeble, unless we can give succour from hence, which, from a variety of causes, must depend on a naval superiority.

In addition to the representation made to you by the Marquis de Lafayette, it has been imparted to me by the Chevalier de Ternay, that he has also applied to you for a reinforcement to put him in condition to act. Though I have entire confidence, that the steps already taken will determine you to give us all the assistance, which your situation and the plans you have formed will permit, yet, as Congress have lately thought proper to vest me with full power to concert with the officers of his Most Christian and Catholic Majesties any enterprises, which appear to me advantageous to the common cause, it becomes my duty to address you immediately myself, and to expose to you the dangers and difficulties we experience in the present posture of our affairs, that you may judge how essential your assistance would be to us at this juncture.

I write to you with that confidence and candor, which ought to subsist between allies and between military men. In my eye the interests of France and America are the same, and to conceal our embarrassments would be to betray both. While I assure you, that the latter stands in need of the most vigorous assistance of its friends, I entreat you to believe, that I am as remote from exaggerating as from palliating, and that I do not heighten the picture from a partiality to our interest. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, whom I shall beg to transmit to you this letter in ciphers, will, I doubt not, add his testimony to mine. To propose at this time a plan of precise coöperation would be fruitless. I shall only observe in general, that any succour you can send in consequence of this letter must arrive too late for an enterprise against New York; but an unequivocal

naval superiority would, I hope, enable us to act decisively in the southern extremity.

The 20th instant is appointed for an interview with Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, in which we shall probably combine several plans, dependent for their execution on different contingencies. One of these will be the arrival of a detachment from your fleet. Convinced as I am, that the independence of America is with your court the primary object of the war, it is unnecessary to offer any other motives to engage your exertions in our favor. I might otherwise remark, that the destruction of the enemy here would greatly facilitate the reduction of their Islands. Supplies in much greater abundance, and on much better terms, might then be drawn from hence to forward your operations there; and these States, disencumbered of an internal war, might unite their inhabitants and resources in vigorous efforts against the common enemy elsewhere, for the benefit of the common cause. I am happy in this opportunity of congratulating you on the advantages, which you have reaped in your different combats, as glorious to the flag of France, as humiliating to that of Britain. My happiness would be complete, if the coasts of this continent should add to your laurels. I have the honor to be, &c.*

* The Chevalier de Ternay wrote also to Count de Guichen, requesting him to send four ships of the line to the coast of the United States; but he had left the West Indies and sailed for France before the letters arrived. M. de Monteil, his successor, could not decipher them, and of course no reinforcements were forwarded from the fleet.

M. de Ternay was not well satisfied at this time with his situation and prospects. In writing to Count de Vergennes he said; "I think that the squadron of the King, and his army, have not arrived at the most advantageous point for effecting any important operation on the American continent. The inferiority of means seems to require, that we should be at a greater distance from the place where the enemy concentrate their forces. We are actually compelled to remain on a very strict defensive.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 12 September, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to enclose to you a letter, which, upon the whole, I have thought it advisable to write to Count de Guichen. As its contents are of a nature to make its falling into the enemy's hands in its present form dangerous, and as I have no cipher for communicating with the Count, I take the liberty to request your Excellency's assistance in making use of yours, and forwarding it by triplicates with your despatches by the first opportunities. I make no mention of a land force, because, though it would be useful, it may be dispensed with. But if a body of troops could conveniently accompany the fleets, it would give greater energy and certainty of success to our operations. I am the more induced to desire it, as the composition of a considerable part of our army is temporary, and I am not informed what measures may be taken to replace the men, whose times of service will expire.

I need use no arguments to convince your Excellency of the extremity to which our affairs are tending, and the necessity of support. You are an eye-witness to all our perplexities and all our wants. You know the dangerous consequences of leaving the enemy in quiet possession of their southern conquests, either in regard to negotiation this winter, or a continuance of the war. You know our inability to expel them unassisted, or perhaps even to stop their career. I have the honor to be, with the sincerest sentiments of respect, &c.

The English squadron is superior in number and in every other respect. The fate of North America is yet very uncertain, and the revolution is not so far advanced, as it has been believed in Europe." — *MS. Letter, Rhode Island, September 10th.*

TO JOHN RUTLEDGE, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Head-Quarters, 12 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I am fully impressed with the importance of the southern States, and of course with the necessity of making every effort to expel the enemy from them. The late unlucky affair near Camden renders their situation more precarious, and calls for every exertion to stop, at least, the further progress of the British army. It is to be wished, that the composition of our force in this quarter, our resources, and the present situation of the fleet and army of our ally would admit of an immediate and sufficient detachment, not only to answer the purpose I have just mentioned, but to carry on operations of a more serious and extensive nature. But this not being the case, for reasons which must be obvious to you, let it suffice that your Excellency be informed, that our views tend ultimately to the southward.

In the mean time, our endeavours in that quarter should be directed rather to checking the progress of the enemy by a permanent, compact, and well organized body of men, than attempting immediately to recover the State of South Carolina by a numerous army of militia, who, besides being inconceivably expensive, are too fluctuating and undisciplined to oppose one composed chiefly of regular troops. I would recommend to you, therefore, to make use of your influence with the States from Maryland southward, to raise without delay at least five thousand men, for the war if it can be effected, if not, for as long a time as possible. These, with the militia in the vicinity, would answer the purpose I have last mentioned, and would in proper time make a useful body, either to form a

diversion in favor of, or to coöperate with, a force upon the coast.

I have hinted the outlines of a plan to your Excellency, which for many reasons should be in general kept to yourself. You will oblige me by informing yourself as accurately as possible, what may be the present resources of the country, as to meat, corn, wheat, or rice, and transportation, as I suppose circumstances may have occasioned a considerable change. And if it is possible to form magazines of either, it should be done, especially of salt meat, which is an article so essential to military operations, that the States of Virginia and North Carolina should be requested to lay up, as soon as the weather will permit, at least four thousand barrels in proportion to their respective abilities. You will also be pleased to endeavour to gain a knowledge of the force of the enemy, the posts they occupy, the nature and state of those posts, and the reinforcements they may probably derive from the people of the country. As you receive these several intelligences, you will be pleased to communicate them to me, with your opinion of the best place for debarking troops, in case of an expedition against the enemy in the southern States, and the names of persons in that quarter, whose opinion and advice may be serviceable in such an event. With much esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, 13 September, 1780.

SIR,

I have just received advices from pretty good authority, of which the enclosed is a copy. From the

complexion and agreement of these accounts, it seems very probable, that the Count de Guichen is really approaching the coast. Should this be the case, it is of so much importance to lose no time in concerting our plans, that I renew my proposal for meeting you and the admiral on the 20th instant, and I shall be at Hartford accordingly.

Should the Count de Guichen arrive before the end of this month, I still recommend New York to be our object; and in this view I cannot forbear repeating to you how essential it is, that the fleet should instantly proceed to take possession of the port, and that your troops should, as soon as possible, form a junction with ours by way of the Sound. The former is in my opinion the most critical point of the operation, and the advanced period of the season increases the necessity for despatch in the execution. I mention this, lest the arrival of the Count de Guichen should precede our interview. I have directed Captains Dobbs and Shaw to hold themselves in readiness to repair to the fleet on the first notice. A letter from the admiral, or from you to Captain Dobbs at Fishkill, will be immediately obeyed. I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Bergen County, 13 September, 1780.

SIR,

This will be presented to your Excellency by Captain Hendricks Solomon of Stockbridge. He and about twenty of his tribe have been serving as volunteers with the army since the beginning of July. They

* Captains Dobbs and Shaw were employed as pilots.

have been generally attached to the light corps, and have conducted themselves with great propriety and fidelity. Seeing no immediate prospect of any operation in this quarter, in which they can be serviceable, they are desirous of returning home, after receiving some compensation for the time, during which they have been with us, and after having made a visit to Philadelphia. I have thought it best to gratify them, not only on account of its being agreeable to them, but because I have it not in my power to furnish them with such articles of clothing as they request, and which they would prefer to money. Congress will, I doubt not, direct such a supply as they shall think proper. Captain Solomon, with part of these people, was with us in the year 1778. The tribe suffered severely during that campaign, in a skirmish with the enemy, in which they lost their chief and several of their warriors.

I have the honor to be, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ARNOLD.

Head-Quarters, 14 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your favors of the 11th and 12th instant. I have no objection to your sending down the two pieces of cannon to Colonel Gouvion. Under the circumstances you mention, you may detain the men of Colonel Putnam's regiment, who are serving as bargemen to you; and, if you can with convenience withdraw the batteaux-men, sent down to King's Fer-

* Several of the Stockbridge Indians were engaged at the beginning of the war, while the army was at Cambridge, and were in active service at different times. There was a party of Indians with Lafayette in the affair of Barren Hill.

ry, it will be a measure entirely agreeable to me. I hope Colonel Hay's plans for obtaining a supply of flour from the State of New York, and his application to the people of the Grants, will both meet with success. He is a faithful and indefatigable officer.

I shall be at Peekskill on Sunday evening, on my way to Hartford, to meet the French admiral and general. You will be pleased to send down a guard of a captain and fifty men at that time, and direct the quartermaster to endeavour to have a night's forage for about forty horses. You will keep this to yourself, as I wish to make my journey a secret. I am, &c.*

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, 15 September, 1780.

SIR,

I am happy to find, that the late disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its first features indicated. This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence; and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular

* This was the last letter written by General Washington to Arnold. A copy of the statement submitted to the council of general officers, on the 6th of September, was sent to Arnold, with a request that he would forward his opinion in writing. He acknowledged the receipt of it in his letter of the 12th, and said it should receive immediate attention. He wrote his opinion at some length, and gave it in person to Washington in the afternoon of the 18th, when he met him at King's Ferry on his way to Hartford. The statement here mentioned was one of the papers found in André's boots at the time of his capture.

force. Even those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods, and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance, that can justify a different opinion; and it is most earnestly to be wished, that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence.

I cannot but remark, that it gives me pain to find the measures pursuing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of once for all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the true system of war at the southward, the object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one. Every exertion should be made by North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, to raise a permanent force of six thousand men, exclusive of horse and artillery. These, with the occasional aid of the militia in the vicinity of the scene of action, will not only suffice to prevent the further progress of the enemy, but, if properly supplied, to oblige them to compact their force and relinquish a part of what they now hold. To expel them from the country entirely is what we cannot aim at, till we derive more effectual support from abroad; and by attempting too much, instead of going forward, we shall go backward. Could such a force be once on foot, it would immediately make an inconceivable change in the face of affairs, not only in the opposition to the enemy, but in expense, consumption of provisions, and waste of arms and stores. No magazines can be equal to the demands of an army of militia, and none ever needed economy more than ours.

Speaking of magazines, I beg leave to observe, that it is of infinite importance to endeavour to establish ample ones in the southern States. I mean more particularly of provisions, not only with a view to an immediate supply of the troops there, but also with a view to offensive operations in that quarter. A quantity of salt provision would be of great utility. It is deplorable that, if every other circumstance suited our wishes, we cannot reasonably undertake any thing for want of provisions. Here the country might, on an emergency, afford temporary supplies for a much larger force than we have; but, if we should find it eligible to turn our attention to the southward, we should in all appearance meet with an insuperable obstacle in the want of a sufficiency of provisions for the voyage, and for the operations previous to our opening a full communication with the country. In the course of the present month, the army here has had scarcely one third of the established rations of meat; and our distress continues without prospect of relief.

I have the honor to inform Congress, that to-morrow I shall set out for Hartford, to have an interview with Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay.* The command of the army in my absence devolves on Major-General Greene. It is with extreme regret, that I announce the death of Brigadier-General Poor on the 9th instant, an officer of distinguished merit, who, as a citizen and a soldier, had every claim to the esteem of his country.†

I have the honor to be, &c.

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* He did not in reality set out till Monday the 18th, having been delayed one or two days longer than he expected. This was a circumstance of some moment, as connected with the chain of events in Arnold's treason.

† General Poor had been in the army during the whole war, as an officer in the New Hampshire line. Few officers had been engaged in

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 16 September, 1780.

SIR,

To-morrow I shall set out for Hartford, to have an interview with the French general and admiral. In my absence, the command of the army devolves upon you. I have such entire confidence in your prudence and abilities, that I leave the conduct of it to your discretion, with only one observation, that, with our present prospects, it is not our business to seek an action, or accept one, but upon advantageous terms. You will attend to the post at Dobbs's Ferry, and take such precautions for its security, as you may judge necessary. As Lieutenant-Colonel Gouvion accompanies me, a Continental officer should be appointed to the command. There is now a lieutenant-colonel of militia there.

Should you receive authentic advice of the arrival of a superior French fleet on the coast, you will immediately put the army under marching orders, and take measures for collecting all the boats on the North River, and plank to form a bridge across Haerlem River. You will also immediately write to the States of Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Jersey, and New York, informing them of the advice you have received, and urging them to redouble their exertions for collecting provisions and forage, and to raise levies for their Continental battalions; and also to put their nearest militia under marching orders. You will acquaint me with every occurrence of importance, that comes to your

so much active service, and none had sustained a more honorable military reputation, or a more estimable private character. On the occasion of his death a *Discourse* was delivered to the troops whom he had commanded, by the Reverend Israel Evans, chaplain to the New Hampshire brigade.

knowledge, by the route which Colonel Tilghman will point out; and any thing, that it may be interesting for Congress immediately to know, you will transmit to them. I am, &c.*

TO ABRAHAM SKINNER, DEPUTY COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF PRISONERS.

Head-Quarters, 17 September, 1780.

SIR,

It having been agreed, that an interview should take place at Elizabethtown between Major-Generals Phillips and Lincoln on the subject of their exchange, I was induced, from the earnest desire I had of relieving the prisoners on both sides, so far as circumstances would admit, and in compliance with the directions of Congress, to inform his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton on the 26th ultimo, that "I should direct our commissary of prisoners to attend at Elizabethtown at the same time, who would be instructed to execute with the commissary on his part, if he should think proper to send him, an exchange of officers, prisoners of war, on the footing of equal rank, or composition, so far as the number in our hands would admit, and to include also the whole of the officers of convention on parole at New York, or in Europe." The interview between the two Generals is to be on the 19th instant, when

* The morning orders on the 17th were issued in the name of General Washington. The following are General Greene's "*after-orders*" for the same day. "His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, going to be absent from the army a few days, the knowledge of which may possibly reach the enemy, and encourage them to make some movement in consequence thereof; the General desires the officers of all ranks to be in perfect readiness to meet them on the shortest notice, and recommends to the out-guards to be very vigilant and attentive, and the patroles active and watchful."

Sir Henry Clinton has informed me in answer to my letter, that "his commissary should attend."

You will, therefore, proceed to Elizabethtown, and meet the commissary on the part of Sir Henry Clinton, or other officer deputed by him, with whom you will make, or endeavour to make, under the restrictions and exceptions heretofore mentioned, an exchange of all the enemy's officers, who are prisoners of war in our hands, and also of all the officers of convention on parole in New York, or in Europe, for an equal number of ours of like rank, according to the order of their captivity; and, when the principle of equal rank will not apply, you will exchange them on the footing of composition; confining the composition to officers only; and according to the value or tariff treated of and judged reasonable by the commissioners at the last meeting at Amboy. In the exchange on the principle of composition, our officers next in rank to those belonging to the enemy's army, who cannot be exchanged on the principle of equality, are to be included, and in the order of their captivity.

The above are the general rules, by which you are to conduct yourself in the execution of the proposed business, and which are to operate only in general with respect to our officers, prisoners in this quarter, and for their benefit, whose long captivity gives them a claim to the public's first attention. There is, however, besides the exchange, which it is hoped Major-General Lincoln will effect of himself, either for Major-General Phillips or Major-General Riedesel, and which falls within the principle of equality, the case of Brigadier-General Duportail, whose release, being particularly directed by Congress, must be attempted and effected, either upon one or the other of the foregoing principles, though it would be best if it could be obtained on that of com-

position. The case of Lieutenant-Colonels Ramsay and Connolly is also to be particularly attended to, for the reasons formerly given, and likewise Colonel Webb's, if the several officers taken in the Eagle packet are comprehended in your transactions, which, upon every principle of justice, ought to be the case. If there are any other instances of exchanges out of the general and customary line, about which you have received any orders from Congress or the Board of War, you must of course regard them and comply with their directions, or at least endeavour to carry them into execution.

You are perfectly acquainted with all the circumstances respecting violators of parole, and know who have been adjudged such, and who have not, and the order and manner in which they are to be accounted; and also the characters for whom we do not conceive ourselves accountable. It is therefore unnecessary for me to observe further respecting these, than that the instructions, which you have had repeatedly concerning them, are to govern you on the present occasion. We have in Canada a Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey, a prisoner belonging to the Massachusetts line, who was taken at Cherry Valley on the 11th of November, 1778. He is to be added to your list of lieutenant-colonels, and exchanged whenever it comes to his turn, having regard to the time of his captivity. You will also recollect the captains, who are hostages, and endeavour to obtain their release.

An exchange of all the officers, prisoners of war in our hands, and also of all the convention officers on parole in New York or Europe, is what is earnestly wished. But if you find that you cannot make it so general as to comprehend the whole, make it as extensive as you can. You will report your proceedings

to me and the exchanges you may make, specifying the names and rank of the officers on both sides. I have mentioned your instructions to Major-General Lincoln, who will facilitate the objects to which they extend, so far as he can, by endeavouring to get General Phillips to countenance the business either wholly or partially, if it should be necessary.

I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO COLONEL WADE, AT WEST POINT.

Head-Quarters, Robinson's House, 25 September, 1780.†

SIR,

General Arnold is gone to the enemy. I have just now received a line from him, enclosing one to Mrs. Arnold, dated on board the Vulture. From this circumstance, and Colonel Lamb's being detached on some business, the command of the garrison, for the

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* Mr. Skinner met the British commissary, but they could not agree upon any plan of exchange within the range of the above instructions. Mr. Loring, the British commissary, said the proposals would be accepted if the privates then prisoners in New York were included. On the 8th of October, General Washington wrote to Sir Henry Clinton; "This is perfectly agreeable to me, and I have accordingly directed our commissary to take the most effectual and immediate measures to carry into execution the exchange as well of those privates as of the officers."

† According to his previous arrangements Washington left the camp on the 18th of September, and the same evening crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry. Arnold went down the river, and met him there, but returned the next morning to Robinson's House. Washington pursued his journey to Hartford, had an interview with the French commanders as proposed, and reached West Point in the morning of the 25th, on his way back to camp. Meantime André had been captured, and Arnold had deserted to the enemy. All the details relating to these events are fully and accurately narrated in SPARKS's *Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold*, contained in the *Library of American Biography*, Vol. III. See likewise the official letters and other papers in the APPENDIX, No. VII.

present, devolves on you. I request, that you will be as vigilant as possible; and, as the enemy may have it in contemplation to attempt some enterprise, even to-night, against these posts, I wish you to make, immediately after the receipt of this, the best disposition you can of your force, so as to have a proportion of men in each work on the west side of the river. You will see me or hear from me further to-morrow.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL EBENEZER GRAY.

Robinson's House, 25 September, 7 o'clock, P. M., 1780.

SIR,

From some intelligence I have received, I think it necessary, that the regiment at present under your command should march without a moment's delay. You will therefore, on the receipt of this, put it in motion, and with one half of it you will occupy the north and middle redoubt on the heights above this place, as soon as possible. The other half will proceed to the landing-place above Mandeville's, near the old Connecticut encampment, and will cross the river to West Point immediately after their arrival.

I am, Sir, with great regard, &c.*

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* At the same time the above letter was written, another was despatched to Colonel James Livingston, who commanded at Verplanck's Point and Stony Point, and to whom Washington wrote in the following laconic manner. "I wish to see you here immediately, and request that you will come without the least delay." Colonel Lamb was ordered to take the command of the posts in Colonel Livingston's absence. He also wrote to the officer commanding a wood-cutting party at Staatsburg; "I request that you will, on receipt of this, march with the wood-cutting detachment under your command to Fishkill, where you will remain till further orders." To Major Low, of the Massachusetts levies, who was stationed at Fishkill, he wrote; "You will be pleased to march early

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN JAMESON.

Robinson's House, 25 September, 7 o'clock, P. M., 1780.

SIR,

I wish every precaution and attention to be paid, to prevent Major André from making his escape.* He will without doubt effect it if possible; and, in order that he may not have it in his power, you will send him under the care of such a party and so many officers, as to preclude him from the least opportunity of doing it. That he may be less liable to be recaptured by the enemy, who will no doubt make every effort to regain him, he had better be conducted to this place by some upper road, rather than by the route of Crompond. I would not wish Mr. André to be treated with insult; but he does not appear to stand upon the footing of a common prisoner of war; and therefore he is not entitled to the usual indulgences, which they receive, and is to be most closely and narrowly watched. General Arnold, before I arrived here, went off to-day to the enemy, and is on board the Vulture sloop of war. I am, Sir, &c.†

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to-morrow morning with all the militia under your command, and proceed to the landing opposite to West Point. You will send an officer to this place, by whom you will receive further orders. Colonel Gouvion, the bearer of this, will apply to you for an officer and a small party of men. These you will furnish." All these letters were dated at half past seven o'clock in the evening. Colonel Gouvion was sent to arrest Joshua H. Smith, who was then at Fishkill, and the guard was designed for that object, and to conduct him to West Point.

* A letter written by Major André in his own name to General Washington, on the 24th of September, had been received before the date of the above letter.

† Major André and Joshua H. Smith were brought to Robinson's House on the morning of the 26th of September, the former from Colonel Sheldon's quarters in Lower Salem, and the latter from Fishkill. They were sent over separately to West Point the evening of the same day.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Robinson's House, 25 September, half past 7 o'clock, P. M., 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I request, that you will put the division on the left in motion as soon as possible, with orders to proceed to King's Ferry, where, or before they arrive there, they will be met with further orders. The division will come on light, leaving their heavy baggage to follow. You will also hold all the troops in readiness to move on the shortest notice. Transactions of a most interesting nature, and such as will astonish you, have been just discovered. I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

Head-Quarters, Robinson's House, 26 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I arrived here yesterday, on my return from an interview with the French general and admiral, and have been witness to a scene of treason, as shocking as it was unexpected. General Arnold, from every circumstance, had entered into a plot for sacrificing West Point. He had an interview with Major André, the

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* General Greene was now at Tappan. The above letter reached him in the night, and the left wing of the army immediately commenced its march towards King's Ferry.

Before this order came to the hands of General Greene, he had received intelligence of what had happened, as will appear by the following letter from Hamilton to General Washington. As soon as the escape of Arnold was ascertained, Hamilton was despatched from Robinson's House to Verplanck's Point, with orders to intercept and seize Arnold, should he not already have passed below King's Ferry. In writing to Washington, after his arrival at Verplanck's Point, Hamilton said;

"You will see by the enclosed, that we are too late. Arnold went by

British adjutant-general, last week at Joshua H. Smith's, where the plan was concerted. By an extraordinary concurrence of incidents André was taken while on his return, with several papers in Arnold's hand-writing, that proved the treason. The latter unluckily got notice of it before I did, went immediately down the river, got on board the Vulture, which brought up André, and proceeded to New York. I found the post in the most critical condition, and have been taking measures to give it security, which I hope will be to-night effectual. With the greatest respect and regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Robinson's House, 26 September, 1780.

Dear Sir,

In the present situation of things, I think it necessary that you should join the army, and request that you will do it. You will come to head-quarters. The route through Litchfield will be the most eligible for you on account of security, and you may direct your baggage to halt at Fishkill for your further orders. I write to the Count de Rochambeau by this conveyance; and I trust that your coming away now will not be attended with any material inconvenience to him.

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water to the Vulture. I shall write to General Greene, advising him, without making a bustle, to be in readiness to march, and even to detach a brigade this way; for, though I do not believe the project will go on, it is possible Arnold has made such dispositions with the garrison, as may tempt the enemy in its present weakness to make the stroke this night, and it seems prudent to be providing against it. I shall endeavour to find Meigs, and request him to march to the garrison; and shall make some arrangements here. I hope your Excellency will approve these steps, as there may be no time to be lost." — *MS. Letter, September 25th.*


OPERATIONS
ON
HUDSON'S RIVER.
Fishkill
Head Qrs.
Fredericksburg
Newburg
Washington's Hd. Qrs.
New Windsor
Encampment
Landing
Fishkill Cr.
Butter Hill
Fort Constitution
Ft. Putnam
Buttermill Falls
West Pt.
Robinsons House
Sugar Loaf Hill
Mahopac Pond
Continental Village
Peekskill Cr.
Anthony's Nose
Ft. Montgomery
Ft. Clinton
Independence
Peekskill
Crompond
French Army
Salem
Verplanck's Pt.
American Army
Dunderberg
Stony Pt.
Smith's House
Haverstraw
Croton River
Pine's Bridge
New Bridge
North Castle
André Landed
Vulture
Landing
Singsing
Nyack
HUDSON'S RIVER
André taken
Tarry Town
Bronx R.
White Plains
Tappan
Dobbs Ferry
American Army
French Army
Miles

I cannot conclude, without informing you of an event, which has happened here, and which will strike you with astonishment and indignation. Major-General Arnold has gone to the enemy. He had had an interview with Major André, adjutant-general of the British army, and had put into his possession a statement of our army, of the garrison at this post, of the number of men considered as necessary for the defence of it, a return of the ordnance, and the disposition of the artillery corps, in case of an alarm. By a most providential interposition, Major André was taken in returning to New York, with all those papers in General Arnold's handwriting, who, hearing of the matter, kept it secret, and left his quarters immediately, under the pretence of going over to West Point on Monday forenoon, about an hour before my arrival; then pushed down the river in the barge, which was not discovered till I had returned from West Point in the afternoon; and, when I received the first information of Major André's captivity, measures were instantly taken to apprehend General Arnold; but, before the officers, sent for the purpose, could reach Verplanck's Point, he had passed it with a flag, and got on board the Vulture ship of war, which lay a few miles below. He knew of my approach, and that I was visiting, with the Marquis, the north and middle redoubts, and from this circumstance was so straitened in point of time, that I believe he carried with him but very few if any material papers, though he has a very precise knowledge of the affairs of the post. The gentlemen of General Arnold's family,* I have the greatest reason to believe, were not

* Colonel Franks and Colonel Varick were General Arnold's aids-de-camp, but they had no knowledge or suspicion of his treasonable designs, till he had escaped to the enemy.

privy in the least degree to the measures he was carrying on, nor to his escape. I am, dear Sir, with very great esteem and regard, your, &c.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Head-Quarters, near West Point, 26 September, 1780.

SIR,

On my arrival here a very disagreeable scene unfolded itself. By lucky accident, a conspiracy of the most dangerous nature, the object of which was to sacrifice this post, has been detected. General Arnold, who has sullied his former glory by the blackest treason, has escaped to the enemy. This is an event that occasions me equal regret and mortification; but traitors are the growth of every country, and in a revolution of the present nature, it is more to be wondered at, that the catalogue is so small, than that there have been found a few. The situation of the army at this time will make General Heath's presence with us useful. I have written to him for this purpose. I hope his removal will be attended with no inconvenience to your Excellency. With the greatest regard, I am, &c.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Robinson's House, in the Highlands, 26 September, 1780.

SIR,

I have the honor to inform Congress, that I arrived here yesterday, about twelve o'clock, on my return from Hartford. Some hours previous to my arrival, Major-General Arnold went from his quarters, which were at this place, as it was supposed over the river to the

garrison at West Point; whither I proceeded myself, in order to visit the post. I found General Arnold had not been there during the day, and on my return to his quarters he was still absent. In the mean time a packet had arrived from Lieutenant-Colonel Jameson, announcing the capture of a John Anderson, who was endeavouring to go to New York, with several interesting and important papers, all in the handwriting of General Arnold.* This was also accompanied with a letter from the prisoner, avowing himself to be Major John André, adjutant-general of the British army, relating the manner of his capture, and endeavouring to show that he did not come under the description of a spy. From the several circumstances, and information that the General seemed to be thrown into some degree of agitation on receiving a letter, a little time before he went down from his quarters, I was led to conclude immediately, that he had heard of Major André's captivity, and that he would if possible escape to the enemy; and I accordingly took such measures, as appeared the most probable, to apprehend him. But he had embarked in a barge, and proceeded down the river under a flag to the Vulture sloop-of-war, which lay some miles below Stony and Verplanck's Points. After he got on board, he wrote to me a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy.

Major André is not arrived yet, but I hope he is secure, and that he will be here to-day. I have been and am taking proper precautions, which I trust will prove effectual, to prevent the important consequences, which this conduct on the part of General Arnold was intended to produce. I do not know the party, that took Major André, but it is said to have consisted only

* The papers contained in André's boots, copies of which were sent to Congress.

of militia, who acted in such a manner, as does them the highest honor, and proves them to be men of great virtue. They were offered, I am informed, a large sum of money for his release, and as many goods as they would demand, but without any effect. Their conduct gives them a just claim to the thanks of their country, and I also hope they will be otherwise rewarded. As soon as I know their names, I shall take pleasure in transmitting them to Congress. I have taken such measures, with respect to the gentlemen of General Arnold's family, as prudence dictated; but, from every thing that has hitherto come to my knowledge, I have the greatest reason to believe they are perfectly innocent. I early secured Joshua H. Smith, the person mentioned in the close of General Arnold's letter, and find him to have had considerable share in this business. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING AT WEST POINT.

Robinson's House, 27 September, 1780.

SIR,

You will immediately make a distribution of the troops under your command to the several posts, that the whole may be in a state of defence at the shortest notice. You will also have each work supplied with ten days' provision, wood, water, and stores, and keep up constantly that supply; and you will take every other precaution for the security of the post. The enemy will have acquired from General Arnold a perfect knowledge of the defences, and will be able to take their measures with the utmost precision. This makes it essential, that our vigilance and care should be redoubled for its preservation. You will do every thing

in your power to gain information of the enemy's designs, and give me intelligence, as early as possible, of any movement against you. A party of militia, who have been employed cutting wood, and another as guards to the stores at Fishkill, that have been called in, are to return to their destinations. Colonel Gouvion will remain a few days at this post, to assist in the necessary arrangements. I am, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Robinson's House, 27 September, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I have concluded to send to camp to-morrow Major André of the British army, and Mr. Joshua H. Smith, who has had a great hand in carrying on the business between him and Arnold. They will be under an escort of horse, and I wish you to have separate houses in camp ready for their reception, in which they may be kept perfectly secure; and also strong, trusty guards trebly officered, that a part may be constantly in the room with them. They have not been permitted to be together, and must be still kept apart. I would wish the room for Mr. André to be a decent one, and that he may be treated with civility; but that he may be so guarded as to preclude a possibility of his escaping, which he will certainly attempt to effect, if it shall seem practicable in the most distant degree. Smith must also be carefully secured, and not treated with asperity. I intend to return to-morrow morning, and hope to have the pleasure of seeing you in the course

* On the day that the above instructions were written, General Mc Dougall was directed to take the command at West Point, till the arrival of General St. Clair.

of the day. You may keep these several matters secret. I write to Mr. Tilghman. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR.

Instructions.

Sir,

You will repair forthwith to West Point, and take the command of that post with its dependencies till further orders. The troops under your command will consist of the Pennsylvania division, Colonels Meigs's and Livingston's regiments of Continental troops, and a body of Massachusetts and New Hampshire militia. The enclosed is a copy of the instructions left for the commanding officer, which you will please to observe. Unless you should think it necessary, for the immediate security of the post, to draw the first Pennsylvania brigade nearer to West Point, I should wish it to remain somewhere in its present position, as it may then, at the same time, serve the purpose of reinforcing the main army, in case of a movement against it. But, on the first appearance of the enemy coming in force up the river, that brigade should have previous orders to march to your succour.

Orders have been given, in the case last mentioned, for the posts of Verplanck's and Stony Points to be evacuated, with all the cannon and stores, and the garrison added to that at West Point. But I would not wish this step to be precipitated; as, in case of an attempt to surprise you, these posts will not only be useful to give you the alarm, but they will probably, in all cases, gain you time, as the enemy would hardly venture to pass them with transports full of troops. The baggage and extra stores may be sent off at the

first aspect of a serious movement; but the troops should not evacuate until the enemy are in a situation to invest the posts. Dobbs's Ferry may also serve you as an out-post; but care must be taken to distinguish the firing against a single vessel passing, from that against a number, which will of course be more continued. Great vigilance should be used in patrolling on the east side of the river, as it would otherwise be easy for the enemy to land a body of men below, and surprise Verplanck's Point. I must entreat your particular care of the boats on the river; to keep them in repair, and as much as possible collected. All those at King's Ferry, more than are wanted for the necessary service of the communication, should be moved up the North River. A part of the militia at Verplanck's and Stony Points may also be drawn to the main garrison. Given at Head-quarters, Tappan, October 1st, 1780.

TO JOHN MATHEWS, IN CONGRESS.

Tappan, 4 October, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR,

I thank you much for your kind communications, which are rendered more pleasing as they are offered without reserve. As Congress has already allowed the alternative of raising men for twelve months, opinions on the propriety of the measure can be of no avail; but since you have done me the honor to ask mine, I have no scruple in declaring, that I most firmly believe the independence of the United States never will be established, till there is an army on foot for the war; and that, if we are to rely on occasional or annual levies, we must sink under the expense, and ruin must follow.

From an opinion, which seems to have influenced Congress, that men cannot be drafted for the war, (but which, with due deference to their judgment, I think is a mistaken one, as it seems to be a prevailing sentiment I have heard, that nothing but an army on a permanent footing will do,) gentlemen unacquainted with the true state of facts, and struck with the magnitude of the bounty, which in the first instance must be given to induce men to engage for this period; without attending to the sum which is given for a year's service (perhaps in reality for a much less time, though a year may be mentioned as the ostensible term); without reflecting that this sum is more than doubled at every new enlistment; without considering the immense waste of arms, ammunition, stores, and camp utensils, incidental to these changes; without adverting to the pay and subsistence of two sets of men at the same instant, the old and new levies, and the expense of marching and countermarching them to and from camp; without taking into the account the interruption, which agriculture and all kinds of handicraft meet with, by which our supplies are lessened and the prices considerably increased; and, which is of the greatest importance, without considering the difference between a healthy army, which is generally the case of one composed of old soldiers, and a sickly one, which is commonly the case with respect to the new, and the lives lost in acquiring a seasoning; and without considering that, in all exchanges of privates prisoners of war, we give the enemy a certain permanent force, and add but little and sometimes nothing to our own strength, as the terms of service of those we receive in exchange are already expired, or terminate often soon after; — without attending, I say, to these things, which are remote, and require close investigation and a recurrence

to the public expenditures to be masters of them, they conclude, that the bounty necessary to engage men for the war is beyond our abilities, reject it, and adopt another system, which involves ultimately ten times the expense and infinitely greater distress. While, in the one case, we should have a well disciplined army, ready at all times and upon all occasions to take advantage of circumstances; in the other, the most favorable moments may pass away unimproved, because the composition of our troops is such, that we dare not in the beginning of a campaign attempt enterprises, on account of the rawness of the men, nor at the latter end of it, because they are about to leave us, after the immense toil and pains the officers have taken to teach them their duty, and we have another set to attend to.

From long experience and the fullest conviction, I have been and now am decidedly in favor of a permanent force; but knowing the jealousies, which have been entertained on this head (Heaven knows how unjustly, and the cause of which could never be apprehended, were a due regard had to our local and other circumstances, even if ambitious views could be supposed to exist), and that our political helm was in another direction, I forbore to express my sentiments for a time; but, at a moment when we are tottering on the brink of a precipice, silence would have been criminal. The amendment proposed by you for keeping the old levies in the field, till the new should arrive, would certainly be a most desirable thing, if it could be accomplished; but I doubt the practicability of it. For, if there is not a definite term fixed with the men, we could as easily get them for the war; and, if there were a period fixed, although the condition of a relief should be annexed to it, which more than probably would be kept as much as possible out of their sight, we never

should be able to retain them. Desertion and a general loss of public arms would be the inevitable consequence of an attempt to detain them, after they had completed what they conceived to be the term of their engagement.

I felt much pain in reading that part of your letter, which speaks of the reception of the committee of cooperation in Congress. At a time when public harmony is so essential, when we should aid and assist each other with all our abilities, when our hearts should be open to information and our hands ready to administer relief, to find distrusts and jealousies taking possession of the mind, and a party spirit prevailing, affords a most melancholy reflection, and forbodes no good. I shall always be happy to hear from you, being with the truest esteem and regard, dear Sir, &c.*

TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 4 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

I should have been happy in the information you give me, that some progress had been made in the business of raising a permanent army, had it not been intimated to me, through other channels, that in the resolutions framed on this article, the fatal alternative of *for one*

* The committee of coöperation, who had been several months with the army, and recently returned to Congress, had become unpopular with some of the members, in consequence of their strenuous endeavours to increase and render more permanent the military force. They were charged with being "too strongly tinctured with the *army principles*," which they had imbibed while absent in camp. In short, it appears from the letters of Mr. Mathews, that the spirit of party raged unusually high at this time in Congress, and not only soured the feelings of the members towards each other, but essentially obstructed the adoption of efficient measures for the public service.

year has been admitted. In my letter to Congress, of the 20th of August, I recommended a draft for the war, or for three years, and said, "A shorter period than one year is inadmissible." You will perceive, however, that the general scope of my arguments look to an army for the war. Any different idea crept in from an apprehension that this plan would not go down. The present juncture is, in my opinion, peculiarly favorable to a permanent army, and I regret that an opening is given for a temporary one. It also gives me pain to find, that the pernicious State system is still adhered to, by leaving the reduction and incorporation of the regiments to the particular States. This is one of the greatest evils of our affairs.

I share with you the pleasure you feel from the measures taking to strengthen the hands of Congress. I am convinced it is essential to our safety, that Congress should have an efficient power. The want of it must ruin us. The satisfaction I have in any successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, is always allayed by a fear that it will lull us into security. Supineness and a disposition to flatter ourselves seem to make parts of our national character. When we receive a check, and are not quite undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and, when we do gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive and expect the war immediately at an end. The history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! This winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing scene, than we have yet experienced, to the southward. I have little doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton will detach to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far from being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts.

Reflections of this kind to you, my dear Sir, are unnecessary. I am convinced you view our affairs on the same scale that I do, and will exert yourself to correct our errors and call forth our resources. The interview at Hartford produced nothing conclusive; because neither side knew with certainty what was to be expected. We could only combine possible plans on the supposition of possible events, and engage mutually to do every thing in our power against the next campaign. Happy to rank you among the number of my friends, I speak to you with confidence. With the truest esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN CADWALADER.

Head-Quarters, Tappan, 5 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

Although I have but little leisure for the gratification of private correspondence, I beg you to be assured, that, from a warmth of friendship, any letters of yours

* In reply to this letter, after speaking of the plan proposed in Congress for a new arrangement of the army, Mr. Duane said, — "I am persuaded that your Excellency's representations on this and every other subject will have as much influence as you can wish, and that, on this particular occasion, nothing but a clear conviction of impracticability will induce Congress to overrule your opinion. A false estimate of the power and perseverance of our enemies was friendly to the present revolution, and inspired that confidence of success in all ranks of people, which was necessary to unite them in so arduous a cause. You cannot forget the opinions, which were current on this floor during the first and second Congresses, and how firmly they established this error. We seem to part with it with reluctance. It still hangs heavily upon us, and has produced the indecision, the expedients, and the debility, of which you complain. I hope misfortunes and distresses will at length rouse us to just sentiments and vigorous exertions; and, with your Excellency, I pray God, that the fatal delusion, which has marked our conduct, may end here." — *MS. Letter, October 10th.*

will be gratefully accepted; and it is with much pleasure I receive fresh assurances of your regard and attachment to me. We are now drawing an inactive campaign to a close; the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a favorable complexion. I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was displaying, which would enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favorable disposition of Spain, the promised succour from France, the combined force in the West Indies, the declaration of Russia (acceded to by other governments of Europe, and humiliating to the naval pride and power of Great Britain), the superiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the Irish claims and English disturbances, formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast, which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams, that the hour of deliverance was not far distant; since, however unwilling Great Britain might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power to continue the contest. But alas! these prospects, flattering as they were, have proved delusory, and I see nothing before us but accumulating distress.

We have been half of our time without provision, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor money to form them; and in a little time we shall have no men, if we had money to pay them. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and economy. It is in vain, however, to look back, nor is it our business to do so. Our case is not desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is wisdom among our rulers. But to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army, that this army will be subsisted by State supplies, and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is in my opinion absurd,

and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion in the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it was necessary, it could be easily proved to any person of a moderate share of understanding, that an annual army raised on the spur of the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, in various ways which could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than a permanent body of men, under good organization and military discipline, which never was nor ever will be the case of new troops. A thousand arguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, might also be adduced to prove, that the army, if it is to depend upon State supplies, must disband or starve; and that taxation alone, especially at this late hour, cannot furnish the means to carry on the war. Is it not time then to retract from error, and benefit by experience? Or do we want further proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously adhered to?

You seem to regret not having accepted the appointment of Congress to a command in the American army. It is a circumstance, that ever was most sincerely regretted by me; and it is the more to be lamented, as we find an officer high in rank and military reputation capable of turning apostate and attempting to sell his country. Men of independent spirit and firmness of mind must step forth to rescue our affairs from the embarrassments they have fallen into, or they will suffer in the general wreck. I do not mean to apply this more to the military than civil line. We want the best and ablest men in both.

To tell you, if any event should ever bring you to the army, and you have no command in it equal to your merit, nor place more agreeable to your wishes than being a member of my family, that I should be happy in seeing you there, would only be announcing a truth,

which has often been repeated, and of which I hope you are convinced. My best respects attend Mrs. Cadwalader, and compliments of congratulation to both of you on the increase of your family. With sentiments of the most sincere regard and affection, I am, dear Sir, &c.*

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Head-Quarters, 6 October, 1780.

DEAR SIR,

There is no disposition that can be made of the army at this time, under our present uncertainties, that may not be subjected to material change, as you will be convinced by recurring to the conversation, which I held with you on Wednesday last. It is, as I observed to you on that occasion, a matter of great question with me, whether West Point will not become the head-quarters of the army, when we go into cantonments for the winter. I am very apprehensive, that the diminution of our present force and the little prospect of recruiting the army in season, the importance of West Point and economical motives, will compel us to concentre our force on the North River, keeping light par-

* General Cadwalader had written; — "I have now reason to wish I had accepted the command given me by Congress; but at that time I conceived that the war was near a conclusion. Many others were of the same opinion, and we flattered ourselves with expectations of a speedy peace. In this, however, I remember you widely differed in opinion. Whatever may be the event, be assured there is no person in America more firmly attached to you as commander, and to the general cause; and, should our affairs take an unfortunate turn, I shall to the last share with you the misfortunes of the times." — *September 20th.* General Washington had a strong personal regard for General Cadwalader, and confidence in his military talents, and had solicited him earnestly to accept a command in the army, when it was proffered to him by Congress.